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Stripping Away the Fictions: Interview With Mr.
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg*
Professor Wisotsky: Mr. Justice Goldberg, in the case of Wash-
ington v. Davis,1 a group of black applicants, unsuccessfully seeking
police positions on the District of Columbia Police Force, sued alleging
the entrance test, in effect, was racially discriminatory because they
failed at a rate much greater than white applicants.
The Supreme Court rejected their claim, saying it wasn't enough
that they failed at a greater rate; there must be some showing of an
intention to discriminate against black people. Do you agree with that
decision?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: No, I don't agree with it at all. The most
difficult thing to do is establish the intention of local officials, including
members of the state legislature. I must confess I don't know about
Florida, but most states in our union keep no record of state legislative
proceedings. There certainly are no transcripts kept of proceedings of
local authorities.
In law we normally apply a simple rule about human conduct. We
say people are presumed to intend the logical, reasonable consequences
of their act. So to me the big question is "What is the effect of the
official's action?" not "What is the motivation?"
I recall a dissent I wrote in the reapportionment case Wright v.
Rockefeller.2 I discussed our inability to probe peoples' mental re-
cesses.' We have no tools to do that, and no local official would take
the stand to say "I was racially motivated." So I would judge by effect.
These decisions seem to me a way of ducking the primary issue.
* Former Justice of the United States Supreme Court. This article was adapted
from a videotaped interview with Mr. Justice Goldberg by Professors Michael Burns,
Robert Marsel and Steven Wisotsky of the Nova University Center for the Study of
Law. The interview took place at the Law Center on Sept. 16, 1980, when Mr. Justice
Goldberg was Nova's Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law.
1. 426 U.S. 299 (1976).
2. 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 73-74.
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They resemble a situation we had when I was on the Court in Swain v.
Alabama.4 There, no black person had ever served on a jury for a white
defendant; blacks only served for a black defendant. This selective
elimination of black jurors was done through the guise of peremptory
challenges. To me it was a clear case of racial discrimination. I did not
exalt the right to exercise peremptory challenges, nowhere safeguarded
in the Constitution, over the right to equal treatment, which the Con-
stitution affords.
Professor Burns: Mr. Justice, in deciding whether females, like
blacks, should constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes,
we find ourselves attempting to compare the female experience in the
United States with the black experience. What are your observations?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Of course nothing can approximate the
way we treated the black population of this country; they were in slav-
ery. And our slavery, Professor Elkins reported in his book,5 was the
worst slavery in the North and South American continents. We permit-
ted families to be separated; children, wives and husbands were sold
separately. In South America, thanks primarily to the Jesuit Church,
that practice was not permitted, even though they had slavery.8
On the other hand, women are grossly discriminated against to
this day. As a former Secretary of Labor, I can say women are still
paid substantially less than men for the same jobs. We must recognize
that while for many centuries women were not held in physical bond-
age as slaves, there were many inhibitions against women's freedom.
It's only recently that states have begun adopting a law which
should have been long obvious: a woman can accuse her husband of
rape. We never allowed that before. So if you read the Forsyte Saga,
you recall the famous incident where this man of property, Soames
Forsyte, virtually raped his wife.8 He ruined his marriage by doing so.
Women have traditionally sustained substantial handicaps. They
4. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
5. S. ELKINS, SLAVERY (1963).
6. Id. at 69-73.
7. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(a) (Deering Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-5(b) (West Supp. 1981).
8. "Soames had exercised his rights over an estranged and unwilling wife in the
greatest-the supreme act of property." J. GALSWORTHY, THE FORSYTE SAGA 373
(Grove ed. 1935).
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were denied the right to vote until we had a constitutional amendment.'
They were denied the right to hold property in many states. Now,
much has been corrected; but there is no doubt at this very minute
women are not treated on an equal basis with men.
That being so, I believe the Court should opt for a suspect classifi-
cation. In our jurisprudence it is not necessary to absolutely equate the
enormity of black discrimination and gender discrimination. If discrim-
ination is substantial, the Court has a right to move. I regret the Court
hasn't done that. It had a duty to say the class is suspect. This doesn't
mean compelling reasons may not justify some differences: health stan-
dards and the like. But the failure of the Court to fulfill what I con-
ceive to be its constitutional duty has resulted in the Equal Rights
Amendment ° and has led me to support the amendment.
Professor Burns: One controversial focus of the women's move-
ment, shared by American blacks and Jews, among others, is the chal-
lenge to exclusionary admission policies of men's clubs. I think we can
find these clubs serve as the situs for developing male friendships and
ultimately impact on decision-making in business and government. Are
there any viable constitutional bases for challenging these admission
policies?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I would think so. I wrote an opinion once,11
trying to form a majority, in which I said one has a right to be pri-
vately prejudiced; I commented on clubs to gain support for the opin-
ion. Right now I am engaged in an effort to overcome this prejudice in
Washington's Cosmos Club, where women are only admitted as spouses
rather than in their own right. Presently, a cabinet secretary like Patri-
cia Harris cannot enter unless her husband is admitted.
. What is the constitutional basis for ending such admission polcies?
I think several factors activate fourteenth amendment prohibitions.
Most clubs enjoy tax exempt status; thus the state is involved. More-
over, clubs benefit from many municipal services, e.g., garbage collec-
tion, water service and many others; it would seem there is the requisite
degree of state involvement essential for an attack on discriminatory
treatment.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
10. U.S. CONST. proposed amend. XXVI.
11. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
555[1
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Professor Burns: The right of privacy, while now well estab-
lished, remains unenumerated and, in the minds of some, remains all
too fluid. One controversial area concerns extending the right of pri-
vacy from the traditional marriage and family context to the area of
private homosexual conduct. Do you believe laws which prohibit private
homosexual conduct violate the constitutional right of privacy?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I do, for adults and consensual relation-
ships between adults. I do not apply this rationale to children. We have
many laws where special regard is paid to children, and rightly so.
Children do not possess the judgment to make informed decisions.
Adults, unless they inflict harm on others, have the right to pursue
privacy, to pursue their own lives. Now, homosexuality is something I
personally do not favor; but I regard it as a psychological and social
problem. I don't quite agree with those who say it's a way of life which
should be endorsed, but I do agree it's a private matter between
adults. 2
Professor Burns: As a Justice known for having great respect for
personal individual liberties, and having a unique international perspec-
tive as a former United Nations ambassador, to what extent to you
believe the recent Haitian and Cuban refugees should be afforded con-
stitutonal rights?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I believe they have substantial constitu-
tional rights. As always, we must refer to the fourteenth amendment
which states: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The notable thing about
the fourteenth amendment, echoing the fifth amendment, is the term
"any person." When a person comes to our country we can, through
the application of the immigration laws, deny admission. When a per-
son enters illegally, we can deport the person.
Throughout our early history we have had great waves of immi-
gration, dating back to the founding fathers, the pilgrims. We have
12. I have been told I approved of laws of this type in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); but I did not. I did quote John
Harlan, who used the word homosexual. Id. at 499 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 553 (1961)). Often when one Justice quotes another Justice, he does it to garner
votes. Harlan liked his former dissent, and he was right in result. But I merely quoted
him in my opinion.
6
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enacted amnesty laws permitting immigrants to stay if they entered
before a certain date. But in modern times, the recent influx represents
something sui generis in our country. In spite of the Coast Guard's
disapproval, we have permitted Cubans and Haitians to enter; they're
here. In my opinion we cannot regard them as illegal immigrants. We
are in large part a nation of political refugees; it's our heritage.
Except for a hard core criminal element, who arrived through false
pretenses and have been segregated, the Cubans and Haitians who have
arrived are now within our jurisdiction. I would brush aside the techni-
cality of whether they're permanent residents or not. We have admitted
them; and having admitted them the fourteenth amendment applies.
I'd like to illustrate by a simple analogy. Could anybody deny that
if a Cuban or Haitian were charged with a criminal offense he would
be entitled to the constitutional safeguards of a fair trial, the appoint-
ment of counsel, and the other constitutional guarantees? Of course he
would be entitled to them. So I believe in facing this new situation we
should say, and I hope the Court would say, the immigration laws ap-
ply but are subject to the fourteenth amendment. We've allowed the
people to enter and we must give them constitutional safety.
I would like to make another point. I see no basis for distinguish-
ing between Cuban and Haitian refugees. The fourteenth amendment
says no person in our jurisdiction shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws. The Cubans or Haitians, once here, should be treated
equally.
Professor Burns: Mr. Justice, constitutional law students, and I
include myself, have never fully understood the ebb and flow in popu-
larity of the three prongs of the fourteenth amendment. Some have
suggested the equal protection clause has been stretched as far as will
be tolerated, and the privileges or immunities clause is being rejuve-
nated. What do you think?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Well, I take the amendment as a whole; I
do not like the idea that one part is preferred to another part. Indeed I
would have overruled the Slaughter-House Cases13 which virtually
wrote the privileges or immunities clause out of the Constitution. That
clause means something; every word in the Constitution means some-
thing. I do not prefer the clause of the fourteenth amendment which
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
7
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says "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the citizens" over the clause which says
"persons," as I said earlier. I believe every person legally in our coun-
try, or recognized to be here, is entitled to all constitutional safeguards.
Professor Wisotsky: Mr. Justice Goldberg, the public opinion
polls show a large proportion of Americans support capital punishment.
In the face of that support, would you be prepared to rule the death
penalty . . unconstitutional?14
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I think it's clearly unconstitutional. The
fact that a transient majority will, from time to time, say yes or no does
not determine constitutional questions. About fifteen years ago a poll
showed that Americans, by an overwhelming number were prepared to
repeal the whole Bill of Rights. Watergate later brought the American
public to recognize the Bill of Rights is designed for the protection of
all of us, against government and against majorities.
The arguments against capital punishment were pretty well devel-
oped in Great Britain by the Royal Commission. 5 Its finding was a
simple one, unexpected by many advocates of abolition. After close
scrutiny of Great Britain's experience, the Commission found that the
death penalty neither deterred nor failed to deter people from commit-
ting crimes. The deterrent element could be neither sustained nor
defeated.
This is basically what I found in my own analysis expounded in
Rudolph v. Alabama,8 the first decision where a Justice expressed
doubts about the death penalty. I agree with the Commission because
most murders are family murders, or are due to drunkenness, drugs or
passion. Members of the criminal syndicate are rarely indicted for mur-
der, although they are indicted for drugs or other offenses. Without
conclusive, compelling proof that the death penalty actually deters
murder-a basic requirement, it seems to me, in the administration of
criminal justice-it should not be imposed, because of the finality of
the penalty.
14. The Gallup Poll, Nov. 12-15, 1980, taken nationally, returned the following
figures: In favor of the Death Penalty for murderers ... 54%
Opposed to the Death Penalty ... 43%
Don't Know ... 3%
15. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 (1953).
16. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
8
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Also, for me, the institutionalization of taking human life by the
state is a dreadful thing. It puts the state's imprimatur upon killing. I
would have thought as a result of the Vietnam War, and our reflections
upon that terrible incident in American history, we have had too much
killing and should follow a different path.
Professor Marsel: Mr. Justice, turning to the first amendment,
just a few years ago there was a planned Nazi march in Skokie, Illi-
nois. Do you believe this sort of thing is protected by the first
amendment?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: No, I don't, not under the precedents. In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,17 Justice Murphy, writing for the
whole Court, said there are such things as fighting words which are not
protected. He referred back to Justice Holmes' famous statement "you
shall not call fire in a crowded theater."18 In Chaplinsky, the whole
Court, including Justices Black and Douglas, decided the words "you're
a damn fascist," and "you're a damn racketeer"1 9 were outside the am-
bit of first amendment protection.
People express themselves in various ways, by words and by cer-
tain types of conduct. I regard marching with Nazi uniforms in a
predominantly Jewish neighborhood consisting of a large number of
refugees to be the equivalent of fighting words. But in deference to the
first amendment, I say the marchers must be afforded a suitable way to
express their message, benighted as it is. They don't have to march in
that particular area; they can march elsewhere. Unless we overrule
Chaplinsky, the Court's decision governs in spades.
Professor Marsel: Mr. Justice, you mentioned Justice Black. He
said he had an absolutist view of the first amendment.20 Do you agree
with that? How do you reconcile that view with the "time, place and
manner" restrictions? 21
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Justice Black was my dear friend and I
don't think he had an absolutist view. He said he did, but Chaplinsky
17. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
18. Id. at 571 n.2 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
19. 315 U.S. at 574.
20. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 & n.10 (1961) (Black,
J., dissenting).
21. E.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 311 (1974); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941).
9
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showed he did not. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners2 2 Black
recognized the right of bar associations to investigate people, but not
for political reasons. The first amendment has never been construed to
cover only political speech, as Dr. Meiklejohn argued. 3 I think it was
originally designed for that, but we soon recognized the difficulty of
separating novels and other works from political tracts. Gulliver's
Travels is a political document. So are Charles Dickens' books. So is
John Steinbeck's work. You can find examples through the whole his-
tory of literature.
Where Justice Black and Justice Douglas asserted absolutist views
most vigorously in more recent years was in the obscenity area. These
Justices have, in effect, said: since Congress shall make no law, and
since the fourteenth amendment applies the prohibition to the states,
anything goes. Well of course, our founding fathers would shudder to
discover that they, those puritans, countenanced obscenity in the Con-
stitution. The only real justification for Douglas' and Black's position is
not absolutism, as they say, because their own record in Chaplinsky
proves otherwise; it is the inability of the Court to define the word "ob-
scene." Most obscenity cases involve criminal statutes; people are enti-
tled to reasonable notice of what is obscene. Justice Stewart said: I
don't know how to define it, "[b]ut I know it when I see it." '24 That's a
very poor test for constitutional adjudication.
So again, we're in an area, like the homosexual area, where, like it
or not, we may have to allow a large amount of freedom for adults. But
not for children, who are much more impressionable than adults.
The Supreme Court muddied the waters by its so-called local com-
munity standards.25 With all due respect to the Court, that's absurd in
my opinion. The Constitution of the United States applies throughout
the country. You cannot have one constitutional rule in Fort Lauder-
dale and another constitutional rule in San Francisco. That would be
an absurdity. And the absurdity was demonstrated with the film, Car-
nal Knowledge. The Justices were confronted with a movie which they
all recognized as not obscene under any standard of the test, so they
22. 353 U.S. 232 (1957); see also Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
23. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment'is an Absolute, 1961 SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 245, 249 (Kurland ed. 1961).
24. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
10
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applied a national standard. 6
It seems to me there can be only one standard, a national stan-
dard. Although I supported the Roth test, the "utterly without redeem-
ing social importance" test,27 today, upon more mature reflection, I
would say adults should be able to do what they want in the obscenity
area. But this does not apply to children.
Professor Wisotsky: Mr. Justice, continuing our inquiry about
the first amendment, there is a lot of friction between members of the
public and certain religious groups, such as Hari Krishnas, members of
the Unification Church and others who solicit and proselytize in public
places such as airports. Do you think they are within their rights or do
members of the public have a right not to be distfirbed?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I have never understood this argument, to
be very frank. I don't think there is a first amendment right for any
religious group to solicit contributions in an airport. I think they have a
right to do it on the public sidewalk. On this point we are unanimous in
Cox v. Louisiana.28 I said there is no constitutional right to hold a
street meeting at rush hour in the middle of Times Square if another
place is provided, such as Central Park or elsewhere, where any group
can exercise its protest and right of free speech.29
Now an airport is designed for passengers, and it is often crowded.
Passengers have a right to accomplish their business; the airport has a
right to conduct its business. If the Hari Krishnas have a right to solicit
there, then the Catholic Church would have the right to conduct a
Mass at an airport, which would run afoul of the first amendment's
provisions about establishment of a religion. Or a Jewish group would
have a right to assemble a minyan, a proper number of men, and con-
duct a prayer service. That's not what airports are for.
Let me put it another way: an airport is a government sanctioned
building supported by law. There are many government buildings. I
was Secretary of Labor, as I said earlier. I can see no first amendment
right to have the same groups solicit in the lobby of the Department of
Labor Building. That building is devoted to the business provided by
26. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
27. 354 U.S. at 484.
28. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
29. Id. at 554.
11
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law, to carry on the functions of the Department of Labor, to protect
working people, and to administer statutes designed for the protection
of labor. Airport buildings are for air transportation. Airports have
enough problems, including security problems; we shouldn't permit
these solicitors to become an impediment to the flow of commerce. The
last time I was in an airport I found six groups soliciting. And I found
posters stating the airport disclaimed any support, but was required to
allow these groups to exercise their first amendment rights.
I think this is a time, place and manner problem. As long as a
reasonable place is provided for these groups to solicit and proselytize,
the airport should be devoted to the business of selling tickets, process-
ing long lines of people, and boarding passengers on the planes.
Professor Marsel: Mr. Justice, Justice Frankfurter was a great
exponent of judicial restraint. What's your assessment of his
philosophy?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I never believed very much in that philos-
ophy, because it is not a philosophy of general application. There is
great room for judicial restraint in the form of non-intervention with
social and economic legislation. It's not the business of the courts to
decide those matters reserved to Congress and the states. As we said
when I was on the Court, in Ferguson v. Skrupka,30 the Court is not a
super legislature. There is a non-intervention policy beyond judicial
restraint.
On the other hand, there is an area where the courts are compelled
to intervene, and intervene actively, and that area is protection.of the
fundamental rights, guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, of those who
live in our country. That's why the Bill of Rights was adopted. There's
no excuse for not being an activist in protecting those constitutional
rights.
The Bill of Rights is lawyers' material, judges' material. Lawyers
and judges understand the legal process, the right of counsel and the
right of fair trial. Essentially the Bill of Rights is a number of procedu-
ral provisions. But the Court has had trouble with the one substantive
provision of the Bill of Rights, the first amendment, in obscenity cases
and establishment of religion cases.
But I actually distrust judicial activism. I prefer judicial courage
30. 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
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to vindicate rights. The most activist Court in the history of the Su-
preme Court, the 1930 Court, was also the most erroneous. Among the
worst decisions of the Supreme Court are those in which the 1930
Court invalidated all of the New Deal legislation until Justice Roberts
switched his vote.
Professor Marsel: It sounds as if you've been describing the role
the Supreme Court is supposed to play in the United States. Perhaps
you can compare what the Warren Court did with what the Burger
Court did. How do you assess the two courts?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I would say the indicia of the Warren
Court was its willingness to be forthright in protection of fundamental
rights, starting with Brown v. Board of Education,31 Fay v. Noia,3 2 the
habeas corpus decision, Reynolds v. Sims, 33 and others. The character-
istic of those decisions was not merely judicial courage. Many people,
Frankfurter among them, thought the court should stay out of the po-
litical thicket on reapportionment. But we entered the political thicket;
there's nothing new about that. De Tocqueville said the judicial resolu-
tion of political questions is fundamental in our republic.34 In America
there's scarcely a question which goes to court that isn't political in
nature; that's the nature of the Constitution. But the indicia of the
Warren Court was not only courage in vindicating human rights. It
was realism: Brush aside legal fictions.
For example, in Betts v. Brady,35 the Court said a criminal defen-
dant in a felony case could defend himself. The result was that al-
though theoretically everybody had the right to counsel, the poor
couldn't exercise that right. A poor defendant had to defend himself;
counsel was not provided. We overruled that situation in the famous
case of Gideon v. Wainwright.6 We said Betts was unrealistic.
I'll give you anbther illustration of the realism of the Warren
Court. The Warren Court itself decided, in Wolf v. Colorado,37 when
evidence was tainted becuase the government acted illegally, the court
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
33. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
34. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (P. Bradley ed. 1954).
35. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
563116:1982
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would admit the evidence but would punish the constable. Some years
later the Court reviewed the situation and found nobody actually pun-
ished policemen, which may be justified. The few who were punished
were poor policemen who had overstepped the constitutional bounds
very greatly. Therefore the Warren Court, in Mapp v. Ohio,38 said the
only way to hold the government to proper standards (because as Bran-
deis said, "Government is . . .the omnipresent teacher . . . [f]or good
or evil" 39) was to adopt the rule: if evidence is illegally obtained by the
government, it is not admissible. That, in my opinion, is the nature of
the approach of the Warren Court.
The Burger Court is a departure from that concept. The pendulum
hasn't swung all the way back; but Fay v. Noia40 has been emascu-
lated. The defendant's right to have a federal court review state court
proceedings, when there is a violation of fundamental constitutional
rights, has been substantially undermined by recent decisions. I regret
that, because often in state court, there is not a full exploration of the
case, due to the nature of the counsel employed, or because the facts
haven't come sufficiently to light. By bringing habeas corpus actions
into federal court the defendant is finally afforded a full examination of
his case.
I remember a case, Townsend v. Sain,41 when I was on the Court.
A man addicted to drugs was charged with murder. According to nar-
cotics experts, an addict in the hands of authorities and doctors be-
comes quite malleable. The addict knows medical treatment can be
given or withheld. This man soon confessed to several murders in Chi-
cago, which was very convenient for the police.42 But on habeas corpus
in federal court, it was demonstrated the defendant could not have
committed several of the murders he confessed to. That case clearly
demonstrated the great benefit of exploration of the facts by an inde-
pendent federal tribunal unaffected by local considerations.
Local considerations do enter judicial proceedings; we cannot gain-
say that. In Fort Lauderdale, I see judges are elected. And I see by
38. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39. Id. at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
40. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
41. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).42. Id. at 307.
14
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their ads they also want to be reelected. Those judges cannot always
provide a full safeguard of our Constitutional rights, and that is true all
the way up to the highest court in the state. Federal review limited to
certiorari is not always adequate because the full record may not have
been developed. In Townsend we had the court record and we had evi-
dence not present in state court, that the defendant was out of the state
when several of the murders were committed.
The next area of difference between the Warren and Burger
Courts is racial segregation. The Warren Court said, in Brown v.
Board of Education," separate can never be equal. In the history of
our country that was repeatedly demonstrated. Law schools were an
early example: it was proved they were not equal. 4" At the time Texas
had no black law school and sent blacks out of the state, which is un-
thinkable today. 5  The Court found such an arrangement
unconstitutional.
We were always unanimous in civil rights cases during my period
and during most of the Warren Court period. We thought it important
to strive for a consensus, knowing racial matters create high emotions.
The present court is widely divided which I regret. It means the public
understandably becomes confused. For example, the issues of busing
schoolchildren to the suburbs and the associated zoning and tax ques-
tions are now in confusion. Citizens' civil rights are losing their solid
protection because the old unanimity which carried great weight has
been lost.
One of the principal shifts in judicial policy I regret to find hap-
pening on the Burger Court is the reemergent use of legal fictions. The
question of standing is a good example. When I was on the Court, a
criminal died in prison. His children wanted to continue his lawsuit to
vindicate the reputation of their father. Realistically, if a father has
committed a crime, his reputation does reflect on the children: Whether
we like it or not, the sins of the father are visited on the children. We
held the children could continue the suit.4 The old rule, that death
ended standing, was overruled. The Warren Court saw the children had
43. 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
44. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
45. Id. at 631-33.
46. Wetzel v. Ohio, 371 U.S. 62 (1962).
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a stake; they would argue vigorously against the state and thus the
adversary system was served.
Now there is a resurrection of defining standing narrowly. Courts
use various tests for standing, all lawyer's jargon. To me standing
should be defined as it was in the Warren period. Does the person have
a real stake in the outcome of the case? Will his stake compel him to
present the adversary position? There's no need for all the other jargon.
Professor Wisotsky: A moment ago you referred to the added
weight a unanimous decision carries. In the famous 1954 school deseg-
regation case of Brown v. Board of Education,47 Chief Justice Warren
was said to have lobbied the other Justices to achieve a unanimous
opinion. In contrast, the fragmentation of the Burger Court is widely
criticized. In another race case, Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,48 with six separate opinions, the so-called opinion of the
Court by Justice Powell speaks only for himself. Would you comment
upon the qualities of leadership a Chief Justice should have and com-
pare the leadership qualities of Chief Justices Warren and Burger.
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I strongly doubt Warren did much lobby-
ing. I was not on the Court at the time; but lobbying is generally not
very effective in the Supreme Court. The Justices of the Court are
pretty independent-minded people, and ought to be. I think the consen-
sus developed in Brown v. Board of Education was not the result of
lobbying. It was the result of a common realization the time had come
to overrule the separate but equal rule of Plessy v. Ferguson,49 to re-
move the blight of racial segregation from our society.
Going beyond your question for a moment, it has been said the
decision has not really been effective in integrating schools. There is
some merit in that position, considering the flight to the suburbs and so
on. But what is overlooked is the impact of the decision in eliminating
segregation in many other aspects of our society and in various sections
of the country. Interestingly enough, the impact may have been greater
in the South than in the North. I have a farm in Virginia, and in the
local area there was a black school and a white school. That duplica-
tion of facilities was eliminated. Since busing is natural in an agricul-
47. 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
48. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
49. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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tural community, everybody is now bused to one high school.
In Watson v. City of Memphis,"° we held that all public facilities
must be desegregated. Today that would seem to be obvious. But the
Supreme Court later heard an important case where the issue was
raised again in Mississippi. 1 I thought we decided the issue, but appar-
ently not directly. The city desegregated all public facilities, as di-
rected, but closed the swimming pool. Obviously the closing was ra-
cially motivated; but the city council claimed they hadn't the money to
run the pool or things like that. So the situation still exists.
There's a lot written about Brown, so I would like to emphasize it
hasn't achieved the total objective. But as to racial matters, I would
like to compare our country today, with all its shortcomings, with what
it was when Brown was decided. It's a tremendous diference and a
great step forward.
As far as comparing Chief Justices Warren and Burger, I can't
judge. I'm not on the Court now and I haven't experienced Burger's
leadership style. But the question relates to what I said about the inde-
pendence of Justices. I think the public and maybe the academicians
place too much stress on leadership. The Chief Justice is only first
among equals. He has the same voice; he has the same vote. He can
assign opinions if he's in the majority, and he runs the building and
presides over the judicial conference. Beyond that he doesn't affect the
vote or views of any member of the Court. Based on my own experi-
ence, I didn't see any ability to affect Justices in the Warren Court,
and I have the greatest admiration and affection and love for Chief
Justice Warren.52
Professor Marsel: You said Justices were very independent; and
50. 373 U.S. 526 (1963). Justice Goldberg believes that the crucial difference
between Watson, and Brown, is that the Goldberg opinion in Watson demanded deseg-
regation for "the here and now," 373 U.S. at 533, while the Warren opinion in Brown
laid down the less stringent standard of desegregation with "all deliberate speed". 349
U.S. at 301.
51. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). •
52. He was my 'dear' friend. When the Harvard Law Review published our vot-
ing records, Warren and I voted together more than most Justices. Note, The Supreme
Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 183 (1964); Note, The Supreme Court, 1964
Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 109 (1965).
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Justice Powell has said there are nine small law firms at the Court.53
When you were serving, did you get to know your colleagues well, both
as men and jurists?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Powell's assessment was right in one re-
spect and wrong in another. I have been senior partner of a law firm
with 180 lawyers, and I have run a small firm. A large firm is a con-
glomerate. A case revolves around a senior partner, with the aid of a
junior partner and a few associates. This group handles the case
throughout; consultation about the case with other partners is minimal
if it exists at all.
The Court has increased the number of law clerks, creating more
of a law office atmosphere. But a Justice does his work alone. He did it
alone in the Warren era, he does it alone in the Burger era. Once he
has an assignment, he works on an opinion and circulates it to see if he
can keep his majority.
There's one great difference between a law firm and the Court
which Powell overlooked: the judicial conference. In a law firm the
partners don't sit down together to vote on how to handle a case. I
think Powell overlooked that when he made the comparison.
Professor Marsel: Mr. Justice, I understand Florida is a state in
the forefront of the movement to allow cameras in the courtroom.
What do you think of this practice and what effect do you think it has
on the jurisprudence of courts?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I have been opposed to using cameras in
the courtroom ever since I was on the Warren Court; all of us were
opposed at that time including Chief Justice Warren." Our reason was
not any hostility to television. In fact we made it clear television report-
ers could stand outside and interview people; we would not interfere
with that.55 Our basic reason for banning cameras was to insure the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial.
Everybody who participates in a trial is human. Judges are
human; prosecutors are human; defense lawyers are human; witnesses
are human; jurors are human. The net result of permitting televising
53. Powell, What Justices Are Saying, 62 A.B.A.J. 1454 (1976).
54. FLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Cannon 3-A(7) (1973); Petition of Post-News-
week Stations of Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
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from a courtroom, in my opinion, is to convert a solemn trial into
entertainment.
Television is essentially an entertainment industry; television offi-
cials would readily concede that. A trial is not entertainment. It's seri-
ous business.
Viewing broadcasts of actual events is interesting for the people. I
am in favor of televising the legislature because that does not involve
any Constitutional inhibition. But in a courtroom, we can endanger a
Constitutional protection: fair trials.
We do not want to encourage people to play act; it would have
serious consequences on the legal system. We want to insure that the
jury is primarily a group of men and women who apply the law given
them by the judge, who decide the case according to the law and the
evidence.. We don't sequester all juries, and jurors talk to their neigh-
bors afterwards. Jurors don't want to look like soft-hearted knee-jerk
liberals. We don't want to put them in a position where they will decide
cases on the basis of neighborhood approval.
The same is true of judges. And witnesses too, once they take the
stand, know, even if they have not been told, the camera is focused on
them. So they also tend to act.
In my view a trial is not acting; it is serious busines.
Professor Burns: Mr. Justice, which decisions do you believe
were the most important of the Warren era?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Of course, you have to start with Brown v.
Board of Education56 as a landmark decision, followed by Reynolds v.
Sims, 57 the reapportionment case, and Gideon v. Wainwright,58 estab-
lishing the right of counsel-and injecting a concept whose scope is still
unrealized: the extent to which poverty is an element in equal protec-
tion and due process.
I would say those three; and then a fourth, the Colorado River
controversy.59 That case looms so large because it shows the power of
the Court. Seven of us heard the case. 0 I thought to myself, "this case
56. 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
57. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
58. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
59. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), reh'g denied, 374 U.S. 819
(1963).
60. Chief Justice Warren did not participate because he had been Governor of
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represents the essence of our system." California, one of the biggest
states of the union, Arizona, one of the smallest, and others, a total of
eleven states were submitting to seven fallible people the question of
allotment of the waters of the Colorado River. My reading, later con-
firmed by my international experience, showed water rights are respon-
sible for most wars in recent times. Yet it was accepted that these
seven men would determine the question. We split four to three, so four
members of the Court decided it. I have always regarded that case to
be symbolically one of the most important decisions of the Court.
Professor Marsel: As you look back over the many opinions you
wrote, sir, which do you think was the most significant?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I would say Griswold.61 I feel strongly I
was right in my concurring opinion. The area of privacy is protected by
the ninth amendment; it's important to reassert that and extend it to
the fundamental rights not specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. I think that's right historically and right on its merits.
I think Bell v. Maryland62 was an important decision. I believe the
right of equal accomodations for Americans rests on the Constitution.
We did not need a statute to that end, although fortunately Congress
did pass the statute.63 But I thought the whole constitutional concept of
equal protection afforded every American the right to equal accommo-
dations. And Watson v. City of Memphis,64 desegregating public facili-
ties, was important.
My opinion in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez65 demonstrated our
quest for legal realities, saying "forget the symbols". Academicians ar-
gued about what constituted a sanction. But a man was automatically
stripped of his citizenship because he fled the draft; I said it was uncon-
stitutional, a terrible sanction. If the government must act, indict the
person for draft evasion, a criminal violation, and let him make a de-
fense. I also said in that case that the Constitution is not a suicide
California; Justice White disqualified himself because his law firm had handled part of
the case.
61. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
62. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
63. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1964); 42
U.S.C. § 1971 (1964); §§ 1975a-1975d (1964); §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1964)).
64. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
65. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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pact;66 it affords Americans protections even during periods of national
emergency. The Court said as much in Ex parte Milligan,17 where it
stopped President Lincoln from suspending the writ of habeas corpus in
the District of Columbia in the middle of the Civil War.
Interestingly enough, I thought the opinion I wrote in United
States v. Barnett8 was important. I didn't like Barnett, I felt he was.a
racist governor. He denied James Meredith admission to Mississippi
State University, violating an injunction, and was held in criminal con-
tempt for doing so. I said he was entitled to a jury trial, but could only
get three other votes. Stripping fictions aside, my view was he would go
to jail, thus the Constitutional protections should apply. I recalled some
communists who jumped bail under the Smith Act and were sentenced
to longer sentences for criminal contempt than they would have been
under the statute for skipping bail. 9 I thought it was an important
distinction to make. The court has pretty well adopted it now, but they
did not adopt it then. °
Dean Lewis: Mr. Justice, we appreciate very much your willing-
ness to share your insights with us. Thank you.
66. Id. at 160.
67. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
68. 376 U.S. 681, 728 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 739-40.
70. E.g., Codspotti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
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Asbestos Litigation: Balancing the Interests of
Insurance Companies, Manufacturers and Victims
Introduction
Asbestosis victims file approximately 300 to 400 claims each
month.1 An estimated 12,000 to 20,000 pending asbestosis cases re-
present the largest category of claims in the area of products liability
litigation.2 Reports of this disease surfaced in the United States as
early as the 1930's,3 yet a variety of industries still utilize products
containing asbestos fibers.4 Florida courts have numerous asbestosis
cases on their dockets, and it has been predicted that the profusion of
these claims will continue for several years. Dr. Irving Selikoff, director
of Mt. Sinai Hospital Environment Sciences Laboratory in New York,
claims tens of thousands of cancer victims have not yet realized the
association of their malignancies with asbestos exposure. 5 Conse-
quently, current litigation represents a mere fraction of potential suits.
Compounding the problem are the recent decisions in White v.
Johns-Manville' and Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America7
which could dramatically increase the already overwhelming number of
asbestos related lawsuits.8 In White, the Fourth Circuit held shipyard
workers suffering from diseases caused by asbestos inhalation could
bring claims under admiralty jurisdiction which the state statute of
limitations would have otherwise barred.9 The court in Keene expanded
1. The Nat'l L.J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
2. Id. at 24, col. 1; Am. Bus., Dec. 1981, at 1, col. 3.
3. Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
4. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
5. Am. Bus., Dec. 1981, at 1, col. 4.
6. 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981).
7. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 1644
(1982).
8. The Nat'l L.J., supra note 1.
9. 662 F.2d 234.
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the liability of insurance companies, holding that the statutes of limita-
tions in asbestos cases began to run either at the time of exposure, or
the earliest manifestation of symptoms of the disease, whichever is
later. 10 Further, at least one court has suggested the application of
"market-share liability" to asbestos suits.11
Each of these decisions lays the foundation for an onslaught of
new asbestos litigation. This comment explores the basis for each deci-
sion, and examines its potential effects on future asbestos related law-
suits. An overview of the difficulties inherent in asbestos litigation is
also provided.
Perspective on Asbestos
The term asbestos encompasses a diverse group of natural miner-
als capable of separating into fibers.12 There are primarily six species of
these minerals, each having distinct characteristics.13 Durable and flex-
ible, resistant to fire and wear, asbestos is ideal for use in over 3,000
industrial products and functions.14 Workers who manufacture insula-
tion, clutch linings in cars, brake shoes, walls, tiles, floors, ironing
boards and various resistant cloths frequently suffer exposure to
asbestos.' 5
Unfortunately, exposure to asbestos fibers leads to a number of
serious, often fatal illnesses. The most common of these, asbestosis, is a
chronic fibrotic reaction in pulmonary tissue which results in severe
breathing problems.' The disease usually manifests itself between ten
and twenty-five years after initial exposure, 17 and occasionally has a
10. 667 F.2d at 1041.
11. Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1353.
12. R. SAWYER,. ASBESTOS-CONTAINING MATERIALS IN SCHOOL BUILDINGS: A
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT Part 2, 1-1-1 (1978).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1-1-2 (citing F. D. KOVER, ASBESTOS: A REVIEW OF SELECTED LITER-
ATURE THROUGH 1973 RELATING TO ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE AND HEALTH EF-
FECTS (EPA-560/2]-76-001, Office of Toxic Substances 1976)).
15. P. BEESON & W. MCDERMOTT, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 914 (13th ed.
1971).
16. Id. at 915.
17. Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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latency period of up to forty years."8 Once inhaled, asbestos fibers re-
main in the lungs causing progressive, irreversible damage. 9 As a re-
sult of the long latency period, physicians cannot determine with rea-
sonable accuracy which of the victim's exposures to the fibers caused
the onset of illness.20 This feature of the disease led to the controversy
regarding commencement of insurance liability in Keene.2'
Asbestos inhalation may also result in such malignant diseases as
lung cancer, pleural and peritoneal mesothelioma, and cancer of the
gastrointestinal organs.2 2 It has been estimated that at least fifty per-
cent of workers afflicted with asbestosis develop lung cancer.2 3 Family
members in contact with those directly exposed to asbestos fibers may
also develop pleural and peritoneal mesothelioma.24 The problem has
become so widespread that a number of United States Senate and
House members have proposed "White Lung Bills" which would estab-
lish minimum standards for state workers' compensation laws by pro-
viding "prompt, adequate, exclusive, and equitable compensation for
occupational diseases or death resulting from exposure to asbestos. ' 25
Insurance Company Liability in Asbestosis Cases
In all insurance litigation, the plaintiff must prove that an injury
or accident "occurred" within the meaning of a liability policy.26 While
most insurance contracts provide coverage for injuries within the policy
period,27 carriers often contest coverage in situations involving latent
18. 7 F. NETTER, THE CIBA COLLECTION OF MEDICAL ILLUSTRATIONS: RESPIRA-
TORY DISEASES 211 (1979).
19. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083.
20. Id.
21. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
22. Motley & Middleton, Asbestos Disease Among Railroad Workers, 17 TRIAL
38, 39-40 (1981). Mesothelioma is defined as "a malignant tumor derived from meso-
thelial tissue" (peritoneum, pleura and pericardium). DORLANDS ILLUSTRATED MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 803 (26th ed. 1981).
23. Id. at 40 (citing Lewinsohn, Health Hazards of Asbestos: A Review of Re-
cent Trends, 24 J. Soc. OccuP. MED. 2 (1974)).
24. F. NETER, supra note 18, at 211.
25. S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
26. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1386 (1956).
27. Id. at 1387. The policy issued to Keene by Hartford Accident and Idemnity
Company states:
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disease, claiming the injury occurred beyond the time limits of the
policy. 8
Advocates of the manifestation theory contend injury occurs when
symptoms of asbestosis are revealed.2" Under this approach bodily in-
jury is deemed to occur when the disease becomes apparent or when
the victim knew, or should have known, of his illness.30 Therefore, only
those insurance companies who covered the manufacturer during the
period of manifestation of the symptoms are liable for damages to the
victim.
In Porter v. American Optical Corp.,"1 the district court utilized
the manifestation theory. A victim of asbestosis sued the company
which manufactured a respirator he had used as protection against in-
halation of asbestos fibers and dust.32 The trial court held that determi-
nation of the onset of injury was based upon manifestation of the symp-
toms of asbestosis.33 The insurer providing coverage when the plaintiff's
injury became apparent was held responsible, whereas the insurers of-
fering coverage during the victim's exposure, and during the period
when the formal medical diagnosis was made, were exonerated.34 The
[t]he company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily
injury ... to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and
the company shall have th the right and duty to defend any suit against
the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury ... even if
any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent ....
Keene, 667 F.2d at 1039 (emphasis original).
28. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
29. Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1216 (6th Cir. 1980).
30. Id.
31. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981). This case is distinguishable from others cited,
since the filter manufacturer, rather than the asbestos manufacturer, is the party in-
sured. However the court stated that since the respirators were specifically used to
protect against the hazards of exposure to asbestos, the controlling principles in cases
against asbestos manufacturers should be utilized. Id. at 1144.
32. Id. at 1130-31.
33. Id. at 1131.
34. Id. The district court decision resulted in the two appeals presented. Ameri-
can Optical Corp., the manufacturer of the respirators appealed its liability, and Hart-
ford Accident and Indemnity Company appealed the decision holding it the sole insurer
liable for coverage. Id.
1576 Nova Law Journal
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Porter expressly rejected the mani-
festation theory. 35 The majority held an insurance company's liability
for bodily injury due to a cumulative disease should be apportioned
among all insurers covering the manufacturer during the "injurious ex-
posure" period.36 This reversal closely followed a decision by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc.37 The Forty-Eight Insulations Court described
asbestosis as, "a series of continuing injuries to the body, [or a] contin-
uing tort,"' 38 so that companies providing insurance coverage through-
out the period of exposure had to contribute to the victim's compensa-
tion. Five insurance companies had issued policies over the twenty year
period involved, and for some years, Forty-Eight Insulations had been
self insured.39 The court held liability for damages and defense costs
were to be pro-rated among all the companies involved, and treated
Forty-Eight Insulations as a self-insurer for the period during which it
had no commercial coverage.40 When the same court was required to
apply Ohio law in another asbestos suit,41 it determined that a cause of
action for asbestos-related disease accrued when symptoms were mani-
fested.42 This decision was in direct opposition to Forty-Eight
Insulations.
A bold departure from these approaches occurred in Keene Corp.
v. Insurance Co. of North America.4 3 From 1948 to 1972, plaintiff
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1145. The case was remanded for apportionment of coverage between
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company,
and the judgment against American Optical was affirmed. The district court judgment
absolving Continental Insurance Company of liability was also affirmed since Continen-
tal provided no coverage during Porter's exposure to asbestos fibers and his use of the
respirator. Id. at 1145-46.
37. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 1217.
39. Id. at 1213, 1215.
40. Id. at 1225. The five companies included: Insurance Company of North
America, Affiliated FM Insurance Company, Illinois National Insurance Company,
Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-
pany. Id. at 1215.
41. Clutter v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 1158.
43. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Keene Corporation manufactured thermal insulation products contain-
ing asbestos."" As a result of its employees' exposure to this compound,
Keene had been involved as a co-defender in over six thousand cases by
alleged victims of asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer.45
Throughout the period of the er'ployees' exposure, Keene was suc-
cessively issued comprehensive general liability policies by a number of
insurance companies. During litigation however, each insurer denied
coverage in whole or in part.46 Keene filed suit for a declaratory judg-
ment and damages in order to determine the liability of each insurer
with which it had contracted.47
The court rejected both the manifestation theory and the exposure
theory proposed by the insurers, and held "inhalation exposure, expo-
sure in residence, and manifestation all trigger coverage under the poli-
cies."' 48 The court's theory regarding time of injury was essentially a
combination of theories previously accepted, and provided that each in-
surer be held liable for the entire loss. 49 "When more than one policy
applies to a loss, the 'other insurance' provisions of each policy provide
a scheme by which the insurers' liability is to be apportioned. ' 5° The
manufacturer was released from liability for any damage which may
have occurred during its uninsured periods. 51 The court attempted to
44. Id. at 1038.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1039. Keene was covered by the following companies: From Dec. 1961-
Aug. 1968, Insurance Company of North America (INA); from Aug. 1967-Aug. 1968,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.; from Aug. 1968-Aug. 1971, Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co.; from Aug. 1971-Oct. 1974, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.; and Oct. 1974-
Oct. 1980, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. Id. at 1038.
47. Id. at 1039.
48. Id. at 1047. Additionally, the court defined bodily injury as any segment of
injury encompassed by asbestosis. Id.
49. Id. at 1041, 1050. This liability includes defense costs as well as indemnifica-
tion. Id. 1041.
50. Id. at 1050.
51. Id. at 1048-49. The insurance companies asserted that this decision would
allow the defendant to purchase coverage for only one year, and still be covered for a
long period of time. The court presented two reasons why this would not be the case: 1)
the longer a company has purchased insurance, the fewer number of injuries it would
be responsible for; and 2) since only one policy would apply to each injury, the insured
would only be able to collect damages from one of the several policies it purchased,
thereby benefitting the insurance companies. Id.
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satisfy the expectations of the manufacturer when it purchased the in-
surance policies, and to "give effect to the policies' dominant purpose of
indemnity."'5 2
The contracting parties for an insurance policy exchange assump-
tion of the risk of the insured's liability, for a fixed amount of money.53
An insurance contract represents an exchange of an uncertain loss
for a certain loss. In a comprehensive general liability insurance
policy, the uncertain loss is the possibility of incurring legal liabil-
ity, and the certain loss is the premium payment ..... At the
heart of the transaction is the insured's purchase of certainty-a
valuable commodity."
The manifestation theory defeats this purpose, since manufacturers
have been virtually uninsured after the onslaught of asbestos suits filed
in recent years.55 Insurance companies providing coverage during the
exposure period, but prior to manifestation of symptoms, escape liabil-
ity under this approach. Consequently manufacturers face the strong
possibility of being forced out of business from damage awards against
which they are not indemnified, depriving them of the freedom from
liability for which they bargained.
The exposure theory is equally threatening, also defeating the pur-
pose of the bargained-for contract.58 Under this approach no guarantee
of protection against future development of the disease exists. The
court held that in purchasing insurance coverage, Keene Corporation
bargained for coverage of all future liability excluding only those inju-
ries it knew or should have known existed prior to the insurance agree-
ment. 57 The court also determined the extent of protection provided
during the policy period. The majority once again focused on the prom-
52. Id. at 1041.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1045. Once it was confirmed that exposure to asbestos causes serious
disease, (late 1960's-1970's), insurance companies stopped issuing policies providing
adequate coverage for those injuries. Id.
56. Id. at 1044. Under Hartford's theory, the original exposure to asbestos fibers
constitutes the injury, and future development of the disease is merely "a consequence
of the injury." Id.
57. Id. at 1048.
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ise of certaint) upon which plaintiff had relied.8
The court's interpretation of the contracts resulted in Keene being
fully covered by each insurance policy, even if only part of the injury
occurred during the policy period. 9 The court specified however, that
only one policy could be applied to a specific injury. Keene had to se-
lect the policy from its succession of coverage to provide indemnifica-
tion for the injury in question.60 Since only one policy would be selected
to cover each injury, the insurance companies would benefit.61 If, for
example, three policies were in force throughout the victim's exposure
to asbestos fibers, two companies would be free from primary liability.
(Subject to the 'other insurance' provisions.)
Finally, the court determined the method of allocating liability for
each injury. The court simply concluded Keene could collect damages
from any company providing coverage during the time of injury, sub-
ject to the 'other insurance' provisions stated in the policy selected.62
The Keene theory exposes insurers to extraordinarily broad liabil-
ity for coverage, which could cause the downfall of numerous insurance
businesses.6 3 Paul W. MacAvoy, a Yale economist, predicts payments
to asbestos victims may total up to 90 billion dollars over the next
thirty years, and some insurers may have insufficient reserves to cover
these costs.64 This view was criticized by Floyd H. Knowlton, a Vice-
President of Travelers Insurance, who asserted that no carriers are
58. Id. at 1047-48.
59. Id. at 1048. The court holds that the policies do not provide for a reduction
of liability if only part of the injury occurs within the policy period. Additionally, it
states there is no authority for the suggestion that Keene is "self-insured" for periods
during which no other policy was in force. "There are no self-insurance policies, and we
respectfully submit that the contracts before us do not support judicial creation of such
additional insurance policies." Id. at 1049.
60. Id. at 1049-50.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1050. The court cites as an example INA's policy which provides:
When both this insurance and other insurance apply to the loss on the
same basis, whether primary, excessive or contingent, INA shall not be
liable under this policy for a greater proportion of the loss than stated in
the applicable contribution provision below. Id.
63. Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
64. Id. at 18, col. 1.
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threatened by insolvency. 5 Other commentators compare the predic-
tions of doom to those which occurred when medical malpractice insur-
ance payments soared, yet no major crisis ever materialized. 6 Others
fear that based on the Keene decision, insurers must now "reopen their
books on policies that expired 10 or 20 years ago,"'6 7 and will be unable
to project future losses as applied to latent diseases. As a result, it may
be impossible to reliably price new policies.6 8
Asbestosis in Shipyard Workers
Statutes of Limitation:
The tolling of the statute of limitations in cases involving insidious
disease depends upon determination of the onset of bodily injury.
Under the laws of several states, the statute begins to run when the
plaintiff knows, or should have known, of the cause of injury.6 9 This
approach was followed in In re Johns-Manville, wherein asbestos vic-
tims were required to file their claims within two years of the time
plaintiffs knew or should have known of the onset of their disease. °
Other states hold this identification of injury insufficient to begin run-
ning of the statute. Under the laws of Pennsylvania, the statute will not
being to run simply because plaintiff knows of his injury-he must also
be able to determine a nexus between cause and injury.7 1 Virginia law
dictates that the statute may begin to run prior to manifestation of
symptoms if expert medical testimony can pinpoint the plaintiff's time
of injury. 2
Federal Courts of Admiralty may utilize equity as an alternative
to formal statutes of limitations. Under the doctrine of laches, proof
that a plaintiff was negligent by failing to bring a timely action is an
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 18, col. 3.
68. Id.
69. In re Johns-Manville, 511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
70. Id.
71. Grabowski v. Turner & Newall, 516 F. Supp. 114, 118 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
Under Pennsylvania law a duty is imposed upon the plaintiff to use reasonable dili-
gence in informing himself of facts concerning his injury. Id.
72. Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
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affirmative defense to the complaint.7 3 Laches is premised on the as-
sumption that one has abandoned his right to recover if the claim was
unreasonably delayed, thereby causing prejudice to defendant.
Federal Court Admiralty Jurisdiction:
Pursuant to Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitu-
tion, 7 5 original jurisdiction of admiralty or maritime cases is vested in
United States district courts. The definition of "maritime cases" how-
ever, has been subject to considerable controversy.
Traditionally, locality of the event determined whether a cause of
action was maritime in nature. 8 In The Plymouth,7 7 a shipowner's
claim was given maritime status when his vessel collided with a wharf
(considered land). Paradoxically the prayer for admiralty jurisdiction
by owners of storehouses on the wharf was denied. The United States
Supreme Court held, "the jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend
upon the fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the
locality-the high seas or navigable waters where it occurred. 178 Over
one hundred years ago Justice Story held "the jurisdiction of the admi-
ralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act,"'7 9 and in
recent years the Court in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law80 upheld the
locality test. The majority in Victory Carriers, Inc. held maritime law
applicable exclusively to incidents taking place in navigable waters,
thereby denying admiralty jurisdiction in an action by a longshoreman
73. The Key City, 81 U.S. 653 (1871). The circumstances of each case must be
considered to determine whether the claim may be barred. Id. at 660.
74. Eldridge v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 54 Idaho 213, -, 30 P.2d 781, 784
(1934).
75. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States... ; to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
76. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972).
77. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
78. Id. at 36.
79. Executive Jet Aviation, 409 U.S. at 253.
80. 404 U.S. 202 (1971). The Court reasoned that although the plaintiff was
loading a ship, his injury was caused by a vehicle on land, therefore admiralty jurisdic-
tion did not apply. Id.
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who was injured on a pier by one of his own trucks."1
The Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleve-
land clearly explains that using the strict locality test can lead to un-
sound conclusions.8 2 For example, admiralty jurisdiction may at times
be denied to maritime employees, whereas utilizing the strict locality
test would allow swimmers colliding in water to bring their case under
admiralty jurisdiction. "3
Courts recognize this inequity and often consider other factors
when invoking admiralty jurisdiction." The court in Executive Jet Avi-
ation defined the parameters of admiralty jurisdiction by enacting a
two part test. The criteria established that the action must not only
encompass a maritime locality but must also "bear a significant rela-
tionship to traditional maritime activity. '8 5 The combination locality
and maritime nexus test insures admiralty jurisdiction will be inappli-
cable in a situation where the cause of action fortuitously occurs in
navigable waters.
White v. Johns-Manville:
Plaintiffs in the principal case, John W. White and four compan-
ion shipyard workers, were exposed to asbestos dust over a lengthy pe-
riod of employment, and each developed asbestosis. The district court
joined a number of complaints and issued three individual findings.
First, the court held the injuries did not bear a reasonable relation to
traditional maritime activity and consequently declined to employ ad-
miralty jurisdiction.86 Pursuant to the rules of diversity jurisdiction the
court applied Virginia's two year statute of limitations for personal in-
87jury. The court commenced the limitations period from the date of
81. Id.
82. 249 U.S. at 255.
83. Id.
84. The Court in Executive Jet Aviation explains that in spite of the broad lan-
guage in cases like The Plymouth, the Court has never held that locality of an action is
the exclusive consideration in applying admiralty jurisdiction. Id.
85. Id. at 268.
86. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 1981). The
court rejected the plaintiff's claims brought under the Extension of Admiralty Act, 46
U.S.C. § 740 (1976), and general maritime law, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). Id.
87. Id. at 238; VA. CODE § 8.01-243 (1977).
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White's last exposure to asbestos, thereby barring his claim.88
Second, the court restricted damages to "injuries which occurred
during the period commencing at a date two years before the institu-
tion of each plaintiff's action and ending at the date of last exposure."8 9
Consistent with its ruling the court excluded evidence of asbestos expo-
sure prior to the commencement of this time period.90 Although sum-
mary judgment was granted against White and several other plaintiffs,
a jury verdict of $435,000 was awarded to four employees.91
The trial court's third order granted a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict for the manufacturer, based upon a failure to prove injuries
during the restricted two year time period. Each order was appealed
before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The circuit court ques-
tioned the district court's refusal to apply admiralty jurisdiction. Deter-
mining that the criteria established in Executive Jet Aviation92 had
been met, the circuit court reversed. The locality requirement was ful-
filled by the employees' exposure to asbestos containing materials on
ships at both shipyard and dry-dock locations, as well as while working
at sea. The nexus requirement was also satisfied because insulation
materials are an integral part of ships, and "clearly essential to the
maritime industry." 93
The circuit court overruled the district court's application of the
Virginia statute of limitations, 94 although in applying the equitable
doctrine of laches district courts may consider state statutes of limita-
tions.95 In asbestos cases the long latency period of the disease must
also be considered, with the burden upon defendant to prove prejudice
88. White, at 238.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The cases were: "1) Oman v. Johns-Manville and Owens-Corning, 2)
Walker v. Johns-Manville, Owens-Corning and Pittsburgh Coming, 3) Reynolds v. H.
K. Porter Co. Inc. and 4) Gibbins v. Johns-Manville." Id. (emphasis deleted).
92. See supra text accompanying note 85.
93. White, at 239.
94. Id. at 239-40. The manufacturers argued that applying admiralty jurisdiction
in products liability cases would expand such jurisdiction to cases involving products
remotely associated with maritime activities. The court, however, found that the manu-
facturers were able to foresee that these insulation materials would be used primarily
on ships. Id.
95. Id. at 240.
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by showing plaintiff inexcusably delayed his claim.
The circuit court approved the district court instruction that man-
ufacturers were not liable for asbestosis incurred prior to the specified
periods of exposure. It stated, however, the defendant may be account-
able for negligent "aggravation of a pre-existing condition.""6 It was
therefore permissible for the jury to award damages based upon exac-
erbation of the plaintiff's pre-existing asbestosis. The decision of the
district court was vacated and remanded for a new trial conducted
under federal court admiralty jurisdiction.
Market--Share Liability
The third decision in the trilogy presented focuses upon the rela-
tively new doctrine of Market Share Apportionment. A basic tenet of
traditional tort liability demands plaintiff demonstrate a connection be-
tween his loss or injury, and defendant tortfeasors' act or omission.97
Historically it has been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain damages
when one is unable to clearly identify the party at fault.98 Three lim-
ited exceptions to the rule necessitating precise identification of the
tortfeasor have evolved: concert of action, alternative liability and res
ipsa loquitur.9  Under each of these doctrines, the presumption that the
defendant is in a better position to determine who actually caused the
injury shifts the burden of proof away from the plaintiff. Each defen-
dant's relationship to, and involvement in the injury producing activity
must be demonstrated.
96. Id. at 241.
97. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 236 (4th ed. 1971).
98. Id. at 671-72.
99. Newcomb, Market Share Liability for Defective Products: IlI Advised Rem-
edy for the Problem of Identification, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 300 (1981). Under each of
these doctrines there must be some evidence that the defendant could have been at
fault, whereas under "enterprise liability" or "market-share liability" no connection
between the defendant and a particular incident need be identified. It is sufficient that
the named defendant was producing the injury-causing product at the time of the oc-
currence. Id. at 310.
6:1982 585]1Asbestos Litigation
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Early Application:
In Hall v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,100 and the companion
case Chance v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,"' damages were
sought from a number of explosives manufacturers and their trade as-
sociation for injuries incurred in eighteen accidents. 102 Because identifi-
cation of the manufacturers of the blasting caps involved in each acci-
dent could not consistently be determined, defendants were randomly
selected from the six companies comprising the entire explosives indus-
try. The existing doctrines allowing recovery under these circumstances
were inapplicable since defendant's relationship to the injury-producing
activity could not be proved.103 In an effort to provide recovery to the
victims, the court in Hall suggested that virtually the entire industry be
held liable for injuries resulting from use of its product. 4 This theory,
referred to as enterprise liability or industry-wide liability, resulted
from the responsibility of industries to compensate victims for harm
typically resulting from use of its goods.1 0 5 The court proposed the en-
tire industry share the burden for any member's failure to take appro-
priate safety measures.
The doctrine received much publicity when in 1980, two suits were
brought by women who had developed cancer and/or adenosis as a re-
sult of in-utero exposure to diethylstilbestrol, ("DES"), a drug adminis-
tered to their mothers during pregnancy.10 Unable to identify which
drug company produced the particular DES ingested, plaintiff's in
Sindell employed the enterprise liability doctrine in order to hold all
manufacturers of DES jointly liable.10 7 The court modified the Hall
100. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
101. Id. The cases were later severed; none of the eventual decisions were based
upon the theory of enterprise liability suggested in this decision.
102. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 358.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
104. 345 F. Supp. at 358.
105. Id. at 369.
106. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super.
551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980).
107. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132. Plaintiffs in
Sindell alleged that all D.E.S. manufacturers adhered to identical industry-wide testing
and safety standards and should therefore be jointly liable for injuries caused by D.E.S.
1586 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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approach, deeming it unfair to impose liability on the approximately
200 distributors of DES, when only 6 or 7 manufacturers produced
90% of the drug then marketed. 08 The court formulated a narrower
application of industry wide liability:
we hold it to be reasonable in the present context to measure the
likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the product which
allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by
each of them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the
entire production of the drug sold by all for that purpose. 0 9
Under this theory, those companies manufacturing a substantial share
of DES available at the time of distribution could be joined in the ac-
tion with the liability of each equitably apportioned."10
Market Share Apportionment Applied to Asbestos Suits:
The problem of proof encountered in Hall and Sindell repeatedly
arises in asbestos suits. Victims of asbestosis and mesothelioma are fre-
quently exposed to asbestos-containing products over an extended pe-
riod of time. It becomes impossible to determine the precise moment of
onset of the disease, therefore impossible to identify the manufacturers
of the product from which they became ill.
In Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,"' a United States dis-
trict court took a step in overcoming this hurdle, by determining that
Texas courts would probably adopt some form of enterprise liability," 2
thus permitting discovery based upon the theory of market share appor-
tionment." 3 Because this ruling limited itself to discovery and cross
claim motions, a final adjudication of whether the doctrine applied to
asbestos cases has yet to be reached.
The Hardy decision, although narrow, has opened the door for
market-share liability in asbestos cases. Some commentators will cele-
Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at _.
108. Id. at ., 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at _.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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brate this extension of the Sindell doctrine. At first blush its applicabil-
ity in asbestos cases seems directly on point. Asbestos usage abounds
despite knowledge of asbestos carcinogenicity.1 14 As stated in the
landmark case introducing the concept of alternative liability, Sum-
mers v. Tice,115 when a choice exists between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendant, the latter should bear the cost for injuries in-
curred.116 If, through no fault of his own, a plaintiff cannot identify the
guilty defendant, the manufacturers primarily responsible for distribut-
ing the dangerous product to the public should apportion damages
among themselves.
Some find market-share apportionment a deplorable basis upon
which to hold asbestos manufacturers liable for damages. Contrasted
with victims of DES for whom it has been virtually impossible to iden-
tify the producers of the drug ingested by their mothers,1 1 7 plaintiffs in
asbestos cases can provide substantial information regarding the time
and place of their exposure. Although it may be impossible to consist-
ently determine which exposure caused the disease, thorough discovery
procedures may lead to identification of the appropriate defendant.
Furthermore, under the Sindell doctrine those companies not manufac-
turing DES during a particular plaintiff's exposure to the drug could
exculpate themselves from liability.11 8 Because it is often impossible to
determine the onset of disease in an asbestos case, manufacturers not
even producing the product at the time of injury should not be pre-
vented from avoiding liability. To hold a 'substantial share' of asbestos
producers liable for an injury with no evidence linking them to a partic-
ular occurrence defies the foundation upon which tort theory is based.
114. Id. at 1355.
115. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
116. Id.
117. Plaintiffs in the D.E.S. cases were not yet born when their injury occurred.
They had no means by which to determine the brand of D.E.S. administered to their
mothers. Even if medical and hospital records were available, it would be impossible to
determine with certainty the manufacturer of the D.E.S. distributed by individual
pharmacists at any given time.
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Ramifications
The trilogy of decisions presented strongly favors plaintiff's rights.
Keene expands the liability of insurance carriers who issued policies to
companies utilizing products containing asbestos. As a result, employ-
ers who are uninsured for certain time periods under either the expo-
sure theory or manifestation theory are now fully protected. The com-
panies are at last free from the possibility of facing bankruptcy because
of asbestos injuries incurred during their uninsured periods and plain-
tiffs are guaranteed a source from which to recover damages.
The White decision provides access to federal court admiralty ju-
risdiction, allowing shipyard workers to by-pass state statutes of limita-
tions which previously barred their claims. The potential surge of new
claims by shipyard employees who constitute the majority of victims
suffering from mesothelioma and asbestosis could flood our courts for
years to come.119 Finally, the Hardy application of market-share appor-
tionment in asbestos suits shifts the burden of proof away from victims.
Defendant manufacturers must demonstrate their freedom from liabil-
ity in producing the injury causing product.
The theory expanding the scope of 'when bodily injury occurs' can
be applied to a host of latent occupational diseases (e.g., those caused
by cotton dust and uranium). 12° The application of admiralty jurisdic-
tion to a products liability case where the substance was manufactured
on land, could arguably be extended to a myriad of products which
eventually find their way into a maritime environment. Although the
majority in White denies this possibility, a comparable decision was
handed down in the recent case of Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of America,121 perhaps indicating a trend in maritime products-liability
cases. Applying the theory of market-share liability to asbestos claims
indicates a growing acceptance of this relatively new doctrine, which
119. The Nat'l L.J., supra note 1.
120. Legal Times of Wash., Feb..8, 1982, at 5, col. 3.
121. 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980). The court applied admiralty jurisdiction in a
products liability case against the manufacturer of a gyro-pilot steering system used
aboard a vessel. The defendants in this case also argued that this might expand admi-
ralty jurisdiction to any case involving a product used in a maritime situation, which
the court denied. Id. For further discussion of maritime products liability, see Com-
ment, 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 283 (1979).
16:1982 5891Asbestos Litigation
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conceivably could be expanded to any products liability case in which
precise identification of the party at fault is impossible.
Steps have been taken which would minimize the effects of these
decisions. Numerous attorneys have been involved in lobbying efforts
for legislative action to compensate victims of asbestosis.1 12 Reactions
to this effort are mixed: some legislators see it "as too much of an effort
to bail out Johns-Manville," 123 who bears the brunt of most asbestos-
related lawsuits. Insurance companies are split while organized labor
seems to be "taking a wait and see" stance, and trial attorneys face
losing huge fees if litigation is halted.124
Under a bill proposed by Senator Hart, (D-Colo.), 25 an industry
and government funded pool would be created to compensate victims of
asbestosis. Under this act, asbestos victims would be prevented from
filing lawsuits to obtain additional remuneration. However, Rep.
George Miller (D-Calif.), who will soon introduce his own bill, states,
"let the companies explain. . . how the federal government should pay
out billions of dollars when there is established liability (on their part)
. . . .If they want a government bailout, they're whistling in a hurri-
cane." 126 Rep. Millicent H. Fenwick (R-N.J.) has proposed a bill, H.R.
5224, 127 establishing a federal trust fund which would operate through
the Labor Department, although there has been some indication that
she may abandon it and support Miller's bill.128 There has also been
some indication that Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.) may intro-
duce a bill paralleling Miller's house bill, perhaps including provisions
for uranium-linked disease.1 29 Attorneys representing private industries
are also working on proposals which are intended for introduction
through sponsors in the Senate.130
122. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., supra note 120, at 1, col. 1.
123. Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A.J. 139, 142 (1981).
124. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., supra note 120, at 1, col. 1.
125. Podgers, supra note 123, at 142.
126. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., supra note 120, at 5, col. 3. Sources have indi-
cated that Miller's bill would create a "federal workers' compensation mechanism,"
operating through the Labor Department, and not requiring government payments. Id.
127. H.R. 5224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 28, 415 (1981).
128. Legal Times of Wash., supra note 20, at 5, col. 3.
129. Id.
130. Id. These include Kenneth Feinberg, representing Raysbestos-Manhattan
Inc., William Tucker retained by Johns-Manville, and Harrison Wellford, also repre-
1590 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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Defendants are also beginning to assert that they were simply fol-
lowing government specifications in their manufacturing process.131
This "government-contract defense" has not yet been ruled on in asbes-
tos suits, but has been allowed in "Agent-Orange" cases.13 2 If success-
ful in the asbestos arena it could dispose of thousands of pending asbes-
tos suits. 133 In order to utilize this defense, defendants would have to
first prove a contractual relationship with the government.13' Since
much of the asbestos manufactured was for use in naval shipyards, it
might be possible for defendants to show this relationship. In order to
successfully assert this defense, manufacturers would have to prove
that the government established specifications for the product, the spec-
ifications were met, and the government was aware of the product's
hazards.1 35
Conclusion
Defendant manufacturers and insurance companies face a growing
threat as the arsenel of support for plaintiffs in asbestos-related cases
continually increases. A variety of compromises have been proposed,
but a multitude of problems must be overcome before a satisfactory
solution can be achieved. The necessity of reaching an equitable bal-
ance is clear. Insurance companies need protection from the threat of
over-expansive liability, employers and manufacturers must be saved
from the threat of bankruptcy, 36 and above all, the victims of asbesto-










136. After this article was committed to print, Johns-Manville Corp. filed for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Wall St. J., Sept. 13,
1982, at 5, col. 1.
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Appellate Review of Class Standing Orders in Florida
In many instances, the order indicating that a lawsuit may proceed
as a class action determines whether the suit will proceed at all. This
note examines the rationale behind Florida courts' treatment of orders
determining class standing. Preliminarily, this note focuses on the pre-
sent status of class standing orders in federal courts. Federal judges
have the option of either certifying the suit as class action or refusing
class action certification.1 In either event, the federal trial court judge's
discretion in certifying or refusing to certify a class action suit is not
appealable except in rare cases which will be discussed below.
In Florida the law is unsettled in this area. A Florida judge has
the same option of class action certification as his federal counterpart.2
Differences arise, however, in that the Florida judge may order all alle-
gations of a class suit stricken from the complaint or may dismiss the
complaint entirely.3
After treatment of the federal viewpoint of class action certifica-
tion orders, the focus of this note will shift to the effect a Florida
judge's choice of action will have on whether a class action order is
appealable.
Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in Federal Courts
Congress, by statute, created the federal appellate court power to
hear final lower court decisions on appeal. Generally, federal appellate
courts hear appeals only from final judgments. However, because of the
harshness sometimes associated with strict adherence to the final judg-
ment rule, federal courts have created certain exceptions such as the
collateral order doctrine.5
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
3. id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... " Id.
5. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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1 594
[Some decisions appear] to fall in that small class which finally
determines claims of rights separate from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate considera-
tion be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.'
While this exception to the final judgment rule is approved by the
United States Supreme Court, the Court specifically rejected its use
regarding class standing orders in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.7 The
grounds for such a rejection were threefold. First, these orders are sub-
ject to revisions in the district courts as part of the federal class action
rule provides for amendment or alteration of a class standing order any
time prior to final judgment on the merits.8 Second, the considerations
involved in determining whether a suit should proceed as a class action
are "enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's
cause of action."9 Third, review can effectively be achieved after final
judgment at the behest of the named representative or intervening class
members. 10
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals formulated another excep-
tion to the final judgment rule dealing specifically with class action cer-
tification denials called the "death-knell" doctrine.' This exception al-
lowed for immediate appeal when denial of class certification would
"for all practical purposes terminate the litigation,"' 2 thereby causing
irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the class.' 3 Other circuits viewed
the "death-knell" doctrine with mixed responses. Both the Eighth Cir-
cuit and the Tenth Circuit accepted the "death-knell" doctrine'4 while
6. Id. at 546.
7. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
8. Id. at 469.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
12. Id. at 121.
13. Id. In Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), the court
dropped the requirement that the class suffer irreparable harm and just looked to the
named representative.
14. The death knell doctrine of the Second Circuit was accepted by the Eighth
Circuit in Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1220 (8th Cir. 1973) and the Tenth
6:1982 1
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Class Standing Orders6:1982 595 1
the Third and Seventh Circuits rejected it altogether. 5
The United States Supreme Court, however, killed the "death-
knell" doctrine in Coopers.6 In that case, Coopers & Lybrand, an ac-
counting firm, certified that financial statements contained in a pro-
spectus were correct. Relying upon the prospectus, respondents pur-
chased shares in a company. The company later restated its earnings
reported in the prospectus by writing down its net income. Thereafter,
respondents sold their shares and sustained a loss of $2,650 on their
investment. Respondents brought a suit on behalf of themselves and the
class of similarly situated investors. Initially, the district court certified
the suit as a class action but later decertified it. The court of appeals
examined the amount of respondents' claims in relation to their
financial resources and the probable cost of litigation and concluded
that if class certification was not given the lawsuit would terminate.
Under this "death-knell" doctrine, jurisdiction was accepted and the
order decertifying the class was reversed.1 7
The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reasoned that an
order which either refuses to certify or decertifies the class does not
force the plaintiff to abandon his claim. Since the plaintiff is free to
pursue his individual claim, orders refusing to certify are not final judg-
ments and will be appealable only if they fall within an appropriate
exception to the final-judgment rule. 8
The Court, refusing to accept the "death-knell" doctrine as an ap-
propriate exception to the final judgment rule based its decision on five
reasons. First, the formation of an appellate rule which revolves around
the amount of the plaintiff's claim is a legislative responsibility.' 9 Con-
gress has made "finality" the test of appealability, and an amount in
controversy rule established by the Court would be arbitrary in that "it
ignores the variables that inform a litigant's decision to proceed, or not
Circuit in Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 620, 624 (10th Cir.
1973).
15. Both the Third Circuit, in Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 621
(3d Cir. 1972), and the Seventh Circuit, in King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 1259, 1260 (3d Cir. 1973), rejected the doctrine.
16. 437 U.S. 463. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
17. Id. at 466.
18. Id. at 467.
19. Id. at 472.
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to proceed, in the face of an adverse class ruling."2 Second, acceptance
of the "death-knell" rule would have serious debilitating effects on the
administration of justice as further appeals from adverse rulings on
other grounds would inevitably result. 1 Third, the "death-knell" doc-
trine's acceptance would result in indiscriminatory interlocutory review
of the trial judge's decision. 22 Such indiscriminatory review would cir-
cumvent the purpose behind 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) which allows for re-
view only upon trial court's discretion and then only in special circum-
stances.2 Fourth, since the doctrine only applies to class certification
denial orders, it operates in favor of the plaintiffs even though the is-
sues will often be of critical importance to the defendants as well.24
Finally, by allowing appeals that turn on the particular facts of the
case, appellate courts would be thrown into the trial process in a way
which defeats one of the main purposes of the final judgment rule:
maintaining appropriate relationships between the various courts.25
Furthermore, the Court, in dicta, stated that approval of class certifica-
tions were interlocutory orders and not final judgments within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.20
While the Coopers decision settled the issue of appealing class
standing orders as final judgments, such appeals were not precluded
under other federal rules or statutes.
Injunctions
District court interlocutory orders concerning injunctive relief are
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).17 In Brunson v.
Board of Trustees, 8 appeal of class certification denials were available
20. Id.
21. Id. at 473.
22. Id. at 474.
23. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
24. Coopers, 437 U.S. at 476.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. This section provides: "(a) The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeal from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, ...
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dis-
solve or modify injunctions . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)(1970).
28. Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1, 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir.
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under Section 1291(a)(1) on the theory that a denial of class certifica-
tion would in effect narrow the scope of injunctive relief. 9 In Brunson,
an action was brought by forty-two black children and their parents
against the school board as a class action suit. Upon motion, the dis-
trict court struck all of the plaintiffs except Brunson who was the first
named plaintiff.30 By forcing each individual to pursue his own claim,
injunctions issued would only be directed with respect to that single
plaintiff whereas if class action were successful general injunctive relief
would be granted. Hence, the court concluded denial of class certifica-
tion had the effect of narrowing the scope of injunctive relief.31
In Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,32 the United
States Supreme Court, however, refused to accept this rationale by
holding an order denying class certification was not appealable under
the interlocutory injunctive relief statute.33 The court noted the statute
was created as an exception to the policy against piecemeal review and
as such should not be enlarged or extended. 34 Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, class certification orders may be reviewed by the
trial judge both prior to and after final judgment.3 5 Finally, the Court
concluded the class determination does not affect the merits of the rep-
resentative's personal claim nor does it pass on the legal sufficiency of
any claim for injunctive relief.36 In the event that the order did pass on
the legal sufficiency of a claim for injunctive relief or if it would effect
the merits of the petitioner's own claim, the Court left open the possi-
bility for review.37
1962).
29. Id. at 108. The same view has been taken in Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut.
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1975), and Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d
1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1975). Because the district court's refusal to certify the suit as a
class action directly controlled the subsequent disposition of the request for preliminary
injunction it too should be reviewable. Jenkins, 522 F.2d at 1237.
30. Brunson, 311 F.2d at 107.
31. Id.
32. 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 480.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
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Appeal of Denial of Class Action Certification Under Federal
Rule 54(b)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)38 provides an alternative
way to appeal a denial of a class action certification. There have been
cases where a trial judge has dismissed the action as to the absent class
members and the judge certified the dismissal as a final judgment and
therefore appeal was appropriately taken.39
This rule may also be utilized if the action is dismissed against the
parties for reasons other than lack of class standing. 40 For example, in
Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas,4 the trial
court refused class status to private contractors. The contractors at-
tempted to intervene in the suit but this was also denied. "Final judg-
ment" was entered against the contractors in accordance with rule
54(b). The order denying class status was held reviewable under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). "The general rule is [that] interloc-
utory orders from which no appeal lies are merged into the final judg-
ment and open to review on appeal from that judgment. '42
Since, the scope of rule 54(b) is limited to final judgment, and
interlocutory orders merged into final judgments, the rule cannot ex-
tend to reviewing decisions granting status to a class.43
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) states: "[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment . .. ."
39. Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978), holding certification appropriate under FED. R. Civ. P.
54(b) to unnamed members of class upon denial of certification and final judgment of
dismissal against them. See also Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.
1968) (dictum). But see West v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 558 F.2d 997, 980
(10th Cir. 1977), holding putative class members were not parties to the suit and de-
claring judgment dismissing action on behalf of the class void.
40. Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th
Cir. 1977).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1077.
43. Katz, 496 F.2d at 752.
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Discretionary Appeal of Class Standing Determinations in
Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
In Coopers,4 the Supreme Court held that a class action certifica-
tion was not appealable under section 1291 as a final judgment, but
such a motion for appeal is not precluded under section 1292(b)." 5
Under this statute, when a district court judge determines that an issue
involves a controlling question of law on which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and immediate appeal may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the suit, the question may be certi-
fied to the court of appeals. 6 The court of appeals may then exercise
its discretion as to whether to hear the appeal.47 Policy reasons for al-
lowing these appeals under section 1292(b) include judicial economy
and protection of the parties from erroneous interlocutory orders. 48
Due to the stringent requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), as an
interlocutory order, a class certification decision will be applicable only
in special circumstances. Such special circumstances were demon-
strated in Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co..49 The trial court, in
Tucker, stated that the order certifying a class could be considered a
"controlling question" because considerable time and expense would be
saved if the issue was immediately certified since reversal would proba-
bly mean termination of the suit.50
The same result was reached in Aschul v. Sitmar Cruises,5 1 where
a passenger on a fourteen day pleasure cruise brought an action on
behalf of himself and other passengers against the shipping line alleg-
ing the cruise had not stopped in all the ports announced in its itiner-
44. 437 U.S. 463.
45. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 n.8 (1980).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
47. Id. This section is only used for orders that would not ordinarily be immedi-
ately appealable. "In some cases such appeal would promise substantial savings of time
and resources or for other reasons should be viewed hospitably." Roper, 445 U.S. at
336 n.8.
48. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir. 1974).
49. 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
50. Id. at 483. While the court held this should be sufficient, the questions certi-
fied to the court of appeals were more specific. See also In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig. v.
Touche Ross & Co., 69 F.R.D. 24 (S.D. Cal. 1975) holding the same.
51. 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1976).
5991
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ary. The trial court denied class action certification. On appeal, the
court of appeals cited with approval the use of section 1292(b) in lim-
ited situations where the trial court determines that substantial grounds
for difference of opinion on the class status question exists and immedi-
ate appeal may materially advance the end of litigation. 2
Mandamus
The All Writs Act 5 3 provides another possible alternative for re-
viewing class standing determinations. Mandamus is labeled as one of
the "most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal"54 and accordingly its
use is limited to cases where there has been a showing of an abuse of
judicial power.55
In Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,56 the Securities and Ex-
change Commission filed a complaint for injunctive relief against Occi-
dental Petroleum alleging violations of specific sections of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act. Based on the allegations of the SEC complaint
numerous private actions were filed. After extensive briefing, the dis-
trict judge entered an order certifying a class under rule 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5" The district judge
52. Id. at 1369.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
54. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967).
55. Id. at 104.
56. 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976).
57. Suits brought under 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure have to meet the initial prerequisites of a class action. 23(b)(1) suits will be
allowed when:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substanially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests;
Id.
23(b)(3) suits would be appropriate where "the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
48
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refused to certify the ruling on the class certification under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). The Ninth Circuit addressed the latter question first and held
it was an inappropriate remedy to mandamus the district judge to exer-
cise his discretion to certify a question under section 1292(b). Relying
on earlier opinions of the Second and Eighth Circuits the court con-
cluded that to issue the writ instructing a district judge to certify a
question under section 1292(b) would circumvent the statutory require-
ment that the district court and the court of appeals agree on the pro-
priety of such an appeal.58
As to certification of the class suit the court held that mandamus
was inappropriate as to the 23(b)(3) class certification. The court ac-
cepted the district court judge's discretion in the certification. The
court did, however, issue the writ as to the certification under rule
23(b)(1). After determining certification was improper the court con-
cluded judicial efficiency required the issuance of the writ to correct the
improper certification.59
Mandamus has also been used to review orders granting class ac-
tion status to determine if the lower court acted beyond its power au-
thorized by the rule. In Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co.,60 Schmidt
brought an action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
alleging that they were employed by Fuller Brush Company and that
Fuller Brush had failed to pay them minimum wages and overtime
compensation allegedly required under the Fair Labor Standards Act."1
After certifying the class, the district judge directed that notice be sent
to the absent class members as required by rule 23. Under rule
23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless a class mem-
ber comes forward and asks to be excluded from the suit he will be
bound by the judgment. On the otherhand, section 16(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act provides that an employee must consent in writ-
ing to be a party plaintiff. The court concluded that these two provi-
sions were irreconcilable and issued mandamus vacating class action
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy . . . ." Id.
Suits brought under 23(b)(3) have notice requirements not found in 23(b)(1) suits.
58. Green, 541 F.2d at 1337.
59. Id. at 1339.
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order.6 2
The continuing viability of mandamus even in these limited situa-
tions has been thrown into question after the Supreme Court decisions
of Coopers6 3 and Gardner.4 While not specifically addressing the issue
of mandamus, the Court's attitude toward class actions may lead one to
suspect they have closed the "back door" as well as the front one to
any appeals of class action standing prior to final judgment.
Class Actions in Florida
The new Florida class action rule," patterned after the federal
rule,6 went into effect January 1, 1980. While the language varies in
many respects, the basic requirements for bringing a class suit are simi-
lar. The Florida rule contains detailed pleading requirements not found
in Federal Rule 23.17 Additionally, the notice requirements in Florida's
rule are more explicit and stringent than in its federal counterpart.6 8
Under the federal rule, a judge initially determines whether the
suit may proceed as a class action. If it may, the judge certifies the
class. If not, the judge denies certification and the suit proceeds. Under
the Florida rule, a judge has the same option but, additionally, the
judge may strike the class allegations.6 9 Two questions then arise: what
is the legal significance attached to striking the class representation al-
legations? and what prompts striking?
Prior to the adoption of the new Florida rule, the Florida Supreme
Court decided Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp.70 That case involved
a complaint in the form of a class action. The trial court dismissed the
entire complaint because it was improperly brought as a class action.
The Florida Spreme Court held that where the complaint stated an
individual claim which could withstand a motion to dismiss, it was im-
62. Id. at 536.
63. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
64. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
65. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
67. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(c).
68. Id. at advisory committee note.
69. Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(1) with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
70. 287 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1973).
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proper to dismiss the complaint. "Rather, the trial court could have
treated those allegations relating solely to a class action suit as having
been stricken from the complaint by ordering dismissal of the com-
plaint insofar as a class action was asserted." 71 Other courts have re-
peatedly held that misjoinder of parties is not a basis for dismissal.7 2
'Since an order striking class allegations is not the equivalent of a dis-
missal against the individual representative, that representative should
not be allowed to appeal the order prior to final judgment.73 Under the
Florida Supreme Court approach, the striking of class allegations is
analogous to dismissal, thus arguably a final judgment as to the absent
class members.74 However, the rule provides that orders "[m]ay be
conditional and may be altered or amended before entry of judgment
on the merits of the action. ' 5 If this language is read to mean that a
judge is free to change his mind during the course of the trial and
reinstate the class allegations, the order is not final as to the class but
interlocutory. As an interlocutory order, it can only be appealable if it
falls within the scope of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 or
if a district court grants a common-law writ of certiorari.
Class Standing Determinations as Final Judgments in Florida
In Florida, absent a contrary statute or rule of court, appeals will
lie only from final judgments or decrees. 0 Class standing orders have
been held not to be final judgments under Florida law. 77
Prior to the adoption of the new Florida class action rule, the First
71. Id. at 295.
72. Id. at 294. See also Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Fuller, 275 So. 2d
568, 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), and Gordon Fin. Co. v. Belzaguy, 216 So. 2d
240, 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
73. This does not take into account remedies such as mandamus, common law
certiorari, or interlocutory appeal under jurisdiction over the person.
74. Harrell, 287 So. 2d at 295.
75. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(2)(1).
76. Brannon v. Johnson, 83 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. 1955).
77. Ero Properties, Inc. v. Cone, 395 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
National Lake Dev., Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass'n, 395 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Palm Beach Towers, Inc. v. Korn, 400 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); American Heritage Inst. Sec., Inc. v. Price, 379 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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District Court of Appeal decided Cordell v. World Insurance Co.78 The
court held the dismissal of a class action suit with prejudice a final
order even though plaintiffs were entitled to file an amended complaint
and pursue claims in their individual capacity. The order was final as
to the proposed class even though it did not finally dispose of the case
on the merits."9
With the new provision allowing the judge to strike class allega-
tions, question arises as to whether it is permissible to dismiss an action
that fails to meet the prerequisites of a class but does state an individ-
ual cause of action. While there is no authority under the new rule, the
courts are likely to strike the class allegations in accordance with the
rule, rather than entirely dismiss the complaint. The only time dismis-
sal would be appropriate would be when the plaintiff has stated no
claim for himself in which case dismissal would be a final judgment
and appeal should be granted as a matter of right.
Appeal of Class Standing Determinations in Florida When
Multiple Parties are Involved
There is no corresponding rule in Florida to rule 54(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. s" Accordingly, there is no rule that
renders final a split judgment in a case involving multiple parties.8'
Moreover, Florida has a strong policy against piecemeal review.82
Therefore, appealability of an order dismissing less than all the parties
will turn on the grounds of the dismissal.
The general rule in equity is that an order that dismisses one party
(or which disposes of the claims of that party) is final and appealable
as to the dismissed party.83 The modern approach to actions at law is
that these too should be immediately appealable.8 4
78. 352 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
79. Id. at 109.
80. See supra pp. 8-9.
81. Evin R. Welsh & Co. v. Johnson, 138 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
82. S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).
83. Evin R. Welch & Co., 138 So. 2d at 391. See also Shute v. Keystone State
Bank, 159 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
84. Evin R. Welch & Co., 138 So. 2d at 394. See also Schneider v. Manheimere,
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In Conboy v. City of Naples,5 Vincent H. Conboy brought a class
action suit in equity on behalf of himself and all other ad valorem tax
payers residing in the City of Naples. The action named the City of
Naples, its Tax Assessor, the State Controller, and two land develop-
ment concerns as the defendants. Conboy asserted that for the year of
1966 the lands owned by these development concerns were greatly un-
derassessed. Therefore, claimed Conboy, all lands in the City of Naples
did not bear their just burden of taxation which resulted in an increase
of taxes to the class. The trial judge entered a directed verdict in favor
of one of the land development concerns. An order enacted "final judg-
ment" was recorded in favor of the land concern. Six months later the
entire case was disposed of against the class. The issue was whether the
initial directed verdict in favor of the first land development concern
was an interlocutory order or whether the directed verdict was a final
judgment requiring appellate review. The Second District Court of Ap-
peal ruled that in a class action, dismissal of one of the defendants was
final as to him and appeal must be taken when the action was dis-
missed against that defendant and not when the entire suit was
decided.8 6
Class Standing Appeals as Interlocutory Orders in Florida
Prior to the change in the interlocutory order appeal rule, deci-
sions on whether a suit could proceed as a class action were the subject
of appeal to the Florida district courts.8 7 These interlocutory orders
were appealable under Florida Appellate Rule of Procedure 4.2, which
provided: "Appeals may be prosecuted in accordance with this rule
from interlocutory orders in civil actions which, from the subject mat-
ter or relief sought are such as formerly were cognizable in equity...
."" Equity has long held that one or more persons may sue or defend
on behalf of others with common interests when it is impractical to
170 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
85. 226 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Rosenwasser v. Frager, 307 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Hendler v. Rogues House Condominium, Inc., 234 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1970).
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bring all before the court.89 Since the replacement of rule 4.2 there is
no longer immediate appellate review of interlocutory orders "formerly
cognizable in equity."' 0 As a result, to be appealable as an interlocu-
tory order, class determinations must fall within one of the categories
of non-final orders from which immediate appeal will lie.
The present rule specifically limits review on non-final orders91 to
include orders involving injunctive relief,92 orders which determine the
issue of liability in favor of the claimant,93 and orders which determine
jurisdiction over the person.94
A. Injunctions
The Florida rule allowing interlocutory appeal concerning injunc-
tions95 is almost identical to the federal statute.96 As pointed out in
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 97 the considerations for a
class action are completely different from the considerations for grant-
ing or denying injunctions. 98 While the denial of class certification may
affect the possible scope of an injunction, it will not have any effect on
whether the petitioner is entitled to such an injunction. Yet, Florida
courts are free to disregard the Gardner decision and allow immediate
appeal of class standing determinations which involve the request for
an injunction. The Florida rule allows interlocutory appeal of orders
involving injunctive relief. When read literally, however, the rule ex-
cludes orders of class standing. Yet, as was conceded by the United
States Supreme Court, such orders may indirectly affect injunctive re-
lief.99 Whether Florida courts decide to allow such interlocutory review
of class standing orders remains to be seen. If circumstances arise
where the class standing determination would affect the merits of the
89. 379 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
90. FLA. R. APP. P. 4.2.
91. Id. at 9.130(a)(3).
92. Id. at 9.130(a)(3)(B).
93. Id. at 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv).
94. Id. at 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
95. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970).
97. 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
98. Id. at 480.
99. Id.
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petitioner's own claim or pass on the legal sufficiency of any claims for
injunctive relief, appellate 'review under the injunction section should
be allowed.
B. Orders that Determine the Issue of Liability in Favor of the
Claimant
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that a non-final or-
der which determines "the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking
affirmative relief" is immediately appealable.100 In American Heritage
Institutional Securities v. Price,10' appellants filed an interlocutory ap-
peal of the trial court's order denying appellants motion to strike and
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both motions were directed as to
whether the cause of action stated in the complaint could be prosecuted
as a class action. Appellants argued jurisdiction under
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure which
states, "Review of non-final orders of lower tribunals is limited to those
which. . . determine. . the issue of liability in favor of a party seek-
ing affirmative relief." The Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected this
contention. It held that in determining class standing, the court is judg-
ing whether a cause can appropriately be brought as a class suit or
whether there are sufficient allegations to sustain a class suit. 102 Once
this determindtion is made, the suit will then proceed toward a poten-
tial liability which has not been determined and may never be
determined.10 3
The reasoning for this determination is sound since the subject of
liability is not relevant to a class determination. Class standing deter-
minations only decide who is participating in the lawsuit, not who is
liable.
C. Orders that Determine Jurisdiction Over the Person
Thus far, the only way recognized by a Florida appellate court to
appeal a class standing determination as an interlocutory order has
100. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv).
101. 379 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
102. Id. at 421.
103. Id.
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been as a non-final order which determines jurisdiction over the person.
In Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc.,"0 4 the trial court had
entered certain pre-trial orders including the determinaton that a class
action suit could be maintained. The petitioner filed a petition for certi-
orari to have this ruling reviewed and the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal allowed an appeal. The appellate court held that since a class ac-
tion was binding on all members of the class, the court obtained
personal jurisdiction over them. As a result, these were orders that de-
termined jurisdiction over the person and fell within this section of im-
mediately appealable interlocutory orders.
The idea of interlocutory appeal based on jurisdiction over the per-
son. was emphatically rejected by the Second District Court of Appeal
in National Lake Developments, Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners As-
soc. 105 The court held that orders of class determination decide the
makeup of the proper class, not whether the court has jurisdiction over
the members of the class.' 06 Court policy reasons alone were held suffi-
cient to reject the Kohl view since acceptance of its rationale could lead
to interlocutory appeal in all class suits. 10 7 This was something the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal did not believe the drafters of the appel-
late rules would have deemed proper under orders that determine juris-
diction over the person. 0
The reason that immediate interlocutory appeal for jurisdiction
over the person is allowed under the appellate rules is to eliminate use-
less labor. 09 This reason should be focused upon when trying to deter-
mine if class standing orders should be immediately appealable as in-
terlocutory orders determining jurisdiction over the person. It is
apparent that if one accepts the premise that class standing orders do
determine jurisdiction over the person then all such orders are or would
be immediately appealable. To allow this would create labor for the
district courts as clearly the party that had the adverse class ruling
may take an immediate appeal regardless of its merits. Yet, to make
the parties go through the time and expense of a complete trial only to
104. 385 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
105. 395 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
106. Id. at 593.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130 advisory committee note.
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have the initial class determination reversed at the appellate level
would circumvent the purpbse of the appellate rules.
While this is a reason for allowing class standing orders to be im-
mediately appealable, the ramifications of doing so under jurisdiction
over the person will lead to both useless labor and a form of piecemeal
review. Although there is always the possibility of a judge making an
erroneous initial determination, such determination is subject to
amendment or alteration at anytime prior to final judgment on the
merits.110 In cases of clear error there may be a possibility of a writ of
mandamus or common law certiorari. If neither of those remedies work
then there still is appeal after final judgment.
From the standpoint of useless labor, it becomes a choice between
"floodgate" review for all class standing determinations or the isolated
case where an erroneous decision is initially made and remains un-
changed throughout the trial with no way to rectify it until final review.
In that light, policy reasons dictate that the courts of Florida reject
class standing determinations as determining jurisdiction over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the person is the power to determine an action
because the parties are lawfully before the court."" When defining ju-
risdiction over the person, Florida courts have included such things as
service of process or applicability of the long arm statute to non-re-
sidents.11 2 In Atreco-Florida, Inc. v. Berliner,'" the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held jurisdiction over the person to be limited to these
types of considerations. 14 In so holding, the court refused to review an
order which determined class status." 5 However, in Kohl, the Fourth
District retreated from this limited view and extended the definition of
jurisdiction over the person for purposes of the appellate rule.116
The issue to be resolved is whether approval or denial of certifica-
tion of a class is an order determining jurisdiction over the person. In a
110. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
111. National Lake Dev., Inc., 395 So. 2d at 593.
112. American Health Ass'n v. Helprin, 357 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
113. 360 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 385 So. 2d at 1029.
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class action suit, all members of the class will be bound by the court's
final judgment. In this respect, the court is asserting jurisdiction over
all members of the class. But, the right to challenge personal jurisdic-
tion has traditionally been reserved to the person over whom the court
is asserting jurisdiction.1 17 The Florida class action rule provides meth-
ods which allow members of the class to exclude themselves from the
court's jurisdiction.118 These provisions of the rule protect the absent
class members. Those class members who do not exclude themselves
waive their objections to the court taking jurisdiction over them.
Mandamus as a Method of Reviewing Class Standing
Determinations in Florida
Just as mandamus has been extremely limited at the federal level
when dealing with class standing orders, it is equally limited in Florida.
The Florida Constitution119 and the Florida Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure"O empower the courts to issue writs of mandamus. For a writ of
mandamus to be issued, the act commanded by the writ must be minis-
terial.1 21 This writ may be used to command an officer to exercise his
discretion, but not to exercise it in a particular way. 22
While mandamus should not lie to review all class determinations,
in certain instances mandamus review should be allowed. The discre-
tion which mandamus does not control is the one the law has vested in
the judge. When the judge abuses his discretion to a point that
amounts to a failure to do the act as the law requires, mandamus is
proper. 23 For example, the Florida rule requires the court to submit an
order stating the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the
determination is made.1 24 Where such findings are totally inconsistent
with the class status order, discretionary abuse is apparent, and manda-
117. National Lake Dev., Inc., 395 So. 2d at 593.
118. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(2).
119. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(8), 4(b)(3), 5(b).
120. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(3), (b)(3), (c)(3).
121. State ex rel. Zuckerman-Veron Corp. v. City of Miramar, 306 So. 2d 173,
175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
122. Green v. Waiter, 161 So. 2d 830, 834 (Fla. 1964).
123. Permenter v. Younan, 31 So. 2d 387, 390 (Fla. 1947).
124. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(1).
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mus should be issued.
Common Law Certiorari to Review Class Standing Orders
An existing method which allows for immediate review of an oth-
erwise non-reviewable order is the common law writ of certiorari.125
Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to a lower tribunal exer-
cising a judicial or quasi-judicial function.12 6 Whether certiorari is a
workable structure to allow review of these orders will depend on how
liberally it is granted.
The general rule is that certiorari will be issued only when a lower
court order, if allowed to stand, may cause material injury to the peti-
tioner throughout the proceedings and later appeal would be inade-
quate.127 There is at least an argument that the "death-knell" rationale
should be used to grant review of some denials of class certifications.
For example, where the plaintiff would not pursue his claims individu-
ally, denial of class suit participation may lead to material injury.
Kohl came to the Fourth District Court of Appeals by way of peti-
tion for writ of common law certiorari.12 8 In rejecting the petition the
court said, "[i]t has not been demonstrated either that the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction or that the essential requirements of law and
due process have been violated."12 9 Implicit in this statement is the fact
that if a petitioner can demonstrate either of the above prerequisites,
certiorari would be granted to review class orders.
Failure to observe the essential requirements of law has been in-
terpreted to mean the commission of an error so fundamental in nature
as to render the judgment void.130 Yet in Everglades Protective Syndi-
cate, Inc. v. Makinney,1 31 the Fourth District Court of Appeal granted
125. See generally Haddad, Common Law Writ of Certiorari in Florida, 29 U.
FLA. L. REV. 207 (1977).
126. Simmons v. Owen, 87 Fla. 485, 100 So. 735 (1924).
127. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hill, 388 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
128. Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 385 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
129. Id.
130. Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry. v. Boy, 34 Fla. 389, 16 So. 190 (1894).




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
1 612 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
certiorari and quashed a motion to compel discovery. Makinney was
expelled from membership in The Everglades Club, a private social
club. He filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Palm Beach
Circuit Court seeking to compel the club to reinstate his membership.
Makinney served the club with written interrogatories. The club an-
swered some but refused to answer others on the grounds they were
irrelevant and immaterial to any issue in the action. A motion to com-
pel was granted by the trial court whereupon the club filed a petition
for common-law certiorari.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the interrogatories
neither consisted of questions relevant to the subject matter involved in
the litigation nor were they "reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." 13 2 This was sufficient to depart from
the essential requirements of law. While answering irrelevant questions
in interirogations is'an inconvenience, the answers to the questions also
have no bearing on the outcome of the suit. In this respect, it appears
that a liberal interpretation of departing from the essential require-
ments of the law has been used. In a liberal setting it appears clear that
there will arise cases where a sympathetic district court could grant a
petition for certiorari and indeed change a class standing
determination.
To obtain review of a class standing determination by common law
certiorari, the petitioner must show that the judge's decision was erro-
neous when compared to the class action rule. The wasting of judicial
time and expense associated with a second trial has been held insuffi-
cient justification for issuance of the writ.13 Indeed, mere expedi-
ency134 has not formed a basis for review by certiorari.
In Schever v. Wille,'35 plaintiff sought common law certiorari after
the trial court granted defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's prayer for
punitive damages but where the case was still pending on the issue of
132. Id. at 263.
133. Bowl Am. Fla., Inc. v. Schmit, 386 So. 2d 1203 (Fla.-5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Ford Motor Co. v. Nelson, 355 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Professional Medical Specialties, Inc. v. Renfroe, 362 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Whiteside v. Johnson, 351 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Siegel v. Abramowitz, 309 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
134. Schever v. Wille, 370 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
135. Id.
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actual damages. In dismissing his petition, the court said: "[I]t is cer-
tainly not impossible that such a trial would finally resolve this case.
Plaintiff may not prevail in the case . . . or the parties may in some
fashion settle their differences and all issues will then be removed from
the court's consideration." '36 The identical rationale could be used in
the class action setting. If class certification is granted to the plaintiffs,
there is no reason to assume that the defendant will lose the suit or
decide to settle the case rather than litigate. Additionally, if defendant
does lose the case, appeal will include the determination of whether the
class suit was proper. Unquestionably inconvenient to the defendant to
wait, review is available to him eventually. The same is equally true for
the denial of class certification to the plaintiff.
It should be noted that in the commentary to the appellate rules,
the advisory committee stated that they did not intend to abolish the
common law writ of certiorari.137 Yet, they recognized that due to the
heavy burden on the petitioner, it would be extremely rare that errone-
ous interlocutory orders could be corrected by resorting to common law
certiorari. 13 8 Perhaps, class standing orders may find their way into
that extremely rare category the advisory committee had in mind.
Conclusion
Class standing determinations are not presently appealable as a
final judgment. As a matter of law, this judgment is sound. Prerequi-
sites to maintaining class actions do not theoretically address the merits
of a claim. These prerequisites are a procedural device and unless the
complaint is actually dismissed, a judge is free to amend or alter his or
her decision at any time prior to final judgment on the merits.13 9 With
the new rule allowing for striking of class allegations there will be very
few cases where a complaint is actually dismissed. If dismissal is
granted, immediate appeal should be allowed as a final judgment.
If the judge strikes the class allegations, this order is final as to the
class. Yet, it is unlikely that immediate appeal will be allowed. Since
this order would not dismiss the complaint as to the individual plaintiff,
136. Id. at 1166.
137. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 advisory committee note.
138. Id.
139. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(1).
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the entire lawsuit would probably have to run its course before appeal
will be allowed.
While discretionary interlocutory appeals may be heard at the fed-
eral level, 140 Florida has no comparable rule or statute. To be heard as
an interlocutory appeal, an order must fall into one of the specific cate-
gories laid down by the rule. Orders concerning injunctive relief ordina-
rily are not allowed as a vehicle for review of class standing orders.
While such class standing orders may influence the scope of the injunc-
tion, the requirements for obtaining injunctive relief do not involve the
same considerations as class standing determinations. Unless the merits
of petitioner's own claim would be affected or the order passes on the
legal sufficiency of a claim for injunctive relief, this coat-tail review
should not be allowed.
Appeal by means of non-final orders which determine the issue of
liability in favor of the claimant has equally been unacceptable for re-
view of class standing determinations. Class determinations will show
who is participating in the lawsuit, not who, if anyone, is liable. In
isolated situations where a class standing determination would deter-
mine liability, such appeals will obviously be allowed.
Jurisdiction over the person as a basis for immediate appeal seems
unsound yet if the Florida Supreme .Court wishes immediate appeala-
bility of such interlocutory determinations, this may be the only way to
accomplish the task. Under that rationale all class standing determina-
tions would be reviewable. This was a concern which led the United
States Supreme Court to reject the "death-knell" doctrine. Such indis-
criminate review would circumvent judicial economy and lead to piece-
meal review. This, Florida courts have long been opposed to, thus it is
likely the Florida Supreme Court will reject the approach.
A liberal view of the writ of common law certiorari may allow
appeals of class denials under the death-knell rationale. Yet it seems
probable that this liberal view will not be accepted and this writ will be
unavailable in all but the most exceptional cases.
As a final resort, mandamus is available in cases where there has
been a clear showing of usurpation of judicial discretion. This remedy
is available for improper class certification as well as improper denial
of certification.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
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Orders which determine whether a suit may proceed as a class
action should not be immediately appealable in all cases. At the present
time the Florida courts are not in a position to use their discretion.
Orders of this nature will either have to be immediately appealable or
none may be appealed. What would seem vital to effective class action
suits in Florida is some change in the appellate policy. A revision of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure incorporating Federal Statute 1292(b) is
needed. Since this is a form of procedure, the Florida Supreme Court
should be able to make this necessary adoption.
Such an addition to rule 9.130 could be added as (a)(3)(D) and
might read...
(a)(3) "Review of non-final orders of lower tribunals is limited to
those which:" '
(D) involve a controlling question of law which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinions, and an immediate appeal may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. These
appeals will be heard only upon the certification of a Circuit Court
judge and acceptance by the District Court.""
This addition would allow the Florida courts the right to hear immedi-
ate class standing appeals in cases where immediate review would ef-
fectuate Florida's litigation policies.
Janice Seamon
141. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3).
142. This suggestion is patterned after 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
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The Corporation's Attorney-Client Gamble: Privileged
Communications or Discovery Prone Disclosures
Introduction
This article consists of a six-part study into the attorney-client
privilege as it applies to the modern corporate client. Parts One and
Two focus on the history, purpose, effect and traditional formulations
of the attorney-client privilege. Sections Three and Four analyze prece-
dent applying the privilege to the corporate client at the national level,
with a separate look into Florida state courts and former Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals applications prior to the inception of the new Elev-
enth Circuit. The succeeding sections involve a critical analysis of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn v. United States,1
focusing primarily on the rationale supporting the Court's decision and
the effect Upjohn will have on the corporate client.
The Attorney-Client Privilege
Throughout history, man's insatiable quest for truth has been con-
ceptualized in two distinct procedural forums: the adversarial process;
and the inquisitorial process. Excepting Frederick the Great of Prussia
and Lenin, few political leaders have adopted the inquisition, preferring
instead the adversary system, pitting man against man.2 Government
officials, in the adversary system, generally have been used only as
referrees, maintaining a separateness from the adversary's participation
in the process.
Anglo-American jurisprudence reflects this philosophy in the
strictest sense, demanding injury-in-fact between adversaries and full
disclosure of all pertinent facts. 3 The concept of a privilege against dis-
1. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
2. D. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE 389 (2d ed. 1977).
3. "The guiding philosophy behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particu-
larly the discovery rules, is disclosure." Milstein, Attorney-Client Privilege And The
Work Product Doctrine: Corporate Applications, 22 CORP. PRAC. SERIES (BNA) A-1
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closure apparently conflicts with this philosophy. Since the sixteenth
century, however, there has existed the oldest of testimonial privileges,
the attorney-client privilege, which cloaks certain communications be-
tween client and attorney with immunity from disclosure.'
For a privilege against disclosure to be recognized at law the fol-
lowing four conditions must exist:
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered. [and]
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.'
The genesis of the original attorney-client privilege embodied the
purpose of protecting the honor of the attorney and his oath of secrecy
to his client by not forcing him to divulge his confidential communica-
tions.6 By the end of the eighteenth century this underlying justification
started eroding from within, however, as professional jealousies devel-
oped from the hodge-podge labeling of privileges as exclusionary rules.'
Consequently, the courts were convinced to disregard application of the
attorney-client privilege to all of the lawyer's relationships.8
The attorney-client privilege is not an exclusionary rule and should
(1980); the goal secured by this philosophy is the "free and unobstructed search for the
truth." This goal must be continually balanced with "the right and absolute necessity
for confidential disclosure of information by the client to its attorney to gain the legal
advice sought thereby," before the scope of the privilege can be ascertained. Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963), rev'g 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
4. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
5. Id. § 2285, at 527.
6. Id. § 2290, at 543.
7. D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
430 (4th ed. 1981).
8. Id.
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not be considered as such.9 It may, "by chance of litigation become,
[an] exclusionary rule; but this is incidental and secondary. Primarily
. . . [it is] a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in
certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or
supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping. 10
Recent critics of the attorney-client privilege, however, are still
quick to label it as an exclusionary rule of evidence in an attempt to
discredit its fundamental importance to the judicial system. 1 Such
spurious generalization, however, undermines the modern purpose of
the attorney-client privilege. This purpose encourages a client's "full
disclosure to his attorney by removing the .. fear of having such con-
fidential communication divulged under judicial compulsion. ' 12
Whereas the original privilege operated as the attorney's protectionist
device to insure the honor of the profession, the new theory focuses on
the client's fears. Thus the modern privilege belongs to the client, not
the attorney. 13 The client may invoke the privilege to protect his confi-
dential disclosures regardless of his relationship to the particular cause
or the attorney's desire to divulge the communications. 4
While the privilege is "designed to secure the client's confidence in
the secrecy of his communications,"1 5 the purpose behind such a privi-
lege is not thwarted by allowing for its voluntary relinquishment.
Therefore the client may waive the legal protections afforded by the
privilege at any juncture of the lawyer-client relationship.16 It is signifi-
9. Id. at 428.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Milstein, supra note 3, at A-1. "The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need
for the advocate and the counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for
seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.'" Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). The Supreme Court has recognized the purpose
of the privilege "to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys." Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
13. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950); J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2292, at 554, § 2321, at 629.
14. J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2321, at 629. This rule is not absolute, how-
ever. See the FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE, § 90.502(2)(e) (1979) of the Florida Statutes,
which states in part that an attorney may invoke the privilege on behalf of his client.
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cant to note that this right to waive "belongs solely to the client and
not to the attorney."17
The conscientious advocate must keep in mind that the attorney-
client privilege is not a rule excluding evidence from admission into a
court record; rather it is a substantive right granting the client immu-
nity from divulging particular confidences communicated to his attor-
ney. This fundamental difference emphasizes that the nucleus of the
privilege is the client's substantive state rights: a concept that must be
understood before a logical prediction can be made concerning the ap-
plication and scope of the privilege. While making decisions concerning
the availability of the attorney-client privilege it is mandatory for the
advocate to balance the client's right to protect his confidential commu-
nications with the procedural requirement of full disclosure., The ad-
judicative forum must be considered in this decision-making process.
For example, rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that a
federal court decide most privilege questions in accordance with "the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience."1 9 Con-
versely, in a civil action where state law controls the rule of decision
concerning an element of a claim or defense, questions regarding privi-
lege, "shall be determined in accordance with state law."20
General Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Dean Wigmore's formulation of the attorney-client privilege has
gained widespread recognition. 21 According to Wigmore, the following
elements are prerequisites for application of the attorney-client
privilege:
17. Id. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888), for an extensive discussion
on the process of voluntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege by the client.
18. Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d at 324.
19. FED. R. EvID. 501. Although the federal courts will apply federal common
law, they cannot agree upon the proper common-law privilege to apply. See Monarch
Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
20. FED. R. EvID. 501. See also Milstein, supra note 3, at A-2. Courts will apply
federal privilege law "in civil actions involving application of federal law" (e.g. anti-
trust, securities, and patent suits). Id.
21. J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2292, at 554.
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1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought 2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, 3) the communications relat-
ing to that purpose, 4) made in confidence 5) by the client, 6) are
at his instance permanently protected 7) from disclosure by himself
or by the legal adviser, 8) except the protection [may] be waived. 2
Another general formulation of the privilege receiving frequent ci-
tation appeared in Judge Wyzanski's opinion from United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.23 In a civil anti-trust action where the
defendant corporation objected to the introduction of nearly 800 exhib-
its on the grounds that they fell within the attorney-client privilege, the
court held a matter privileged when:
(1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in con-
nection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the com-
munication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a)
by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the pur-
pose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for
the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client."'
"The beginning point [in understanding the applicability of the attor-
ney-client privilege] is the fundamental principle that the public has
the right to every man's evidence, and exemptions from the general
duty to give testimony that one is capable of giving are distinctly ex-
ceptional. ' '25 An exemption will become justified "if - and only if -
policy requires it be recognized when measured against the fundamen-
tal responsibility of every person to give testimony." 26
22. Id.
23. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). See H. PITT & H. WACHTELL, PRESERV-
ING CORPORATE CONFIDENTIALITY IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 327 (2d ed. 1981).
24. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
25. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971). See also, J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2192, at 70.
26. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1100.
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The Privilege Applied to the Corporate Client
Although the Supreme Court recognized the attorney-client privi-
lege in the 1880's,27 it was not judged applicable (arguably) to the cor-
porate client until 1915.128 A landmark case from the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Associa-
tion,29 reflects the modern view toward the availability of the privilege
for the corporate client. Radiant Burners was a private civil action al-
leging violations of the Sherman Act by American Gas Association.
The court held that "based on history, principle, precedent and public
policy the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available to
corporations ... ."30
As a keystone to predicting future application of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege to the corporate client, it is important to understand the
court's rationale for its holding in Radiant Burners. In the court's view,
the ultimate objective of the privilege is to "facilitate the administra-
tion of justice by encouraging full disclosure by the client to its attor-
ney."' 31 Although Radiant Burners reflects the typical balance of fed-
eral and state interests, as a federal nondiversity action the federal
common law privilege was utilized instead of state law.32 The court in
Radiant Burners declined an invitation to decide a blanket privilege for
corporations, holding that the applicable privilege must be decided on a
case-by-case basis by "balancing the competing goals of the free and
unobstructed search for the truth with the right and absolute necessity
for confidential disclosure of information by the client to its attorney to
gain the legal advice sought thereby. .. .
Availability of the attorney-client privilege for the corporate client
27. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
28. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
29. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), rev'g 207
F. Supp. 771 (N.D. I11. 1962).
30. Id. at 323.
31. Id. at 322.
32. It should be noted here, however, that there was no state law, codified or
judicial, addressing the problem of applying the attorney-client privilege to corpora-
tions. Id. at 319. In other nondiversity federal actions the courts have used state law
when it was available. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1100.
33. 320 F.2d at 324.
1622 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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623
is made more complex due to choice of law problems." The former
Fifth Circuit recognized this problem in Garner v. Wolfinbarger,3 5
where it held that "[tihe privilege does not arise from the position of
the corporation as a party but its status as a client."3 In Garner, a
class action suit was brought by stockholders against the corporation
for alleged violations of federal and state securities laws. The court
held "that the choice of law cannot be settled by reference to any sim-
ple talisman, but can be arrived at only after a consideration of state
and federal interests that are inseparable from the factors bearing on
the availability of the privilege itself."' 37 Those factors bearing on the
availability of the privilege have become the basis for discord among
the federal and state judiciaries. As a result various combinations of
interests have been advocated and many have been adopted. Although
the Supreme Court of the United States recognizes a need, it refuses to
standardize the attorney-corporate client privilege, emphasizing that
those cases can only be decided on a "case-by-case basis." 38
While, as stated, availability of the attorney-client privilege for the
corporate client has been judicially accepted, there is much disagree-
ment concerning the proper scope of that privilege. Recognizing that a
"corporation can communicate only through its human agents, the...
question arises: which individuals may 'be' the corporation for purposes
of the attorney-client privilege?" 39 Other courts have phrased this di-
lemma as "how far down the corporate table of organization [does] the
privilege extend[?]"'
If a corporation is deemed to communicate only through its human
agents, then only those agents "deemed to personify the corporation
may invoke the corporate privilege. ' 41 Who, then, personifies the corpo-
34. See 2 B. BARRON & G. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
967, at 241-44 (Wright ed. 1961).
35. See generally 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 1097.
37. Id.
38. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981). This approach appears
consistent with the rationale espoused by the Seventh Circuit in Radiant Burners, 320
F.2d 314.
39. United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 42 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
40. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 613 (8th Cir. 1977) (en
banc) (1978).
41. Milstein, supra note 3, at A-5.
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ration to the extent required to invoke the privilege? The courts are
divided on this issue. Although two primary tests are used to determine
the scope of the privilege, in practice they actually form only the
boundaries within which the courts operate. The test used by the ma-
jority of jurisdictions, and the most restrictive of the two, is the con-
trol-group test."2 This test, originally authored by Judge Kirpatrick in
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Co.,43 held that an em-
ployee sufficiently personified the corporation for purposes of the attor-
ney-client privilege:
if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he
may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part
in a decision about any action which the corporation may take
upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member
of a body or group which has that authority. .. .
In every other case "the employee would be merely giving information
to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in the corporation
having the authority to act or refrain from acting on the advice."' 45
Although the control-group test is the majority view, it is rapidly
losing support, being forced to give way to less restrictive and more
realistic views. One of the most striking criticisms of the control-group
test is that it does not provide for privileged communications between
middle-level or lower-level management and counsel. 46 The Eighth Cir-
cuit noted this flaw in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,'47 hold-
ing that: "In a corporation, it may be necessary to glean information
relevant to a legal problem from middle management and nonmanage-
ment personnel as well as from top executives."' 8 A strict reading of
42. Id.
43. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
44. Id. at 485.
45. Id.
46. See Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Cor-
porations in The Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339 (1972), for a critical analysis of
the control-group test. But see Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (Con-
trol group includes managers and assistant managers of patent division and research
and development department).
47. 572 F.2d 596.
48. Id. at 608-09. The ability to "glean" this information from those who are in
Nova Law Journal
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the control-group test, wouldt require tlhat such communications not be
privileged.
The Supreme Court in Upjohn v. United States'9 recently decided
not to use the control-group test, holding that it "frustrates the very
purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant
information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render
legal advice to the client corporation."' 0 The Court further explained
that there may be instances when the attorney's advice will be more
significant to "noncontrol group members than to those who officially
sanction the advice, [indicating that] . . . the control-group test makes
it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees
who will put into effect the client corporation's policy."51 Keeping in
mind that corporations, quite unlike individuals, "constantly go to law-
yers to find out how to obey the law," 52 the application of the control-
group test seems to encompass an unrealistic view of the business com-
munity in general. Nevertheless, this test continues to enjoy widespread
popularity in its application. 3
possession of it poses a problem for the attorney as well as the client. The privilege
exists not only to protect "the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it
but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and in-
formed advice." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390. See also the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSImILITY, EC 4-1 (1980), which states: "A lawyer should be fully informed of
all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advan-
tage of our legal system." The incentive to perform this investigation might be lost
were the attorney to suspect that his inquiry had uncovered confidential communica-
tions that could become the subject of discovery.
49. 449 U.S. 383.
50. Id. at 392.
51. Id.
52. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus.
LAW 901, 913 (1969).
53. The Tenth Circuit used this test in Natta, 392 F.2d 686; the Sixth Circuit
used it in Upjohn v. United States, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981). The Sixth Circuit was reversed on the particular facts of the Upjohn case only.
The Supreme Court explicitly refused to espouse any "blanket-privilege law"; hence
the effect of this decision on the Sixth Circuit's use of the control-group test remains
uncertain. "Many district courts in other circuits have also applied the test," Milstein,
supra note 3, at A-6 (citing Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md.
1974); United States v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
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The subject-matter test is another approach receiving widespread
jurisdictional support. This test, holding the content of the communica-
tion to be determinative of its status with regard to a privilege rather
than the corporate rank of the communicator, found its origin in the
Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.5 In a
complex civil anti-trust action alleging horizontal price fixing by
twenty-three defendants, the court held certain defense memoranda
privileged communications when:
an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his com-
munication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superi-
ors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of
his employment.55
Another criticism of the control-group test attacks the very basis of its foundation,
Judge Kirpatrick's reasoning in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 210 F.
Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Attorneys writing as amici curiae for petitioners in Upjohn
condemned the control-group test and Judge Kirpatrick's interpretation of Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Brief Amici Curiae On Behalf Of The American College
Of Trial Lawyers And 33 Law Firms In Support Of Petitioners; Submitted To The
Supreme Court Of The United States, No. 79-886, For The Case Upjohn v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), at 19 n.16. [Hereinafter cited as Brief Amici Curiae].
The content of the brief argues that Judge Kirpatrick's decision in City of Philadel-
phia reflected a misguided reliance on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Hickman. Their position stresses that Kirpatrick found the Hickman decision to be
dispositive as to the scope of the attorney-corporate client privilege by holding that
when a corporate executive "communicates a fact relative to pending litigation to a
lawyer retained or employed by the corporation . . . the employee is merely a witness
.," and as such his statements to the lawyer are not privileged. City of Philadel-
phia, 210 F. Supp. at 485. The Court in Hickman, however, specifically refused "to
delineate the content and scope of [the attorney-client] . . . privilege as recognized in
the Federal Courts." Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508. Any reliance upon that decision for a
disposition of the scope of the attorney-corporate client privilege would be unjustified.
Brief Amici Curiae at 19 n.16.
54. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), arfd per curiam by an equally divided court,
400 U.S. 348 (1971).
55. Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added).
1 626 6:1982 1Nova Law Journal
73
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
6:1982 Privileged Corporate Communications 627
Although the subject-matter test is considered to be more reflec-
tive of the realities of modern corporate life, its broader blanketing of
communications has been limited by at least one federal circuit. The
Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. held the subject-matter
test appropriate only if:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the
direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the re-
quest so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the sub-
ject matter of the communication is within the scope of the em-
ployee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents. 6
A common criticism of the subject-matter test is its apparent'con-
flict with the limitations imposed on the work product doctrine by the
United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.5 7 The Seventh
Circuit (in Harper & Row), ingeniously averted running afoul with the
Hickman limitations, explaining that the privilege does not cover "the
communications of employees about matters as to which they are virtu-
"158ally indistinguishable from bystander witnesses ... .
56. 572 F.2d at 609.
57. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Court in Hickman recognizes that "[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litiga-
tion." Id. at 507. (Statements of witnesses to a tugboat accident, though the product of
an attorney, prepared while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation, were sub-
ject to discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 only upon a showing that
denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of the adversary's
case or cause him any hardship or injustice).
The Work Product Doctrine established in Hickman, now codified in FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3), must not be confused with the attorney-client privilege. While the privi-
lege belongs to the client, protecting his confidential communications, the work product
doctrine belongs to the attorney as a means of protecting the fruits of his labor. An
attorney may be forced to disclose his work product only upon a showing of good cause
by his adversary. Id. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege, The Self-Evaluative
Report Privilege, And Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 699,
701 (1979).
58. Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491. The subject-matter test was criticized by
the Sixth Circuit in Upjohn as enabling "the corporation's management-via agents-to
'communicate' to counsel the details of transactions about which management is only
74
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Many courts have adopted tests of their own, which are combina-
tions of the control-group and subject-matter tests, with characteristics
far less restrictive than the former. For example some federal district
judges in the District of Columbia have adopted their own test, fash-
ioned after the control-group and subject-matter tests. First authored
by Judge Richey in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,59 the follow-
ing requirements must be met before the employee communications can
be claimed within the attorney-client privilege:
1) The particular employee. . . must have made a communication
of information which was reasonably believed to be necessary to
the decision-making process concerning a problem on which legal
advice was sought;
2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of
securing legal advice;
3) The subject matter of the communication . . must have been
related to the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment; and
4) The communication must have been a confidential one .... 60
Another well known analysis, coined the all-employees test, was
authored by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp."1 The court in United Shoe held: "the attorney-client privilege
protects communications of any corporate employee to the corpora-
tion's attorneys where those communications otherwise meet the pre-
requisites for application of the privilege."'6 2 This test is the least re-
dimly aware and to have these communications protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege." 600 F.2d at 1227. This encouraged "senior managers purposely to ignore impor-
tant information they have good business reasons to know and use." Id. This suppos-
edly impedes the liberal exercise of discovery which the modern procedural rules seek
to foster. This argument fails to recognize, however, the "full panoply of discovery
devices made available by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" even in jurisdictions
applying the subject-matter test. Brief Amici Curiae at 19 n.16. E.g., Interrogatories
submitted to an adversary under rule 33 require a response containing the collective
knowledge of agents and employees; rule 34 provides for production of corporate docu-
ments; and rule 30 enables an adversary to depose employees. Id.
59. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
60. Id. at 385.
61. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
62. Milstein, supra note 3, at A-10.
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strictive of all and has been criticized as being in direct conflict with
Hickman.63 Despite these criticisms, however, the all-employees test
has found favor in other jurisdictions as well.64
Former Fifth Circuit and Florida State Court Applications of
the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege
The general common law rule that an attorney cannot be forced to
disclose any confidential communications made to him by a client with-
out his client's consent, has long been recognized in Florida. 5 "The
rule is founded on the necessity, in the interest and administration of
justice, that persons seeking legal aid and counsel should be free to
communicate with their confidential adviser about the subject matter of
their problem without fear . . . of disclosure." 66
The attorney-client privilege has been codified in the Florida Evi-
dence Code providing the client with a privilege of refusal to disclose
those communications made to his attorney when such were intended to
be confidential .6  The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Florida has
also adopted the Radiant Burners application of the attorney-client
privilege to the corporate client,6 8 but neither the Florida state courts,
nor the federal judiciaries within the former Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
63. See supra note 57.
64. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D.
Del. 1954), wherein the court seems to have adopted the all-employees test from
United Shoe. See also United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir. 1978); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
65. 24 FLA. JUR. 2d Evidence And Witnesses § 532, at 156 (1981). Keir v. State,
152 Fla. 389, 11 So. 2d 886 (1943); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Parker, 65 Fla. 543, 62
So. 589 (1913).
66. 24 FLA. JUR. 2d Evidence And Witnesses § 532, at 156, 157 (1981) (citing
81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 172 (1976)).
67. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(a)-(c), (2) (1979) Florida recognizes that the privi-
lege is not absolute and may be outweighed "by public interest in the administration of
justice in certain circumstances." Sepler v. State, 191 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) (citations omitted).
68. Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Pledger, 352 So. 2d 85, 88 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977). Although this point was included in Judge Downey's dissenting opinion, it be-
comes clear from a careful reading that the object of the dissent was not related to the
application of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation. Judge Downey was
merely stating that which he knew to be the law in Florida with regard to this issue.
629 1
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cuits have explicitly adopted any particular test with respect to the
scope of this privilege. In fact the Fifth Circuit specifically declined to
choose between the control-group and subject-matter tests.69 A careful
analysis of the precedent on this subject, however, establishes that both
the former Fifth Circuit and the Florida state courts have chosen to
mirror the application set forth in United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp.70 On more than one occasion the Fifth Circuit specifically
adopted the formulation of the general attorney-client privilege from
United Shoe.71 The Fifth Circuit also recognized the importance of
considering state court decisions when deciding the availability and
scope of the attorney-client privilege, especially in light of the vague
guidance provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 501.72
Although Florida state court decisions do not reveal much "blan-
ket-privilege law" concerning this issue, they do show some interesting
corollaries to a less restrictive trend than that evidenced through an
application of the control-group test. For example, Florida courts have
consistently recognized the Hickman work product limitations on wit-
ness' testimony. 73 While inevitable conflict with Hickman remains the
most formidable criticism of the subject-matter and all-employees
tests, 7 4 Florida follows Hickman guidelines, sometimes forcing the dis-
covery of an attorney's work product. 5
Florida courts have also deemed the extent of the attorney-client
privilege to be a matter of state law, indicating that they were not
"bound to follow the [United States] Supreme Court's holding in this
69. See In re Thompson, 624 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit's
decision to pass on this issue was due to their expectation that the Supreme Court
would resolve this matter once and for all in the Upjohn decision that was then pending
before that court. Id. The irony here is that the Supreme Court also refused to resolve
this issue definitively. See infra text accompanying note 82.
70. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
71. See In reGrand Jury Proceedings, 517 F. 2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1975). See
also United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir. 1978).
72. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d at 670.
73. Dupree v. Better Way, Inc., 86 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1956); Nationwide Ins. Co.,
Pinellas County v. Monroe, 276 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
74. Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146, 154 (7th Cir. 1969).
75. Dupree, 86 So. 2d 426; Nationwide Ins. Co., Pinellas County, 276 So. 2d
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regard. ' 6 This adamant stance emphasizes the client's substantive
state rights when balanced with the federal philosophy of full disclo-
sure. With the statutorily guaranteed right to privileged communica-
tion receiving increased emphasis in Florida courts, the federal philoso-
phy toward complete disclosure receives less consideration. The genesis
of the subject-matter and all-employees tests, and the decisions in
Harper & Row and United Shoe respectively, indicate that a need to
protect the client's substantive rights was perceived as giving rise to the
attorney-client privilege. Arguably this perception by Florida courts
represents an intent to apply the less restrictive test when determining
the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 7
The Upjohn Decision
In Upjohn v. United States,7 8 the Internal Revenue Service de-
manded production of questionnaires compiled by Upjohn counsel dur-
ing an in-house investigation of questionable corporate payments to for-
eign government officials.79 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the control-group test, ordering discovery of the documents, but the
United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari "to ad-
dress important questions concerning the scope of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context. ... 8o The circuit court decision
was reversed as the Supreme Court recognized their "task as one of
choosing between two 'tests' which have gained adherents in the courts
of appeals." '81 Attorneys and clients alike awaited a decision that would
finally standardize the applicability of the oldest of testimonial privi-
leges to the corporate client. Such a decision was not forthcoming, how-
ever, as the Court, in practically the same breath that it had recognized
76. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So. 2d 263, 266 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
77. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(b) (1976), "Providing that a 'client' is any per-
son or organization consulting a lawyer to obtain legal services or receiving them from
a lawyer." 24 FLA. JUR. 2d Evidence And Witnesses § 533, at 158 (1981). This rather
liberal definition of a client for purposes of the privilege seems to support this
proposition.
78. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 386.
81. Id.
78
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its task, held not "to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern
all conceivable future questions in this area ... 82
Although at a glance this decision seems to carry limited potential
for future application,8 a careful reading will reveal that the court not
only fashioned a standard set of guidelines, useful during application of
the privilege, but also strengthened the weakening basis of the modern
attorney-client privilege. They held privileged those communications
concerning "matters within the scope of the employees' corporate du-
ties, ... [where] the employees themselves were sufficiently aware
that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could
obtain legal advice." '84 The Supreme Court in Upjohn recognized that
the communications were: [1] made by Upjohn employees, [2] to coun-
sel for Upjohn acting as such, [3] at the direction of corporate superi-
ors, [4] in order to secure legal advice from counsel [5] within their
scope of employment with the intent to be confidential.85
The Court specifically rejected the use of the control-group test
stating that to hold otherwise "frustrates the very purpose of the privi-
lege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by em-
ployees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the
client corporation. 86 The Supreme Court clearly recognized the reali-
ties of corporate operation and management, saying that "[a]fter the
lawyer forms his or her opinion, it is of no immediate benefit to the
Chairman of the Board or the President. It must be given to the corpo-
rate personnel who will apply it."'87
The Upjohn decision also strengthens the attorney-client privilege
by recognizing the underlying purpose behind its application. That pur-
pose is "to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients. ... " The Court's understanding of the purpose of
82. Id.
83. The Supreme Court specifically limited its review to a case-by-case analysis
of the scope of the privilege to be applied. Id. at 396.
84. Id. at 394.
85. 449 U.S. at 394. There is striking similarity between this language and that
used by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th
Cir. 1977) (en banc) (1978). See supra text accompanying note 56.
86. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 389.
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the privilege focuses on the fears of the client, providing for a scope
determination only after a balancing of the federal philosophy of com-
plete discovery with the need to protect the client's rights. The Su-
preme Court specifically refused to decide a standard proposition of law
on this matter,89 emphasizing that "to draft a set of rules which should
govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas .. .would violate the
spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501."90
Although a "case-by-case" analysis results in divergent application
of the attorney-corporate client privilege, it also guarantees its contin-
ued existence by enabling the courts to take into consideration the un-
derlying purpose of the privilege; the protection of the client's substan-
tive rights.91
Conclusion
The Upjohn decision, while narrowly drafted, exhibits far reaching
guidelines. Although the Court restricted application of the subject-
matter test to the facts in Upjohn, the basis of their decision, recogniz-
ing the principles underlying the attorney-corporate client privilege,
strengthened the precedential value of that opinion. The Court neither
expressly condemned the control-group test nor sanctioned any other as
a matter of law; rather their reasoning reflects particular emphasis on
the need for any forum deciding privilege questions to pay particular
consideration to balancing the federal philosophy of full disclosure with
the substantive rights of the client. The product of this balance is then
to be filtered upon application through the facts of the case. 92 This two-
part analysis provides first for a determination of the availability of the
privilege as a matter of law, and secondly an evaluation of its applica-
bility to the facts at issue.
By creating this two-step process, the Court has undercut the
strength of the control-group test as a matter of law. While considering
the availability of the attorney-corporate client privilege the Court
seems to be advocating the advantages of the subject-matter test, much
as an adversary would, to the ultimate demise of the control-group test.
89. Id. at 396.
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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Not only has the control-group test become less available as a matter
of law, it has also become less applicable as a matter of fact.93
While the Supreme Court refused to decide a blanket privilege ap-
plicable to all jurisdictions,94 its adamant stance, and argumentative
style seems to have sounded the death knell for the control-group
test.95
Mark R. McCollem
93. See In re Coordinated Pre-Trial Proceedings, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Supreme Court's holding in Upjohn was followed as precedent with respect to the
availability and applicability of the attorney-corporate client privilege. Regarding the
issue of the privileged nature of corporate employee's orientation sessions, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision ordering discovery, citing Upjohn for the
authority that the subject-matter test privileged those communications. The Ninth Cir-
cuit even expanded the holding in Upjohn, holding that "although Upjohn was specifi-
cally limited to current employees . . ., the same rationale applies to the ex-employees
[as well]." 658 F.2d at 1361, n.7. If the Upjohn decision were actually to be limited to
the facts in that case alone, then the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon that decision would
have been unwarranted. This author is of the opinion that the realistic effect of the
Upjohn decision will be to severely limit the application of the control-group test
throughout the federal judiciaries. See also, Leer v. Chicago, Milwaukee St. Paul &
Pacific Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981). The dissent in Leer found the unaniminity
of the Court's decision in Upjohn to be "highly persuasive," with regard to the applica-
bility of the attorney-client privilege to protect depositions taken from switching crew
employees for a railroad company. Id. at 310.
94. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
95. In the interest of complete fairness; for an indication that the control-group
test still thrives, see Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 50 Ill. L.W. 2469 (Ill.
Feb. 16, 1982). The Supreme Court of Illinois applied the control-group test, clearly
recognizing that although the United States Supreme Court in Upjohn found that test
inadequate, the Upjohn decision was limited to its own facts. The Illinois court found
that a broadening of the scope of the privilege beyond the control-group would be "in-
compatible with [their] . . . state's broad discovery policies looking to the ultimate
ascertainment of the truth .. " Id. at 2470.
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Incarceration as a Condition of Probation: New
Limitations
In the past, Florida judges have attempted to circumvent a parole
policy, which they considered to be ineffective. They withheld imposi-
tion of sentence upon a defendant found guilty of the crime for which
he was charged, and imposed an order of probation with the condition
that the defendant serve a lengthy term in the county jail or state peni-
tentiary. Because the defendant was not incarcerated pursuant to a sen-
tence, but rather as a condition of probation, he was technically ineligi-
ble for parole consideration even after he had served the statutory
period of confinement. Abuse of this technicality effectively granted the
trial judge the power to incarcerate the defendant for a full term rather
than relinquishing the discretion to the Parole Board to grant the de-
fendant an early release.
The authority to impose incarceration as a condition of probation
is established by Florida Statutes section 948.01(4).1 The interpretation
and application of this section has continually been the source of de-
bate and controversy. It has, however, been consistently construed to
permit trial courts to order incarceration followed by probation, or to
withhold adjudication of the defendant's guilt and impose probation
with the condition that he serve some portion thereof incarcerated.2
The abuse of the statute arose from its failure to prescribe the reasona-
ble lengths of incarceration which could be imposed as a condition of
probation.
In its recent decision, Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Com-
1. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (1981).
2. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (1981) provides:
(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony,
except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may,
at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation
upon completion of any specified period of such sentence. In such case, the
court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence
imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon
probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.
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mission,' the Florida Supreme Court attempted to quell much of the
controversy by setting a maximum of less than one year for which in-
carceration may be imposed as a condition of probation. Furthermore,
the court established a more definite framework for application of the
statute than existed in the past, and articulated concrete guidelines for
correcting prior decisions which are inconsistent with Villery's holding.
This comment will explore the past confusion, analyze the Villery deci-
sion and review subsequent application of the statute under Villery's
direction.
Probation and the Validity of Imposing Incarceration as a
Condition of Probation
In discerning whether the imposition of incarceration as a condi-
tion of probation is proper and whether a probationer who is incarcer-
ated pursuant to such an order is eligible to be considered for parole,
Florida's Supreme Court first considered the rationale and authority
for granting probation and imposing incarceration as a condition. Flor-
ida Statutes section 948.01(1) and (3), grants the trial court the discre-
tion to withhold adjudication of guilt, or adjudge the defendant guilty
but withhold the imposition of sentence, and place the defendant on
probation with the hope that he may return to a useful life. This is
generally done if the court determines that the defendant is not likely
to be involved in further criminal activity and the interests of society
and justice do not appear to be jeopardized.' Moreover, the statute al-
3. 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980).
4. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(1), (3) (1981) provides:
(1) Any court of the state having original jurisdiction of criminal actions,
where the defendant in a criminal case has been found guilty by the ver-
dict of a jury or has entered a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere or
has been found guilty by the court trying the case without a jury, except
for an offense punishable by death, may at a time to be determined by the
court, either with or without an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant,
hear and determine the question of probation of such defendant.
(3) If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defen-
dant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that
the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defen-
dant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law, the court, in its
discretion, may either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and with-
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lows the court to impose probation, with or without adjudication of
guilt, to avoid inflicting upon the defendant the stigma of a criminal
conviction 5 and thus prevent the loss of the defendant's civil rights by
virtue of the criminal conviction where such a loss may not be wholly
justified.6
In granting probation, however, the trial judge may feel that a
sample of prison life would be extremely instructive as part of the reha-
bilitation process. In this regard, the Second District Court of Appeal
recognized "that salutary results may be obtained by first giving one
who is to be placed on probation a 'taste of prison' in order to graphi-
cally demonstrate what is likely to happen to him should he violate the
terms of that probation."17 The trial judge's authority to impose such
incarceration as a condition of probation, often referred to as the split
sentence alternative, stems from Florida Statutes section 948.01(4).
During the life of section 948.01(4), however, this grant of author-
ity has not always been well defined. Prior to July 1, 1974, the trial
judge had specific authority only to impose incarcration in the county
jail followed by a period of probation." Therefore, the split sentence
alternative could be utilized only in the case of misdemeanor offenses.9
However, the Florida Legislature amended the statute effective July 1,
1974, by expanding the trial court's authority to grant the split sen-
tence alternative in cases involving misdemeanors and felonies, 10 pre-
sumably encompassing orders imposing prison sentences, as well as
terms in the county jail.
hold the adjudication of guilt and in either case stay and withhold the
imposition of sentence upon such defendant, and shall place him upon pro-
bation under the supervision and control of the [parole and probation]
commission for the duration of such probation.
5. Holland v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 352 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
6. Delaney v. State, 190 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla. 1966).
7. Olcott v. State, 378 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
8. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (1971) originally provided: "(4) Whenever punish-
ment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed ... "
9. State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18, 24 (Fla. 1976).
10. Effective July 1, 1974, FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) was amended by 1974 Fla.
Laws ch. 74-112 to read as follows: "(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment iite
county jail for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony .... " (lined-
through words deleted, underscored words added). id. at 342.
637 1
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Despite the Florida Legislature's efforts toward clarity, the trial
courts continued to indicate confusion in their application of the stat-
ute.11 Numerous sentences of probation, imposed to follow periods of
incarceration were declared void and improper by the district courts.1 2
They generally recognized that the "withholding of sentence or a por-
tion thereof is an indispensible prerequisite to entry of an order placing
a defendant on probation."' s Further, "[there] is no authority for an
adjudication of guilt and a sentence to straight probation."' 4
"[P]robation is concerned only with suspension of the imposition or
pronouncement of sentence."1 5
State v. Jones Authorizes Incarceration for Felony Offenses as
Well as Misdemeanors
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Jones," recog-
nized the inconsistency in the methods used by the trial courts in apply-
ing the split sentencing alternative. The court stated in Jones, that
"[the District Courts have both approved and restricted these orders
to the extent that it is difficult for the trial court to determine the
proper procedure to use."" In Jones, the defendant, after pleading
guilty to "(1) possession of heroin, (2) [issuing] a worthless check, and
(3) .. .a forged instrument," 18 was ordered by the trial court to con-
finement in the Dade County jail for one year, to be followed by five
years probation. 9 Upon violation of the probation, the trial judge re-
voked Jones' probation and sentenced him to three concurrent terms of
two years each in the state penitentiary.20 Upon review, the Third Dis-
11. Jones, 327 So. 2d at 22.
12. Waters v. State, 290 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Williams v.
State, 280 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Washington v. State, 284 So. 2d
236 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
13. Brown v. State, 302 So. 2d 430, 432 (Fla. 4th Dist: Ct. App. 1974).
14. Id.
15. State v. Williams, 237 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
16. 327 So. 2d at 22.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 21. Jones was given 135 days credit for time already served in the
county jail.
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trict Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but reversed the
sentence stating that the maximum period for which the defendant
could be incarcerated pursuant to his violation of probation could equal
only that period of the original sentence withheld by the trial court at
the original sentencing. 21
However, the Florida Supreme Court reinstated the amended sen-
tence of the trial court, imposed pursuant to the probation violation.
The court specifically ruled that the "trial courts have both general and
specific authority for imposition of the split sentence probation alterna-
tive."' 22 Moreover, "the trial courts of this state have the general au-
thority to require incarceration as a condition of probation for felony
and misdemeanor offenses pursuant to the general condition provisions
of section 948.03, Florida Statutes . *."..- While incarceration was
generally not regarded as a condition of probation, the court's holding
in Jones expressly approved the split sentence alternative as provided
by statute24 and rejected the claim that the trial judge must withhold a
21. Id.
22. Id. at 24.
23. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 948.03 (198,1) provides:
(1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probationer
and may include among them the following, that the probationer shall:
(a) Avoid injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Report to the probation and parole supervisors as directed;
(d) Permit such supervisors to visit hiin at his home, or elsewhere;
(e) Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be
possible;
(f) Remain within a specified place;
(g) Make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the dam-
age or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the
court;
(h) Support his legal dependents to the best of his ability.
(i) Make payment of the debt due and owing to the state under §
960.17, subject to modification based on change of circumstances.
(3) The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall
not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it consid-
ers proper. The court may rescind or modify at any time of the terms and
conditions theretofore imposed by the court upon the probationer.
24. 327 So. 2d at 25.
6391
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portion of the initial sentence for possible use in the future should the
terms of the probation be violated. 5 The Florida Supreme Court's ra-
tionale in Jones was evident in its response to the question certified to it
by the Third District Court of Appeal," when the court stated:
that a defendant placed on probation pursuant to Section
948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973) who subsequently violates that
probation may be sentenced to imprisonment by the trial judge for
the same period of years as the court could have originally imposed
in accordance with Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1973), with-
out the necessity of establishing a term of sentence and withholding
a part of it at the initial sentencing proceedings.1
7
Incarceration as a Condition of Probation Is Not a Sentence
For The Purposes of Determining Eligibility for Parole
Despite the Florida Supreme Court's approval in Jones of incar-
ceration as a condition of probation, the issue arises whether such con-
dition should be construed to be a sentence for determining a proba-
tioner's eligibility for parole consideration. Section 947.16(1) expressly
limits such eligibility to those persons incarcerated pursuant to a sen-
tence. The Third District Court of Appeal, in McGowan v. State,2"
held that incarceration does not constitute a sentence, rather it is no
25. Id.
26. The question certified was:
Where one who could be sentenced to imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary for a period of years is sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail
... with direction that he be placed on probation upon completion of a
specified period .of such sentence with the remainder of the jail sentence
stayed and withheld . . ., upon revocation of the probation can the court
impose ... a new sentence in the state penitentiary for a period of years,
such as the court could have originally imposed . . ., or is the time to be
served, following revocation of probation which has been granted pursuant
to § 948.01(4), Fla. Stat., . . . limited to the unserved portion of the previ-
ously imposed jail sentence which was stayed and withheld upon placing
the defendant on probation?
id. at 20.
27. Id.
28. 362 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
87
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Incarceration as a Condition of Probation6:1982
more than a condition of probation. 9 Moreover, the Third District
Court of Appeal recognized the distinction between a sentence and an
order of probation. Probation is granted by the grace of the state in lieu
of a sentence with its primary purpose to be rehabilitation."0 Whereas,
a sentence is imposed "(a) to punish; (b) to deter similar criminal acts;
(c) to protect society; or, (d) to rehabilitate."31
The Third District Court of Appeal relies upon the express lan-
guage of the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.790(a). The rule
clearly states, "pronouncement and imposition of sentence of imprison-
ment shall not be made upon a defendant who is to be placed on proba-
tion regardless of whether such defendant has or has not been adjudi-
cated guilty."32 By the language of the statute, the two concepts appear
to be mutually exclusive since one who is sentenced may not be on
probation.
Probation Conditions Requiring Excessive Terms of
Incarceration Are Determined to Diminish Rehabilitative
Function of Parole
Even though an order of probation is not a sentence, if an exces-
sive prison term is imposed under the guise of probation, the order no
longer serves a rehabilitative function but tends to become punitive in
nature.33 As this inconsistency became apparent, the districts began to
overturn the trial courts' imposition of probation which were condi-
tioned on incarcerations of questionable length. 4
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the propriety of an
29. Id.
30. Loeb v. State, 387 So. 2d 433, 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
31. Freeman v. State, 382 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
32. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.790(a).
33. Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla.
1980).
34. Cunningham v. State, 385 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (three
years confinement in the state penitentiary as a condition of ten years probation for
conviction of manslaughter); Freeman v. State, 382 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (five years imprisonment as a condition of ten years probation); Geter v. Wain-
wright, 380 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (ten years imprisonment as a
condition of fifteen years probation); Olcott v. State, 378 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (six years imprisonment as a condition of fifteen years probation).
641 1
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excessive term of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation in
Shead v. State.35 The court ruled that when the defendant received a
nine and one-half year term of incarceration as a condition of proba-
tion, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the split sentence
alternative. The court's reversal was justified by the trial court's state-
ment that its ole purpose in imposing such a term "was to punish the
defendant by denying her any hope of parole." 6
The Second District Court of Appeal in Olcott v. State37 identified
the imposition of excessive terms of incarceration as conditions of pro-
bation as an attempt by the trial courts to evade what they considered
to be a liberal parole policy. 38 The defendant in Olcott pled guilty to
one count of attempted burglary, nine counts of burglary and four
counts of grand theft.39 The trial court ultimately imposed fifteen years
probation with the special condition that the defendant serve six years
in prison.40 In an amicus curiae brief submitted by the Florida Parole
and Probation Commission the court believed the Commission accu-
rately stated the problem:
The true issue . . . is one regarding the fundamental nature and
relationship of and between probation and parole. The traditional
concepts of parole and probation are such that the two are sepa-
rate, distinct, independent and unrelated conditions. Heretofore,
probation has always been accepted as something imposed in lieu
of incarceration, while parole has traditionally been accepted as a
measure which allows a prisoner to serve out the remainder of his
sentence outside incarceration.41
As noted by the Commission, parole and probation are sharply dis-
tinguishable. Parole has been defined as "the release of an offender
35. 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
36. Id. at 267 (emphasis added); see also Freeman, 382 So. 2d at 1308, where
the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that five years imprisonment to be served in
the state penitentiary imposed under the guise of a special condition of ten years proba-
tion was not permissible.
37. 378 So. 2d 303.
38. Id. at 305.
39. Id. at 303.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 304.
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from a penal or correctional institution after he has served a portion of
his sentence, under the custody of the state and under conditions that
permit his reincarceration in the event of misbehavior." 42 Whereas pro-
bation is "a disposition that allows the convicted offender to remain
free in the community while supervised by a person who helps him lead
a law-abiding life."' 3
The court in Olcott suggested a possible solution would be to
"read Section 947.16 broadly enough to encompass a term of confine-
ment of twelve months or more imposed as a condition of probation.
But this would contemplate the possibility that a person could be on
parole and probation at the same time."44 Furthermore, there exists the
possible anomaly that a probationer serving a lengthy term in prison as
a condition of probation may consider it advantageous to violate the
terms of his probation to provoke the imposition of a sentence under
which he would eventually become eligible for parole consideration."5
The court in Olcott recognized the authority of Jones, to "place
the defendant on probation and include, as a condition, incarceration
for a specific period of time within the maximum sentence allowed.""
The Second District Court of Appeal stated, however, it did not believe
Jones addressed the issue presented in Olcott because it failed to "con-
sider the impact on the parole process of a jail term as a condition of
probation.'4 7 Moreover, the Third District Court of Appeal, in Shead
v. State,"8 expressed doubt that a trial court, by imposing an excessive
prison term as a condition of probation, can usurp the exclusive author-
ity of the Parole Board to grant or deny parole to a person serving
time.' 9 Upon this logic, the court in Olcott noted, "[t]here is much to
be said for a maximum limitation of one year for incarceration as a
condition of probation because it would avoid any conflict with Section
42. S. RUBIN, H. WEIHOFEN, G. EDWARDS & S. ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION 546 (1963).
43. Id. at 176.
44. 378 So. 2d at 304 n.1.
45. Id. at 304-05.
46. Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. 367 So. 2d 264.
49. Id. at 268.
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947.16. "50
Florida Supreme Court Sets Maximum Incarceration Allowable
as Condition of Probation in Villery
The validity of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation
was again examined by the Florida Supreme Court in Villery v. Flor-
ida Parole & Probation Commission. Lula M. Villery previously
pleaded guilty to five counts of knowingly issuing worthless checks in
excess of fifty dollars.5 1 The trial court withheld adjudication of her
guilt and placed her on probation, not to exceed two and one-half
years. 2 Ms. Villery subsequently violated the terms of her probation
and, upon rehearing, the trial court adjudicated her guilty of the origi-
nal charges. 53 Pursuant to her violation of probation, the trial court
extended her probation to five years and imposed, as a special condi-
tion, concurrent county jail terms of two and one-half years for each of
the charges.54 Ms. Villery was given two days credit toward the jail
term for time she had already spent in the Dade County jail.5
The Florida Parole and Probation Commission took the position
that Ms. Villery was not incarcerated pursuant to a sentence, but
rather as a special condition of probation.58 Relying on the rule that
"[e]very person. . . whose sentence. . . or cumulative sentences total
12 months or more. . . shall . . . be eligible for consideration for pa-
role",57 the Commission informed Ms. Villery that she did not qualify
for parole review because she was not incarcerated pursuant to a sen-
tence.58 Ms. Villery asserted that incarceration imposed as a condition
of probation should be considered a "sentence" for purposes of parole
consideration eligibility.59 Thus, Ms. Villery petitioned the Florida Su-
50. 378 So. 2d at 305 n.4.






57. FLA. STAT. § 947.16(1) (1981) (emphasis added).
58. 396 So. 2d at 1108.
59. Id. at 1109.
91
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Incarceration as a Condition of Probation
preme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Florida Parole
and Probation Commission to review her eligibility for parole60 pursu-
ant to Florida Statutes section 947.16(1) (1979).61
The Florida Supreme Court expressly ruled in Villery "that incar-
ceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in sections
948.01(4) and 948.03(2), which equals or exceeds one year is invalid.
This applies to incarceration as a condition of probation as well as to
incarceration followed by a specific period of probation. 62 The court
recognized that a person must be sentenced to at least one year to be
eligible for parole under section 947.16(1). It construed this language
to indicate a legislative intent "to limit the period of incarceration
which may be imposed as a condition of probation under section
948.01(4) to a period of less than one year. If a longer period of incar-
ceration could be imposed as a probation condition the trial judge
could, in effect, negate the parole policy of this state. '63
The court went further to rule that Villery would apply retroac-
tively and that a person who is serving a term in prison, under the split
sentence alternative, which is not in accord with this decision may have
60. Id. at 1108.
61. FLA. STAT. § 947.16(1) (1981) (which is identical to the 1979 version)
provides:
(1) Every person who has been, or who may hereafter be, convicted of a
felony or who has been convicted of one or more misdemeanors and whose
sentence or cumulative sentences total 12 months or more, who is confined
in execution of the judgment of the court, and whose record during con-
finement is good, shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be eligible for
consideration for parole. An inmate who has been sentenced for an inde-
terminate term or a term of 5 years or less shall have an initial interview
conducted by a hearing examiner within 6 months after the initial date of
confinement in execution of the judgment. An inmate who has been sen-
tenced for a minimum term in excess of 5 years shall have an initial inter-
view conducted by a hearing examiner within 1 year after the initial date
of confinement in execution of the judgment. An inmate convicted of a
capital crime shall be interviewed at the discretion of the commission. As
used in this section, the term "confined" shall be deemed to include pres-
ence in any appropriate treatment facility, public or private, by virtue of
transfer from the Department of Corrections under any applicable law.
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the illegal sentence corrected. 4 The following guidelines were estab-
lished for the correction of nonconforming decisions:
In correcting the order, the trial court has the option either of mod-
ifying the order to make it legal or of withdrawing it and imposing
a sentence of imprisonment. However, unless a condition of proba-
tion is determined to have been violated, the court may not extend
the term of probation either with or without incarceration, nor may
the court impose a sentence of imprisonment for a period of time in
excess of the original total term of probation. If a condition of pro-
bation is found to have been violated, the court may modify or con-
tinue the probation or may revoke the probation and impose any
sentence which it might originally have imposed before placing the
defendant on probation. . . . In modifying probation or in revoking
probation and sentencing the probationer, credit must be given for
time spent incarcerated pursuant to a split sentence probation or-
der. Thus in modifying a probation order, no additional period of
incarceration may be imposed on a probationer who has already
served one year or more of incarceration. And in pronouncing a
sentence of imprisonment on a probationer whose probation has
been withdrawn because of a illegal probation order, the time spent
incarcerated pursuant to the probation order will be deemed to
have been time spent in prison under a sentence.6 5
Subsequent Applications of Villery
Since the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Villery, the Florida
District Courts of Appeal have affirmed numerous pre-Villery convic-
tions, but remanded the cases to the trial courts for resentencing in
accordance with the direction of Villery.6 6 Subsequent trial court rul-
64. Id. "[A]n error in sentencing that causes a defendant to be incarcerated or
restrained for a greater length of time than the law permits is fundamental. Such an
error can be corrected on appeal or by a trial court in collateral attack proceedings."
Gonzalez v. State, 392 So. 2d 334, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.850 which allows a defendant, who has been incarcerated for a greater time
than the law permits because of a sentencing error, to have the error corrected on
appeal or by collateral attack in the trial court on the grounds that such error is
fundamental.
65. 396 So. 2d at 1112.
66. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 402 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Good-
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ings imposing the split sentence alternative, or incarceration as a condi-
tion of probation, have been carefully framed within the parameters of
Villery.
Several issues have arisen, which involve the split sentence alterna-
tive, but are distinguishable from Villery. The first materialized in
Peak v. State67 where the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to one
count of attempted murder and two counts of burglary, for which the
court imposed a split sentence of five years imprisonment (with a
mandatory sentence of three years for use of a firearm) followed by ten
years probation. 68 The defendant cited to Villery as the authority for
his claim that the order of the trial court was improper.6 9
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant's
sentence was the result of a negotiated plea, and it did not follow a
trial and conviction, therefore they could not "give the [defendant] re-
lief from his bargain without also offering the State the same relief. '70
The appeal was accordingly dismissed without prejudice. The defen-
dant's right to seek relief, if any, had to come from the trial court
where he and the State would be at equal advantage. 1
The second instance in which a split sentence was imposed, but not
controlled by Villery, occurred where the sentencing was pursuant to a
conviction for multiple offenses. Florida's First District Court of Ap-
peal recognized that the 364 day maximum for incarceration, imposed
as a condition of probation, applies only where incarceration and pro-
bation are imposed for the same offense. Such limitation does not ap-
ply, however, to a period of incarceration for a year or more followed
by probation where the incarceration and probation are imposed for
separate offenses. 2
Moreover, in a recent decision, Florida's Second District Court of
Appeal authorized an innovative combination of split sentences in re-
man v. State, 399 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Walker v. State, 399 So.
2d 63 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Webb v. State, 392 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).




71. Id. at 1044.
72. Tobin v. State, 401 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
6471
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viewing the sentence of a defendant convicted of two crimes.73 The
court permitted a hybrid of the split sentence alternative which effec-
tively allowed a period of incarceration which exceeded one year to
precede a period of probation. The sentence imposed was comprised of
two five year terms of probation for each offense, to run concurrently,
with two terms of incarceration as a condition of that probation of 364
days each, to run consecutively.74 The effect was to confine the defen-
dant for two years (less two days) and to subsequently place him on
probation for the remaining three years.
Conclusion
The Florida Supreme Court in Villery expressly limited the period
for which a defendant, convicted of a single offense, may be incarcer-
ated as a condition of probation or pursuant to a split sentence order to
less than one year. It has since been decided that the mandate of Vil-
lery does not generally apply to convictions for multiple offenses or to
convictions through negotiated pleas.75 Nevertheless, the court, in Vii-
lery, has substantially clarified the application of section 948.01(4) of
the Florida Statutes.
James E. Morgan, III
73. Ellis v. State, 406 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
74. Id.
75. Peak v. State, 399 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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Worker's Compensation and the Employee's Right to
Maintain a Tort Action Against the Parent
Corporation. Gulfstream Land and Development
Corporation v. Wilkerson.
Introduction
The plaintiff in Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Wilker-
son1 sustained injuries when he fell into a hole located on the premises
of Gulfstream Land & Development Corporation. His employer was
Gulfstream Utilities Corporation, the wholly owned subsidiary of Gulf-
stream Land & Development Corporation. Following his accident, Wil-
kerson received worker's compensation benefits from his employer,
Gulfstream Utilities. In Wilkerson, the plaintiff was suing the parent
corporation, Gulfstream Land & Development, for owner's negligence
in failing to maintain a safe premises. Wilkerson sought to recover for
his personal injuries plus damages for loss of consortium. The parent
corporation moved for summary judgment claiming immunity from the
independent tort action because its subsidiary had already paid com-
pensation benefits to Wilkerson. The parent and subsidiary corporations
maintained a joint worker's compensation insurance policy and the par-
ent corporation maintained that it should be immune from a tort action
resulting from the same injury that the worker's compensation insur-
ance had already paid benefits for. The Broward County Circuit Court
granted the parent corporation's motion for summary judgment but
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's
decision, and the Florida Supreme Court followed the District Court's
decision.
This case comment will explore the various issues raised by the
Wilkerson decision which allowed a worker employed by a subsidiary
corporation to maintain an independent tort action against the parent
corporation. First, the focus will be on the background surrounding em-
1. 402 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 420 So. 2d 587 (1982).
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ployer immunity in exchange for worker's compensation and will ex-
amine the trend of other jurisdictions' refusal to extend immunity to
parent corporations. This will be followed by an analysis and compari-
son of the conflicting Goldberg v. Contex Industries Inc.' decision ren-
dered by Florida's Third District Court of Appeal which extended im-
munity to the parent corporation.
As in Wilkerson, the plaintiff in Goldberg was an employee of the
subsidiary corporation who slipped and fell while working on the prem-
ises of the parent corporation. Similar to the facts of Wilkerson, the
injured employee in Goldberg collected worker's compensation benefits
from a policy under which both the parent and subsidiary corporations
were jointly insured.3 In each case, the employee then sued the parent
corporation for negligence in maintaining the premises. The parent cor-
porations in both Goldberg and Wilkerson contended that they volunta-
rily assumed the burden of carrying worker's compensation and were
therefore protected from common law liability. The final focus of this
comment will attempt to set forth guidelines a Florida court might use
in rendering future decisions on this subject.
History of the Enactment of the Workmen's Compensation
Act 4
Wilkerson cites Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 5 a 1979 United
States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision based on Kentucky law.
Boggs exemplifies the modern trend of refusing to extend immunity
from tort action to parent corporations in worker's compensation cases.
In Boggs, fifteen coal miners who worked for a subsidiary corpora-
tion were killed when methane gas exploded in the mine. The coal min-
ers' widows brought an action for negligence against the parent corpo-
ration, Blue Diamond, because the parent corporation had the primary
responsibility for "mine safety functions," and because it was aware of
2. 362 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 459
(Fla. 1979).
3. Brief for Appellants, Wilkerson, 402 So. 2d 550; Brief for Appellants,
Goldberg, 362 So. 2d 974.
4. The Workmen's Compensation Law has been revised to read "Workers' Com-
pensation Law." It may be referred to either way within this paper.
5. 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979).
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the dangerous situation. Boggs raised a question of first impression.
The court, in order to reach its decision, looked to the language of the
Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act, its history and purpose, as
well as the general concepts upon which worker's compensation laws
were legislated. The adoption of worker's compensation laws served to
provide benefits in order "to compensate victims of industrial accidents
because it was widely believed that the limited rights of recovery avail-
able under the common law at the turn of the century were inadequate
to protect [workers]. '"" With the turn of the century, the employer de-
fenses of assumption of the risk, contributory negligence and the fellow
servant rule, resulted in workers recovering compensation for less than
a quarter of the work related accidents. Thus, rapid industrial and eco-
nomic growth were permitted at the expense of the injured worker.7
As a result of the injustices that occurred, worker's compensation
laws were enacted so that employees would be able to receive compen-
sation for injuries and employers would be able to sustain that burden
in a equitable manner. The Workmen's Compensation Act created an
exchange of rights between the employer and his employee. The em-
ployer received immunity from possible common law tort action by his
employee in exchange for accepting limited liability, i.e., payment of
insurance premiums. The employee obtained prompt relief by relin-
quishing his tort remedies against his employer in exchange for
worker's compensation benefits. Even though worker's compensation
has remedied many of the injustices that occurred at the turn of the
century, the benefits have remained relatively low. "[In recent years
serious questions have been raised concerning the fairness and ade-
quacy of present [w]orkmen's [c]ompensation laws in the light of...
new risks to health and safety, and increases in the general level of
wages and the cost of living." 8 Kentucky courts have responded to this
concern by liberally construing the employee coverage provisions of the
act and narrowly construing the employer immunity provisions.9 It ap-
6. Id. at 658.
7. W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 619 (5th ed.
1971); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (1971). See also M.
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 251-66 (1977).
8. Boggs, 590 F.2d 655, 659 n.5.
9. See Bright v. Reynolds Metals Co., 490 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1973); Peters v.
Radcliff Ready Mix, Inc., 412 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1967); Cove Fork Coal Co. v. New-
6511Employee Tort Actions
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pears that in Boggs the trend once again, is to protect the worker from
being neglected in the momentum of economic and technological
advances.
The Boggs court referred to Professor Larson's theory in determin-
ing that the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act does not extend
tort immunity to a parent corporation for injuries sustained by subsidi-
ary employees. Professor Arthur Larson's theory states: "[T]here is no
strong reason of compensation policy for destroying common law rights
• ..[and] every presumption should be on the side of preserving those
rights, once basic compensation protection has been assured. . ..",0
When appraising the question of a parent corporation's immunity
from tort liability for injuries to its subsidiary's employees, one cannot
"ignore the development of modern business conglomerates"11 that own
numerous and diversified enterprises.1 2 "Workmen's compensation laws
were passed before the multi-unit enterprise became the norm in the
American economy"13 and therefore do not address themselves to the
question of parent corporation tort immunity.
The employee should not have to relinquish his common law right
to sue in tort merely because the parent and subsidiary corporation
maintain a joint worker's compensation insurance policy. The parent-
subsidiary corporate relationship should not take precedence over the
employer-employee relationship from which the grant of employer im-
munity has evolved.1 4 Where the parent corporation does not have an
employer-employee relationship with the injured worker the theory
upon which immunity from suit was developed is absent. Thus, provid-
ing the parent corporation with immunity from suit would detour the
worker's compensation laws from their intended effect.
comb, 343 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1961); Mahan v. Litton, 321 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1959); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 342.004 (1978).
10. A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.50 at 14-95 (1976).
11. Mingin v. Continental Can Co., 171 N.J. Super. 148, 151, 408 A.2d 146, 148
(Law Div. 1979).
12. Including such commonly known conglomerates as General Motors, Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph, Dupont, etc.
13. Boggs, 590 F.2d at 658 (citing Mingin, 171 N.J. Super. 148, 408 A.2d 146).
See also A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND 377-498 (1977).
14. Davis, Workmen's Compensation Using an Enterprise Theory of Employ-
ment to Determine Who is a Third Party Tortfeasor, 32 PITT. L. REV. 289, 294
(1971).
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Parent Corporations: Are They Separate Entities or Do They
Qualify as Employers?
There are several factors that any court must address in determin-
ing whether a parent corporation is entitled to claim immunity under
the Worker's Compensation Act. The United States District Court of
Tennessee identified many of these factors in Latham v. Technar, Inc.15
when it analyzed the relationship between the parent and subsidiary
corporation.
Although the stock ownership of one corporation by another may
serve in certain instances as an indicia of identity or commixture as
between the two, for the purpose of determining who may maintain
a common law action against a third party, it is not conclusive.
Likewise, the presence of a common insurer as between the holding
company and the wholly owned subsidiary does not automatically
establish a single employer unit, nor does identity of management
create identity for worker's compensation purposes.16
In Latham, the subsidiary held its own separate charter and filed sepa-
rate payroll withholding tax returns. Therefore, despite the interrela-
tions of the parent and subsidiary via stock ownership and a common
insurance policy, the court did not find the two corporations so com-
pletely integrated that they could not be viewed as separate entities.
The court further expressed that the parent corporation did not show
that it was an employer of the decedent. The individual who was origi-
nally hired and paid by the subsidiary corporation was transferred to
work in the parent company's adjacent operation without being trans-
ferred to a new payroll. Furthermore, she was not given notice that she
was working for the parent company. Based on these facts, the court
concluded that the individual was not an employee of the parent com-
pany. Therefore a common law suit could be maintained against the
15. 390 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
16. Latham, 390 F. Supp. at 1037. As support for the propositions stated in the
quoted language in text, the court cited the following cases among others: O'Brien v.
Grumman Corp., 475 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1965); Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, 74 So. 2d 282 (Fla.
1954); Mingin v. Continental Can Co., 171 N.J. Super. 148, 408 A.2d 146 (Law Div.
1979); Brown v. Moorhead Oil Co., 239 S.C. 604, 124 S.E.2d 47 (1962).
6:1982 653[1Employee Tort Actions
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parent corporation'
In Thomas v. Hycon,1 7 a United States District Court addressed
the issue of when the parent corporation's connection to the subsidiary
would establish an "employer status." The court held it could not con-
sider the parent corporation (who was the employer in this case) and its
subsidiary (who was found to be a third party liable for damages due to
negligence) as a "single employer" for worker's compensation purposes.
This result was reached despite the existence of a joint worker's com-
pensation insurance policy because factors indicated the businesses
were separate entities; each maintained separate accounts; there was no
sharing of profits and losses; and there was no proof that the corpora-
tions had joint control over the employee's conduct.
Similarly in Mingin v. Continental Can Co.,18 a Superior Court of
New Jersey held that the presence of a common worker's compensation
policy was not sufficient to establish a "single employer" status and
thus no immunity could be granted from common law tort liability.
Therefore the plaintiff, a subsidiary's employee who was injured while
using a machine manufactured by another subsidiary, was not barred
from maintaining a tort action against the parent corporation. This was
notwithstanding the fact that the parent corporation and all subsidiar-
ies were covered by the same worker's compensation policy.
The same conclusion was reached by the United States District
Court in O'Brien v. Grumman Corp.19 The O'Brien court held that the
plaintiff was not barred from suing the parent corporation by Georgia's
worker's compensation statute "since that statute only bars an em-
ployee from suing his employer.""0 The court found that even though
the corporations were closely interrelated and were all covered by a
single worker's compensation policy, they were separate and distinct
corporations which could not be considered a single employer immu-
nized from common law tort liability. In reaching its decision the
O'Brien court acknowledged the contrary decision in Goldberg, but
stated that "[t]he majority of the courts which have confronted the
question have held that parent and subsidiary corporations must be
17. 244 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1965).
18. 171 N.J. Super. 171 N.J. Super. 148, 408 A.2d 146 (Law Div. 1979).
19. 475 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
20. Id. at 291.
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treated as separate and distinct entities for the purposes of workmen's
compensation statutes."2
The parent corporations in Goldberg and Wilkerson also claimed
immunity from liability on the basis of joint worker's compensation in-
surance, close interrelations of the parent and subsidiary, as well as
ownership of the subsidiary's stock by the parent corporation. 22 In Wil-
kerson, however, the Florida Supreme Court did not find these factors
sufficient to override the fact that the corporations had been set up as
two separate legal entities. The Wilkerson court therefore held that a
parent corporation is not immune from suit by a subsidiary's employee
who has been injured. This was contrary to the Goldberg decision
which allowed the parent corporation to avoid the consequences of its
corporate structure by barring an independent tort action by the sub-
sidiary's employee.
It seems apparent from the case law of other jurisdictions that
courts generally do not favor extending the Worker's Compensation
Act provision of immunity from suit to parent corporations based upon
contentions such as those advanced in Goldberg.23
Florida: The Duty to Provide Worker's Compensation
The Florida Supreme Court in Jones v. Florida Power Corp.,24
determined that the basis for employer immunity from tort liability
rests upon
whether the Workmen's Compensation Act imposed upon the Cor-
poration the duty as an "employer" to secure compensation for
such employees. It is the liability to secure compensation which
gives the employer immunity from suit as a third party tort-feasor.
21. Id. at 292.
22. Brief for Appellee, Goldberg v. Context Indus., 362 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Brief for Appellee, Wilkerson v. Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp., 402
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
23. The court in Goldberg failed to recognize the parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions as separate entities. But see St. Petersburg Sheraton Corp. v. Stuart, 242 So. 2d
185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970), where the court stated that a parent corporation's
ownership of all the stock of a subsidiary corporation does not erase the subsidiary's
identity as a separate legal entity.
24. 72 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
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His immunity from suit is commensurate with his liability for se-
curing compensation-no more and no less.2 5
The Court's interpretation of sections 440.1026 and 440.1127 in
25. Id. at 287 (emphasis original).
26. FLA. STAT. § 440.10 (1979) states:
(1) Every employer coming within the provisions of this chapter, including
any brought within the chapter by waiver of exclusion or of exemption,
shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment to his employees, or any
physician, surgeon or pharmacist providing services under the provisions of
s. 440.13, of the compensation payable under ss. 440.13, 440.15, and
440.16. In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his contract work
to a subcontractor or subcontractors, all of the employees of such contrac-
tor and subcontractor or subcontractors engaged on such contract work
shall be deemed to be employed in one and the same business or establish-
ment; and the contractor shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment
of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcon-
tractor who has secured such payment. A subcontractor is not liable for
the payment of compensation to the employees of another subcontractor on
such contract work and is not protected by the exclusiveness of liability
provisions of s. 440.11 from action at law or in admiralty on account of
injury of such employee of another subcontractor.
(2) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the
injury, except as provided in s. 440.09(3).
27. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1979) states:
(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in s. 440.10 shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third-party
tortfeasor and to the employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of
such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of
compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee, or the legal
representative thereof in case death results from the injury, may elect to
claim compensation under this chapter or to maintain an action at law or
in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death. In such ac-
tion the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused
by negligence of a fellow servant, that the employee assumed the risk of
the employment, or that the injury was due to the comparative negligence
of the employee. The same immunities from liability enjoyed by an em-
ployer shall extend as well to each employee of the employer when such
employee is acting in furtherance of the employer's business and the in-
jured employee is entitled to receive benefits under this chapter. Such fel-
low-employee immunities shall not be applicable to an employee who acts,
1656 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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Florida's Worker's Compensation Statute clearly bases an employer's
immunity from suit on the legal obligation to furnish worker's compen-
sation. Absent an employer/employee relationship, no legal obligation
exists from which immunity can be derived.
The following analysis of section 440.04 must be viewed as an ad-
junct to, rather than a contradiction of, sections 440.10 and 440.11 as
interpreted in Jones. In Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc.,28
the Florida Supreme Court held the owner operator of a dump truck,
who was injured while cleaning his truck as required by the association
of truckers, 29 could recover worker's compensation benefits pursuant to
the provisions of section 440.0430 of the Florida Statutes, because the
with respect to a fellow employee, with willful and wanton disregard or
unprovoked physical aggression or with gross negligence when such acts
result in injury or death or such acts proximately cause such injury or
death, nor shall such immunities be applicable to employees of the same
employer when each is operating in the furtherance of the emlloyer's busi-
ness but they are assigned primarily to unrelated works within private or
public employment.
28. 170 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1964).
29. The association of truckers referred to was Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc.
Members pay an entrance fee and monthly dues for the right to get on the working
line.
30. FLA. STAT. § 440.04 (1979) states:
(1) Every employer having in his employment any employee not included
in the definition "employee" or excluded or exempted from the operation
of this chapter may at any time waive such exclusion or exemption and
accept the provisions of this chapter as if such exclusion or exemption had
not been contained herein.
(2) When any policy or contract of insurance specifically secures the bene-
fits of this chapter to any person not included in the definition of "em-
ployee" or whose services are not included in the definition of "employ-
ment" or who is otherwise excluded or exempted from the operation of this
chapter, the acceptance of such policy or contract of insurance by the in-
sured and the writing of same by the carrier shall constitute a waiver of
such exclusion or exemption and an acceptance of the provisions, of this
chapter with respect to such person, notwithstanding the provision of s.
440.05 with respect to notice.
(3) A corporate officer who has exempted himself by proper notice from
the operation of this chapter may at any time revoke such exemption and
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association of truckers had "voluntarily caused a policy of workmen's
compensation insurance to be issued covering claimant."3' In carefully
reviewing section 440.04 it is apparent that the employer may waive its
exemption for those who do not qualify as an "employee"32 under the
31. 170 So. 2d at 447.
32. "Employee" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 440.02(2) (1979), which states:
(2) (a) The term "employee" means every person engaged in any employ-
ment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express
or implied, oral or written, including aliens and also including minors,
whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.
(b) The term "employee" includes any person who is an officer of a
corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corpora-
tion within this state, whether or not such services are continuous. How-
ever, any officer of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage
under this chapter by filing written certification of the election with the
division as provided in s. 440.05. Services shall be presumed to have been
rendered the corporation in cases where such officer is compensated by
other than dividends upon shares of stock of such corporation owned by
him.
(c) The term "employee" includes a sole proprietor or a partner who
devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership and elects to be in-
cluded in the definition of employee of filing notice thereof as provided in
s. 440.05.
(d) The term "employee" does not include:
1. An independent contractor, including:
a. An individual who agrees in writing to perform services for a per-
son or corporation without supervision or control as a real estate salesman
or agent, if such service by such individual for such person or corporation
is performed for remuneration solely by way of commission:
b. Bands, orchestras, and musical and theatrical performers, including
disk jockeys, performing in licensed premises as defined in chapter 562,
provided that a written contract evidencing an independent contractor re-
lationship is entered into prior to the commencement of such
entertainment;
2. A person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of
the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer; or
3. A volunteer who falls into one of the following categories:
a. Volunteers who serve in private nonprofit agencies and who receive
no compensation other than expenses in an amount less than or equivalent
to the standard mileage and per diem expenses provided to salaried em-
ployees in the same agency or, in the event that such agency does not have
salaried employees who receive mileage and per diem, then such volunteers
who receive no compensation other than expenses in an amount less than
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Worker's Compensation Act and provide worker's compensation cover-
age.33 The worker's compensation coverage in Strickland entitled the
employer to immunity from common law liability pursuant to section
440.11.
In Allen v. Estate of Carmen,34 the Florida Supreme Court again
interpreted section 440.04 to enable "an exempt employer to volunta-
rily assume the obligations and privileges of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act and thereby insulate himself from common law liability...
.M5 The ruling involved the right of a an employer, who has only one
employee, to choose to assume limited liability by providing worker's
compensation insurance, even though he was under no obligation to do
so. The employer in Allen therefore was also entitled to invoke the de-
fense of immunity from common law liability.
The facts in Strickland and Allen indicate that the interpretation
of section 440.04 permitting the voluntary assumption of worker's com-
pensation is based on the existence of an actual employer-employee re-
lationship. Although the employer in Allen did not have the minimum
of. three employees for which worker's compensation is required, he
chose to cover his one employee. In Strickland, the owner-driver was a
member of the association of truckers which arranged his workload and
deducted from his salary its commission and a percentage for worker's
compensation and automobile insurance. The facts in Goldberg and
Wilkerson, however, are distinguishable because they fail to indicate a
viable employer-employee relationship with the insured. Therefore, to
broaden the application of section 440.04, from actual employers to
parent corporations as presented in Goldberg and Wilkerson, would be
an extension beyond the scope of that section.
or equivalent to the customary mileage and per diem paid to salaried
workers in the community as determined by the division.
b. Volunteers participating in federal programs established pursuant
to Pub. L. No. 93-113.
4. Any officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage
under this chapter.
33. The Florida Supreme Court held that Strickland was an independent con-
tractor rather than an employee of the association of truckers.
34. 281 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1973).
35. 281 So. 2d at 322.
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Precedent: Goldberg or Other Jurisdictions?
Florida's Legislature has not expressly addressed the issue of par-
ent corporation immunity. The Goldberg decision, a brief per curiam
opinion without citation to any precedent or authority, shed little light
on the matter. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Wil-
kerson was compelled to look at case law from other jurisdictions.
Those persuasive opinions from other jurisdictions were appropriately
applied to the Florida statutes. It would have been injudicious for the
Supreme Court in Wilkerson to ignore this trend which militates
against parent corporation immunity since the wording of the Florida
Worker's Compensation Statute does not disclose the answer and the
contrary holding in Goldberg is unexplained. 36
Conclusion
The Florida Supreme Court wisely followed the trend established
by other jurisdictions. It found that a parent corporation is not immune
from a tort action by an injured subsidiary's employee who has col-
lected worker's compensation benefits on a policy issued jointly to the
parent and subsidiary corporation. The holding in Wilkerson deals
fairly with the intended effect of the Florida Worker's Compensation
Statute by refusing to grant protection to parent corporations. It up-
holds the principles upon which worker's compensation is based, as well
as considering the changes stemming from multi-unit enterprises.
Given the development of large conglomerates owning several di-
versified businesses, the legislature should modernize the worker's com-
pensation statutes. This would bring the Florida statute in accord with
the trend applied in Wilkerson so that it deals directly with the new
situations arising in the American economy. The legislature needs to
confront the issue of parent and subsidiary corporations and under
what circumstances, if any, worker's compensation laws should grant
immunity from common law tort liability to parent corporations.
It is suggested that a parent corporation could substantiate an em-
ployer-employee relationship and be entitled to immunity from suit by
demonstrating control of the employee's conduct, payment of the em-
36. Contra Brief for Appellee, Wilkerson v. Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp., 402
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
1660 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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ployee's salary, and notification to the employee that it is his or her
employer. Absent proof of an actual employer-employee relationship
between the injured plaintiff and the parent corporation, the legislature
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Is Home Videotaping A Fair Use of Copyrighted
Programs? Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corporation of America
On October 19, 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that private in-home television videotaping infringes
upon copyrights.' The court concluded that an implied video recording
exemption to the Copyright Act of 1976 did not exist and that noncom-
mercial home videotaping of copyrighted programs is not fair use of the
material.2 This decision reversed the lower court's dismissal of the suit
and the court remanded the case in order to fashion relief for Universal
City Studios and Walt Disney Productions. The result inspired the in-
troduction of identical bills S. 1758 and H.R. 4808,1 designed to elimi-
nate home videotaping liability. Subsequently, a compromise measure
was introduced which would make home videotaping legal but would
call for a surcharge to be added to the cost of video recorders and
blank tapes.4 However, due to the widespread availability and accept-
ance of videotape equipment for home use, Congress may respond to
public pressure by amending the Copyright Act of 1976.1 Based upon
existing law, the home videotaper's liability can only be absolved by an
1. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Sony 11].
2. Id. at 977.
3. H.R. 4808, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) is identical in its language to S. 1758,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Both proposals seek to amend chapter 1 of title 17 U.S.C.
to read as follows:
§ 119. Limitations on exclusive rights: Exemption for certain video
recordings:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringe-
ment of copyright for an individual to record copyrighted works on a video
recorder if-
(1) the recording is made for private use; and
(2) the recording is not used in a commercial nature.
4. H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
5. The Copyright Act of 1976 was codified in title 17 of the United States Code.
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act of Congress since it is outside the judiciary's scope to construe the
Copyright Act so as to confer an exemption.' Should Congress enact an
exemption for home video recording, it is probable that it would closely
resemble the existing home sound recording exemption.7
This comment provides a critical evaluation of the basis for copy-
right protection and application of the fair use defense to a charge of
copyright infringement.' The results of the analysis suggest that the
Ninth Circuit in Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America9
correctly decided under current copyright law, that home videotaping is
an infringement. This decision protects the copyright holders' property
rights and ensures an economic incentive for creativity in the arts and
sciences.
The Sony Case
The controversy is caused by the availability of new technology to
the public. Sony Corporation manufactures and markets the Betamax
tape deck which has the capacity to record television broadcasts on
videotape in the home. Universal City Studios, Inc., and Walt Disney
Productions 0 brought suit against the Betamax manufacturer-distribu-
6. See Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.; 'Fair Use' Looks Differ-
ent on Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1980).
7. Congress, in 1971 amended title 17 of the United States Code [17
U.S.C.A. § l(f) (1971)], to provide for the creation of a limited copyright
in sound recording .... However, [in H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), Congress made it clear that ] this limited copyright was
not intended to interfere with home recording: '[s]pecifically, it was not the
intention of the Committee to restrain home recording . . . where the
home recording is for private use and with no purpose of reproducing or
otherwise capitalizing commercially on it.'
Note, Copyright and the Home Video Recording Controversy, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 231,
245 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
8. Barkan, Universal v. Sony: Is Home Use in Fact Fair Use?, 3 CoM. ENr. L.J.
53 (1980).
9. Sony II, 659 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1981).
10. Plaintiffs will hereinafter be referred to as Universal. It should be noted that
the Motion Picture Association of America has joined the original plaintiffs. In addi-
tion Attorneys General from Alaska, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Vermont and Wisconsin have filed amicus briefs in the
United States Supreme Court in support of defendants' position.
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tor," advertising agency,12 four retail stores, 3 and one consumer 4
charging copyright infringement of programming transmitted over pub-
lic airways and freely received by the public.15
The studios claimed protection under the Copyright Act16 and de-
manded compensation. Plaintiffs argued that defendants were primarily
responsible for the infringment since they produced and sold the
Betamax, a device capable of taping their television programs.
At the trial level,1 7 three years passed before District Judge Fergu-
son dismissed the suit and ruled the studios had not met the burden of
proving harm suffered. The court held that in-home videotaping was a
fair use of copyrighted material and thus not an infringement upon
copyrights as held by the studios. Moreover, the court held the Copy-
right Act of 1976 contained an implied home video-recording exemp-
tion. Thus, the corporate defendants were victorious on all counts. To
fully appreciate the trial court's ruling, it is necessary to become famil-
iar with the purview of the copyright statutes and the cases interpreting
their language.
Source of Copyright Protection
The Constitution granted Congress the power to enact copyright
laws "[tjo promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing,
for limited times, to authors . . . the exclusive right to their . . . writ-
ings."1 8 Congress exercised this power by passing the Copyright Acts of
1909 and 1976.19 Copyright owners were granted various exclusive
rights, subject to limiting provisions codified in the Act.20 Motion pic-
I1. Sony Corporation of America.
12. Doyle Dane Bernback, Inc.
13. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Henry's Camera Corp., Associated Dry Goods
Corporation and Federated Department Stores, Inc.
14. William Griffiths was later dropped from the suit.
15. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 443
(C.D. Cal. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Sony I].
16. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
17. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 469.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); Copyright Act of 1976, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976).
20. Subject to sections 107 through 118, . ... the owner of copyrights
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tures are listed as copyrightable property through the Townsend
Amendment to the 1909 Act, passed in 1912,21 and are now listed in
section 102(a)(6) which sets forth the general subject matter of the
1976 Act.22
Statutory Exemptions to Copyright Restrictions
Should the Home Sound Recording Exemption be Extended to
Video Recording?
The Sony trial court28 ruled that although, "[t]he broad language
of the New Act suggests that copyright holders have monopoly power
over all reproductions of their works .. .legislative history does not
show this intent. '24 The court then characterized its task as a search
for specific congressional intent to protect copyright holders from video
recording.25
under this title. . . has the exclusive right to do and to authorize any of
the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phono-
records;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and motion picture and
other audiovisual works to perform the copyrighted
works publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
21. The text of the Townsend Amendment was codified in the 1909 Copyright
Act at § 5 thereby making motion pictures copyrightable property.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1976).
23. Sony , 480 F. Supp. 429.
24. Id. at 443.
25. Id.
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In 1971 Congress limited the Copyright Act to provide an excep-
tion for home sound recording of copyright materials, provided it was
done for private use.26 The revision committee explained that its inten-
tion was not "to restrain the home recording . . . where [it was] for
private use and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitaliz-
ing commercially on it."' 27 The committee concluded that although pri-
vate home sound recordings was common and unrestrained, it did not
pose a serious threat to producers and performers. The rationale was
based on the belief that modern day copyright holders would be in a
position no different from those who owned copyrights in musical works
over the past two decades.28
The trial court in Sony determined the language of section 106 of
the Copyright Act was not to be strictly construed in every instance.
Sony had argued that Congress did not intend to restrict any form of
home taping, since unrestricted taping of phonograph records had pre-
viously been exempted in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). The court recog-
nized, however, the special treatment afforded sound recordings and
construed similar legislative intent for an implied video recording ex-
emption.29 The court based its opinion, in part, on the premise that a
video recording exemption was implicit in the 1976 revision.30
A contrary result was reached by the appellate court in Sony 3'
which focused on whether Congress "intended" to withdraw copyright
protection from broadcasted programs. Specifically their concern was
"whether Congress ha[d] exhibited the intent to limit the rights of
copyright owners in ways not specified in §§ 107-118. ' '32 The court
found the statute to be unambiguous and consequently found the grant
of exclusive rights to be limited only by explicit statutory exceptions.
The Sony court stated that "absent a clear direction from Congress,
[the court should not] disrupt this [statutory] framework by carving
out exceptions to the broad grant of rights apart from those in the stat-
26. H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
27. Id. at 1572.
28. Id.
29. Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429.
30. Id. at 443.
31. Sony II, 659 F.2d 963.
32. Id. at 966.
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ute itself."3 This holding was diametrically opposed to the trial court's
willingness to consider and analogize video recording to the treatment
of in-home sound recording. Since the statute was deemed clear and
unambiguous by the appellate court, "it would be highly improper to
construe inconclusive legislative history so as to apply a statute in a
manner inconsistent with its claimed meaning. '
Obviously, limited copyright protection for sound recordings does
not mandate a finding of Congressional intent to afford the same treat-
ment to audiovisual recordings.35 A major motivation for the special
Congressional treatment of sound recording is that, home recording "is
common and unrestrained today."36 The underlying rationale seems to
be, "[y]ou simply cannot control it."'37 Conversely, audiovisual tape
technology is less available to the average consumer because of cost.
There also exists potential means of controlling video taping by elec-
tronic interference or by control of tape availability. Consider also that
limitations on availability of sound recording cassettes for home taping
would interfere with independent beneficial uses of soundrecording,
such as dictation and private notes. On the other hand, the dominant
use of the Betamax and audiovisual tapes is to record television mate-
rial. Therefore, limitations on the acquisition of tapes would deter the
copying without disrupting independent beneficial uses.3 8
A distinction also exists between the effect of sound recording and
audiovisual recording on the audience. Where a viewer usually will
only view a videotape a limited number of times, a listener's playing of
a sound recording could entice him to purchase the record.3 9 This fac-
tor, although of questionable significance, was considered by the appel-
late court to bolster its holding that the statute is unambiguous and in-
home video taping for private noncommercial use constitutes an in-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 968-69 (citing United States v. Wilson, 591 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1979)).
35. Id. at 966-67.
36. H.R. Rep. No. 487, supra note 26, at 1572.
37. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 445 (quoting from the statement of Asst. Register of
Copyrights, Barbara Ringer before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (June 9-10, 1971)).
38. Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 49, 63 (1981).
39. Id. at 65.
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fringement on copyrighted material.40
Fair Use
The copyright holder possesses a near monopoly over the use of his
works, however, in certain situations the rights of the copyright holder
are subordinated to the public good. "The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors."41
"Copyright itself has been called 'the metaphysics of law'4 2 and
fair use is one of the more elusive concepts embodied in that [area] ."3
To balance the conflicting desires of the public in unrestricted use with
the copyright holder in retaining control, courts have created the fair
use doctrine. The doctrine previously advanced in Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States,4 4 and later codified in section 107 of the Copy-
right Act, creates exemptions to an author's monopoly thereby allowing
public access to the work. 5
Despite codification, the meaning of fair use remains amorphous.
This is because fair use is an equitable doctrine and its flexible nature
defies concrete definition.4 8 For practical purposes, however, fair use
has been defined as "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright
to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner.''14
To apply the fair use analysis, courts examine four factors: "(1)
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
40. Sony II, 659 F.2d 963.
41. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1931).
42. Barkan, supra note 8, at 60 n.42 (quoting Story, J., in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 344 (C.C. Mass. 1841)).
43. Id. at 60.
44. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
45. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Gels Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
47. Id. at 307.
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the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."48
(1) Purpose and Character of Use:
A first step in fair use analysis requires a determination of whether
the purpose and character of the use "is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes. ' 49 It has been held that use of copy-
righted matter for purposes of science, research,5 0 education and criti-
cism 5' constitutes fair use.
The trial court in Sony pointed out that the taping of home video
programs was private and noncommercial. The studio had chosen to
broadcast their programs over public airways and all that resulted from
the videotaping was increased access to the programs. 2 For example,
the home videotaping could result in increased use by those whose
viewing was curtailed by work schedules or counter programming. The
court determined that enforcement of the copyrights would be intrusive
on private rights, virtually impossible to administer and unwarranted
"where the plaintiffs themselves chose to beam their programs into the
homes."53
The Sony appellate court, however, considered copying video en-
tertainment a convenience and convenience does not translate into a
non-profit educational purpose, as required by section 107. Thus, "[t]he
fact that the use involved does not further a traditionally accepted pur-
pose clearly weighs against a finding of fair use." 54
(2) The Nature of The Work:
There is an absence of extensive analysis in case law and legisla-
tive history regarding the second criteria, "the nature of the copy-
righted work."'55 The inquiry should center on whether the nature of
the work was such that "distribution would serve the public interest in
48. Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1352 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976)).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
50. Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1354.
51. Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D. Conn.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
52. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
53. Id.
54. Sony II, 659 F.2d at 972.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
6:1982 1
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the free dissemination of information."56
The Sony trial court refused to characterize the copyrighted mate-
rial at issue as scientific or educational. Moreover, the court was hesi-
tant to label the works solely as entertainment because, "the line be-
tween transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too
elusive."' 57 Therefore, at the trial level, the minimal informational as-
pect of the programs was deemed sufficient to meet the fair use test.
To determine the nature of the work the trial court even consid-
ered whether the studios' distribution system provided free dissemina-
tion of information. It is significant to note that a finding of commer-
cialism arguably would point toward a finding of entertainment, rather
than information. While viewers of commercial television do not pay
directly for the programming which they view, the copyright holders
(Universal and Disney) are paid for the material by the broadcasters
who earn profits by selling advertising time. The studios argued that
this constant infusion of funds subsidized their business. Thus, "[t]he
direct payment from broadcasters and advertisers has made the 'free'
offering to the public very profitable for the plaintiffs. 58 However, as
this case only involved copyrighted material which the plaintiffs had
voluntarily chosen to telecast free of direct charge to the public, the
work was deemed noncommercial by the trial court.59 Nevertheless, the
trial court's detailed discussion of plaintiffs' method of business opera-
tions was discounted by the appellate bench. While the appellate court
determined that business arrangements could be considered in calculat-
ing damages, it decided that they are not indicative of nature of the
work.6"
Case law indicates that the scope of fair use is narrower for en-
tertainment material than informational works."' In a mass copying
case, Rohauer v. Killian Shows, Inc., 2 the court did not find "public
interest in the dissemination of 'The Son of the Sheik' sufficient to jus-
56. Rosemont Enter., Inc., 336 F.2d at 303.
57. Stanley v. Georgia, 344 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
58. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 453.
59. Id.
60. Sony II, 659 F.2d at 972.
61. Id.
62. 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
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tify the infringement. . . . [The court stated]: It can scarcely be ar-
gued here that the enduring fame of Rudolph Valentino or intrinsic
literary and historic merit of the 'Son of the Sheik' . . . serves any
public interests."63 The fictional works which were the subject of the
suit were entertainment, and absent "productive use" mass copying of
entertainment will not constitute a fair use.
(3) Scope of the Copy in Relation to the Original Work:
The third factor involved in fair use analysis is "the amount and
substantiality of the portions used in relation to the whole of the mate-
rial." '64 The general rule is the more substantial the taking, the less
likely the fair use defense will succeed. The scope of the taking obvi-
ously influences the effect the copy has on the market. Thus the scope
factor intertwines with the harm factor producing a market effect on
the original which can be determinative.6
In Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 6 the court com-
mented, "[c]ounsel have not disclosed a single authority ...which
lends any support to the proposition that wholesale copying and publi-
cation of copyrighted material can ever be fair use."'6 7 When Leon was
decided in 1937, the technology of the era had little impact on copy-
right law. However, difficulties caused by scientific progress have
forced reevaluation of the copyright laws. For example, the trial court
in Sony recognized that home videotaping usually involved copying the
entire original, depriving copyright holders of control and the "intellec-
tual property"8 of its uniqueness. The court, however,' concluded such
copying caused no reduction in the market for the original work. 8
Thus, the Sony trial court evaluated all four fair use factors, deter-
mined that the whole copying did not reduce the value of the original
work, and deemed the copying a "fair use".
Assuming the Sony trial court's ruling on the market effect of
63. Rohauer, 379 F. Supp. at 733.
64. Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1352.
65. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 13.05(D) (1982). For a discussion
of the "harm factor" see infra p. 673.
66. 91 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1937).
67. Id. at 486.
68. "Intellectual property" is a term of art; it encompasses work traditionally
considered art as well as copyrighted and patented material.
69. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
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videotape copying was correct, "[t]he mere absence of competition or
injurious effect upon the copyrighted work will not [necessarily] make
a use fair."' 70 It has been argued that absent compelling reason to the
contrary, equity should render the appropriation of a copyright holder's
work without consent, impermissable. However, the mere fact one
desires to copy a program for his own viewing convenience should not
rise to the concerned level of appropriation. Millions of private home-
owners record television programs for their own private use. Modern
opinion appears to be that government (and the judiciary) should im-
pose less regulations on individuals. Despite this wave of sentiment,
courts have viewed the fact that the entire work is copied against the
videotaper (and the manufacturer as a contributory infringer). Thus,
the scope of the copy factor "in the fair use calculus weighs heavily in
[the copyright holder's] favor. '7 1.
(4) The Harm Factor:
The fourth factor in fair use analysis, "the effect of the use upon
the potential market for . . . the copyrighted work"72 weaves into the
fabric of the other three. Although the traditional approach to fair use
considers all four factors, it emphasizes the harmful impact upon the
value of the copyrighted work.73
When considering whether home recording would cause harm to
the market for copyrighted works,"' the Sony trial court evaluated fu-
ture detrimental effects on the potential market for the work caused by
the technological advances rather than assessing the copyright holder's
actual economic harm.7 5 The studios believed the focus should have
been a determination of their property rights. The companies had
payed to have writers and artists create the material, thus there was no
reason for further proof of harm.
Nevertheless, Universal and Sony argued additional potential
harm based on a belief that videorecording would reduce the audience
70. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
71. Sony II, 659 F.2d at 973.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
73. M. NiMMER, supra note 65, at § 13.05.
74. Sony , 480 F. Supp. at 451-52, 466.
75. Comment, All's Fair in Love and Private Video Recording-The Copyright
Infringement Issues in the Sony Case, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 621, 625 (1981).
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pool for original and repeat broadcasts. This belief was premised upon
the proposition that home video libraries made home videotapers a less
likely audience for television reruns and rereleased movies. Reduction
in audience size would result in a decrease of broadcaster fees earned
through the sale of advertising time. Furthermore, the revenue loss
would precipitate lower royalties paid to the copyright owners.7 6
The claim was also made that "time shifting", taping a program
for later viewing, hurts the sale of commercial time because sponsors
realize viewers now have editing capacity. Essentially, the studios
sought preservation of their market share and business practices from
the threat of technology. Consequently, the trial court in Sony was
forced to evaluate whether the fair use doctrine was relevant when cop-
yright protection was tested by the non-commercial use of new technol-
ogy. For guidance the court utilized the approach of Williams & Wil-
kins Co. v. United States."7
In Williams, the National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) and the
National Library of Medicine (N.L.M.) photocopied entire articles
from plaintiff's medical journals and made copies available to library
users. The copying was extensive, reaching approximately 93,000 cop-
ies per year. 8 The publisher of the medical journals claimed that if
readers could obtain an article from N.I.H. or N.L.M., subscriptions
would decrease and they would not be reimbursed for the use of the
copyrighted material.
In resolving the dispute the Williams court utilized the traditional
fair use factors in addition to other relevant considerations. The key
factors in the court's consideration was whether medical research
would be harmed if copying was prohibited. The N.I.H. and N.L.M.
motivation apparently was to make journal articles available to pro-
mote scientific progress. Both agencies made efforts to limit the distri-
bution of articles to scientific personnel whose research would be im-
peded if fair use was inapplicable. The court found no substantial
injury to the copyright holder. The copyright holder's claim that it is or
will be substantially harmed was balanced against the risk of harm to
76. Marsh, supra note 38, at 75.
77. 487 F.2d 1345.
78. Id. at 1348.
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science; the court concluded that the copying was fair use.79 The lan-
guage of the opinion was not forceful and merely stated that the prob-
lem of balancing the interests of science with the publisher's property
rights called for legislative guidance.80 The court demonstrated this by
confining the finding of fair use to the period prior to Congressional
action.
Obviously there was disagreement between the Sony trial court
and the appellate court over Williams' persuasiveness. The trial court
found Williams value to be a "demonstration of the relevance of the
fair use doctrine . . . when a copyright protection is tested by new
technology and noncommercial use."8 ' Conversely, the appellate court
felt that Williams, "straine[d] fair use beyond recognition and under-
mine[d] our traditional reliance on the economic incentives provided to
authors by the copyright scheme."'82 The real value of Williams lies in
its plea for Congressional action highlighting the inadequacy of copy-
right law as a means of resolving disputes born of technological ad-
vances. Furthermore, new technology cases pose difficult damage ques-
tions because the ramifications of the advances often are not
understood. Thus, courts can only guess as to the potential harm.83
The Sony trial court was "hesitant to identify, the probable effects
of home-use copying."'84 As in Williams, the plaintiff's allegation of in-
jury was found to be without merit. Reasons for this reluctance can be
found in the evolving marketing system and the numerous speculative
assumptions upon which a finding of harm must be based.85 However,
"[t]he central question in the determination of fair use is whether the
infringing works tend to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of the
plaintiff's work."86 Home videotapers obviously use copies for the same
purpose as the original. Thus, taping decreases the economic value of
79. Id. at 1354.
80. Id.
81. Sony L 480 F. Supp. at 450.
82. Sony II, 659 F.2d at 970.
83. Calculation of damages and thorough discussion of potential remedies is be-
yond the scope of this article.
84. Sony , 480 F. Supp. at 452.
85. Id.
86. Sony II, 659 F.2d at 974 (quoting M. NIMMER, supra note 65, at §
13.05(E)(4)(c)).
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the work. Similarly, a strong correlation probably can be found be-
tween the decrease in record album sales and the increase in blank
cassette sales.8 7
Sony argued the harm had not occurred and there is no proof it
would. The movie studios often sell their products three times, (1) to
theaters, (2) as a videotape, and (3) to television networks under a roy-
alty agreement. Thus, movie studios are compensated before home
videotapes can be made. Despite Sony's argument the appellate court
remanded the case to the trial level to calculate damages. In copyright
infringement cases a showing of potential damages is sufficient to sup-
port a judgment for the copyright holder and the copyright act provides
minimum damages when actual damages cannot be proven.88
The studios eventually succeeded in fixing liability on Sony Corpo-
ration, Sony Corporation of America, Doyle Dane Bernback, Inc., and
the retail stores for the copyright infringement by the videotape re-
corder owners based on the theory of contributory infrinjement. Under
this theory, one is guilty of contributory infringement if he, "with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially con-
tributes to the infringing conduct of another." '89 Clearly, the corporate
defendants knew and encouraged the copying of copyright works from
television broadcasts. Indeed the primary selling point of the Betamax
product and its primary use is to reproduce television programs. Thus,
combining the knowledge element with the criteria for infringement,
"[t]he corporate [defendants] are sufficiently engaged in the enterprise
to be held accountable." 90
The Supreme Court recently agreed to review the decision by the
Ninth Circuit that home videotaping of television programming consti-
tutes a violation of federal copyright law.91 Attorneys General from
twelve states have filed amici curiae petitions to challenge the appellate
ruling. The thrust of their novel theory is that "[tielevision is no longer
a luxury; it has become a necessity . ..and accessibility to the full
range of television programming is an essential component of the well
87. Id.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
89. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
90. Sony 1H, 659 F.2d at 976.
91. 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14, 1982).
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rounded citizen." 92 Therefore, since Betamax allows increased access it
contributes to public welfare.
The Supreme Court should not accept this approach because the
concept of fair use is grounded in the dissemination of knowledge and
progress in the arts and sciences, rather than entertainment. To deal
with this case the Court should either defer to the legislature or affirm
the appellate courts unpopular application of the law.
Conclusion
The Courts are required to deal solely with the construction and
constitutionality of statutes, not their wisdom. It seems evident that the
continuing evolution of technology will strain archaic copyright law.
The Supreme Court is faced with the unenviable task of steering be-
tween Scylla and Charybdis. The Scylla of enforcing a clear copyright
statute which fails to anticipate the emergence of mass video reproduc-
tion capabilities and the Charybdis of judicially encroaching upon the
legislative branch by liberally interpreting a statutory exception where
one does not exist. Congress should act to make a distinction between
commercially motivated recording and in-home videotaping. This will
relieve the court of an obligation to make an unpopular decision under
the present copyright act.
Howard S. Toland
92. Miami Herald, May 9, 1982, at A6, col. 1 (referring to Missouri Attorney
General John Ashcroft's friend-of-the-court petition).
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The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Ac-
tivities of Two Supreme Court Justices. By Bruce Allen Murphy.
New York: Oxford University Press. 1982. Pp. 473. $18.95.
Reviewed by Arthur S. Miller*
The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection1 is an interesting book, even
an important one. It should forever bury the notion that Supreme
Court Justices, as individuals as well as members of a collegial Court,
are political eunuchs. We all should know that the Court as an institu-
tion is a significant part of the political process, making public policy
for the nation. That is not Professor Murphy's focus. Rather, he shows
in massive and convincing detail how two highly respected and revered
men, who sat on the High Bench in this century, engaged in covert
political activity after becoming Justices. Murphy, a political scientist
at Pennsylvania State University, relates this in highly readable style. I
see two faults in the book-one minuscule, the other major. The minor
fault is a number of tiny factual errors (some are listed below), which
do not damage Murphy's main message but which do bespeak some
carelessness in proof reading and copy editing. The major fault is that
Murphy really does not know quite what to make of his findings.
First, the message: Justice Brandeis kept Felix Frankfurter, as
professor of law at Harvard, on his personal payroll from the time that
Brandeis became a judge. The purpose of this was to permit Frank-
furter to promote causes that Brandeis could not appropriately advo-
cate from the bench. By this means, Brandeis kept his finger on many
of the important public-policy issues of his tenure (1916-1938), includ-
ing New Deal legislation. Frankfurter learned well; his pervasive per-
sonal intervention into the political arena exceeded that of Brandeis.
There was little of any significance that escaped his attention. Murphy
reveals much, but not all, of this.
Next, the nitpicks: Congressman Celler is not "Cellar," as Mur-
* Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University.
1. B.A. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET PO-
LITICAL ACTIVITIES OF Two SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982) [hereinafter cited as
MURPHY].
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phy writes;2 the destroyers-for-bases deal in 1940 could not have been
rejected by the Senate, for it was never submitted to it;3 Lewis Strauss
is Louis in the text4 and Lewis in the end-note;5 he uses the word "ap-
peal" in a generic sense, as a synonym for certiorari;' he seems to think
that "fortuitous" means fortunate7 and that "enormity" means enor-
mousness. 8 There are a few others, but none of substantial importance.
All of this is mentioned, not to denigrate the book but to indicate that
Murphy was ill-served by the editors of a quality press and by those
who read the manuscript. No doubt these minor lapses will be used in
efforts to show that Murphy's main conclusions are invalid. That sim-
ply is not true.
Finally, what should be made of two Supreme Court Justices be-
ing important secret political actors while on the bench? Murphy treats
this question gingerly, even disingenuously. Consider this statement:
"My contention that Brandeis and Frankfurter wielded, in camera,
enormous political influence does not accuse either man of deciding
cases before the Supreme Court to suit his own perception of political
rectitude."9 Murphy asserts, without a scintilla of evidence, that "both
Brandeis and Frankfurter should properly be classified among those
justices who were best able to separate their political views from their
judicial decisions.""0 Well, maybe . . . and maybe not. Can one think
of any important case other than the Steel Seizure Case," in which
Frankfurter, an intense patriot and close presidential adviser, did not
vote for the government? One is hard put to find any. This is not to say
that he always voted for the government; but, rather, that he almost
invariably did so in significant matters. One need not multiply exam-
ples: Dennis v. United States,2 sustaining thought control, and Kore-
2. Id. at 335.
3. Id. at 210.
4. Id. at 51.
5. Id. at 376.
6. Id. at 269.
7. Id. at 210.
8. Id. at 241.
9. Id. at 341-42.
10. Id. at 342.
11. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
12. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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matsu v. United States,13 upholding the penning up of native-born
Americans of Japanese ancestry, in concentration camps, are evidence
enough. His political views, that is to say, coincided almost exactly with
his judicial decisions.
Sometimes Frankfurter wanted it both ways: he wanted to be a
judicial self-restrainer and yet seek, secretly, to alter the vote of the
Court politically. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,'4 a case Mur-
phy does not mention, provides the classic example. There, Frank-
furter-a lifetime opponent of capital punishment-voted to uphold
Louisiana's second attempt to kill Willie Francis.' 5 But immediately
after the vote by the Court, Frankfurter secretly tried to get Francis's
death penalty commuted by the Governor of Louisiana."6 In his concur-
ring opinion, Frankfurter asserted that the standard to determine
whether due process of law had been violated was "that consensus of
society's opinion" 17---an extraordinary statement from one who surely
knew that due process and other limitations on government were placed
in the Constitution precisely because the majority-the "consensus of
society"-could at times be tyrannical.
Frankfurter, furthermore, espoused judicial self-restraint, while as-
siduously practicing the most extreme type of activism as an individual.
This extrajudicial activity is by no means aberrational, as Murphy
notes in his valuable appendix listing such actions by other justices
from 1789 to 1916, but few had the consummate chutzpah to do it
while asserting that the Supreme Court should be likened to a
monastery:
When a priest enters a monastery, he must leave--or ought to
leave-all sorts of worldly desires behind him. And this Court has
no excuse for being unless it's a monastery. And this isn't idle, high
flown talk. We are all poor human creatures and it's difficult
enough to be wholly intellectually and morally disinterested when
13. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
14. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
15. Id. at 466.
16. L. BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 281-86 (1969). Frankfurter's political ac-
tions were, as Murphy details, usually directed toward the federal government. The
Francis episode is an unsuccessful effort to intervene in Louisiana politics.
17. 329 U.S. at 471 (Frankfurter, F., concurring).
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one has no other motive except that of being a judge according to
one's full conscience.18
I have maintained elsewhere that Frankfurter is "the most overrated
judge in this century and perhaps in American history," 19 and see no
reason to alter that judgment. Certainly Murphy's book gives added
evidence to buttress such a conclusion.
Professor Murphy does pose two questions: what standards about
extrajudicial activity existed when Brandeis and Frankfurter were on
the bench, and what standards should there be? The pity is that he
contented himself with asking the questions, not attempting to answer
them. Perhaps that is enough. Perhaps it is enough that he has spent
years in discovering the facts, and then letting those facts speak for
themselves.
Finally, this is, of course, a controversial book. Already one of
Brandeis' idolators, Professor Robert Cover of the Yale Law School,
has lamented that Brandeis was "framed." 20 His diatribe in The New
Republic is at best a cheap shot at Murphy, at worst an attempt to
blacken an important contribution to the literature. Professor Murphy
has performed a genuine service, heightening our awareness of the Su-
preme Court and the judicial process. For this he should be com-
mended. This book deserves to be required reading for every student of
constitutional law as well as all concerned and thoughtful citizens. If its
minor errors are corrected in a subsequent printing, it deserves serious
consideration for a Pulitzer Prize or National Book Award.
18. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 9.
19. A. MILLER, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM
AND RESTRAINT 176 (1982).
20. Cover, The Framing of Justice Brandeis, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1982,
at 17.
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